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The current crisis in mathematics teaching shown by the 
general lack of achievement and interest in mathematics at 
all levels arises from fundamental misconceptions of the 
nature of mathematics and mathematical activity. Poor 
attitudes are generated largely by views of mathematics as 
· entirely utilitarian, or as a collection of abstract 
structures, and ignoranee of the way in which it arises 
from and influences human situations. A considerable part 
of the activity of the mathematician is concerned with the 
consolidation and systematisation of structures so that the 
original problem-situations are lost, and the essential 
dialectic removed. It is suggested that changes in attitude 
can be brought about by a deliberate attempt to introduce 
the historical-evolutionary dialectic presently omitted from 
mathematics teaching. 
To this end, a number of versions of the nature of 
history and historical explanation are explored, and four 
approaches to the hist;ory of mathematics are defined. Views 
of the nature of mathematics and methods of teaching are 
examined, and some models useful for teaching and examining 
the nature and development of mathematics are offered for 
consideration. 
Examples of developing mathematics show the dialectic 
at work, and four 'case studies' are given to demonstrate 
the relevance of history for the teacher at different levels 
in school and college mathematics. 
A brief survey of reports on the teaching of mathematics 
containing remarks on the place of history of mathematics in 
the curriculum leads ·into a discussion of some past and 
current courses and examinations, the availability of sources, 
and proposals for courses for non-specialist and specialist 
mathematics teachers. 
Finally, statements of how and what we learn from the 
history of mathematics are brought together in a series of 
Philosophical, Pedagogical and Methodological implications 
for the mathematics teacher at all levels. 
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SECTION 1. 
. ~ . ' 
Iit.trocta.ction 
(a) Motivation 
The motivation for this study ariaea from two main 
sources. First 9 the common experience 0£ teachers and 
teacher-trainers relating to the majority of students 
in secondary and college education, namely poor achieve-
ment in mathematics. Whatever criticisms there are ot 
~he particular tests applied, there is general agree-
ment in the results that a great many students at all 
levels are less mathematically able than we should expect. 
Considering the proportion of time given to the teaching 
of mathematics in schools, 'in these terms, we are clea•ly 
being much less e££icient than we would hope. Further 
investigations suggest that behind this lack of ability 
lie many complex factors like examination systems, role 
expectations, teaching methods, aptitudes and attitude&1 
My particular concern is, that while we can attempt to 
remedy lack of achievement by improving methods intended 
to teach· content, this is only an 'ad hoc' move 2 and we 
require t~ look deeper into the nature of mathematics 
and the attitudes 0£ teachers and students towards mathe-
matics if we are to arrive at any more substantial answers. 
The second source is within mathematics itself. 
It would be foolish to attempt a once-for-all detinition 
1. Manchester University (1968) is an example ot such 
a study.· 
2. Th~~~ .. in~lude41 ,man~-- •n~w ma~hem~ti!tf~· /a;yllab11Ses aa 
w.ei~-:.a~ sugge~tions tor improving particular topics 
and classroom method.iJ. 
' ' • 
I 
•. 
aDd inclividuals haTe~r•gar.ded it: .1• di'ftuent •ays.e:. Thia 
disparity ia no't necessari:ly a disadvantage, for in the 
very recognition of variety, we have a powerfu1 tool for 
the widening of peoples• apprecia.tions of mathematics. 
The communication of the ways in which this variety bas 
evolved and relates to the needs of individuals and 
•ocieties is a factor generally omitted from mathematics 
teaching. In fact, •athematics teaching has traditionally 
been more concerned with 1 the coJD111unication of mathematic• 




and the application to the phy•ical••o•l4~~ Th• oaitted 
part of mathematics, the dialectic concerned w:l:tli the 
communication of its variety, is largely a historical-
evolutionary study and as such has not yet found a place 
either in the mathematics syllabus which deals with 
•facts•, or the history syllabus which continues to ignore 
a significant proportion of our scientific and mathematical 
·culture. 
In a way, mathematics is itself to blame for its own 
. 
failure to.communicate a large part of its essential 
nature, for the main activity of the mathematics communi-
cator - the consolidation and systematisation of existing 
structures - deletes the original activity of the mathe-
matics creator from the record. Briefly, mathematics 
3. ATM (1967) Chapter 1 contaiD.9 a philosophy of 
mathematics teaching based on the nature of mathe-
mati:ca as an activity, whicb :typ:l:fies aoae more .... •,":. .l. .~ 
















u a ..abjeet iwtd.cJl;·.detmea~ away. 1u~ J(as't, and mathematics 
creators and c'ommunJ;ca:tors uDWi.t'ting1y aubacribei. to· tne 
c011'finuation·. 0£·. this· a.i tuati·on:. It ... · , . ,, ·' 
·The hypotheses I propoae 1 theref'ore, ·is that changes. 
in attitudes (and conaeq_uently· achievement)·5 ca.a. be brought 
about by a deliberate attempt to intro.duce the htetor..tcal -
evolutionary dialectic. hitherto omitted from mathematics 
t·eaching. 6 Appreciation of'.· the history· 0£ mathematics .-
the evolution of mathematics in our culture, and the devel.op-
ment 0£ mathematical conce.pts "'! show this dialectic at. work, 
and can provide a me.aD.Sl for teacher.a at all le\"els to:~ 
develop a~tit·ude._s tow~~~ ma~ematics, wtµch rill help. t.o 
· make it more readily access!ble. to themaelve_s and their 
students. 
(b) Some general pr:oblem&: 
Consider a description of' some popular views of 
mathematics, necessarily crude, but designed to introduce 
4. I do not mean to imply that the roles 0£ creator and 
5. 
6. 
co~unicator are mutually exclusive. 
Naturally changes in attitudesmight a££ect the manner 
and the content 0£ the mathematics taught, so that any 
attempt to quanti£y a comparison of achievement may 
be £undamantall.y impossible, see, £or example ATCDE 
(1965). 
This dialectic is not the same as teaching the history 
of' mathematics, although this latter can play an 
important part in ita presentation. See bel.ow, Section 3 .... 
and Section 5 in particul.ar. 
--- ad .. ,-
aome ot the problems to be considered.? 
·, "!'. .5 . ' . . ...... .. ' 
Two popu.1ar views ot mathematics are what I shall . . 
call the ~~actical a~d the technica1.8 These distinguish 
the majority of users of mathematics in the following way. 
The practical view considers mathematics as a fixed body 
oC knowledge which can be learnt and applied to Yarious 
problems. Generally this requires enough arithmetic to 
enable ordinary computations to be done; simple monetary 
transactions, weights and measures and simple proportions 
and estimations; no algebra, and some rudimentary practical 
geometry of the type used in home carpentry, for examp1e9• 
In addition to this unskilled uae, w~ have the semi-skilied 
use of mathematical formulae in trades and crafts which. 
often requires fairly sophisticated specialist knowledge. of 
some areas of algebra, trigonometry and calculus, together 
with the ability to use particular calculating devices. 
At this low level of mathematical culture parents might 
teach their children to count (in the most elementary sense), 
Wha~ follows is a deYelopment of the views expressed 
in Wilder (1965), P• 283. 
8. I use the word practical to suggest the practitioners; 
the craftsmen, tradesmen, technicians and others using 
elementary mathematics and mathematical instruments. 
Technical implies that mathematics in one form or 
other is used for problem-solving in specific fields. 
9. Arithmetic, Algebra and Geometry are used in their ., 
traditional meaning here. . . . ' . . . ... . -. 
" . ' .' .,. ' . (' ..... .'' 













and in s~ae ~·~~•«!4 1~~~4H11p~ ~~. ~elp: ~th J~~d.ewo!:1'~· Thei~,-0 • 
s•neral inab~l;it.1 to-do_.eJtber .~c:f·q~~tely leads to distress 
and C~ustration tor th~ children, parents and teachers, 
rein1'orcing misconceptions 0£ the nature 0£ mathematics 
and the intellectual capacities required to understand it. 10 
The technical view considers mathematics not only as 
a body ot knowledge, bat also as a collection of methods or 
models which can sometimes be improved and o£ten adapted 
to solve speci£ic problems. Tbis view includes the former, 
practical. approach, but has its specialist knowledge at. 
a higher level, th~t of tile technician, engineer or 
scientist, st~ll .~ing _•athematJ.os a_~ a tool, with little 
appreciation ot the originality or creativity o~ the mathe-
ma tics its el£.. There is, however, an added dimension here, 
that oC mathematical method, or problem-solving by mathe-
matical modelling which is at least implicit in the ways 
11 that such higher-level mathematics is used. 
At this level oC culture we expect most mathematics 
to be available Cor transmission but these seem no more 
saccesstul than others in transmitting even the most 
10. A common experience of mathematics teachers is the 
adult who expresses some guilt at tailure in mathe-
matics at school. 
11. Only in very few cases are pure mathematical models 
co:natJNctecl .. and manipulated here. • Polanyi ( 1964) 
and Daris-: ( 1967>· make- it· clear: that a great deal 
problem~solving in ·man)i- tields. I • , 
I:, r'. 
!I.: 
' .. , 
I 
' , , • ' •"! " 1 ..... ' :, ; ~ .., I ~ ' "" .. ' 
•atic• is equated with harder mathematics and the same . 
aisconceptions· 'ar·e- inherited.· The practical and technical 
views are held by the majority of the popuiation. 
. . 
In contraat to these two popular views is another, 
the intellectual, which recognises that a well-established 
body of knowledge exists but is also aware of the growth 
of that knowledge, and the creation of new mathematics. 13 
This view recognises the existence of particular schools 
of mathematical thought to which mathematicians may subscribe 
at different times, and concerns itselC not only with the 
evolution, but also.the origin oC mathematics and the nature 
of mathematical activity. Thi• view is held only by a 
minority, most of whom are specialist mathematics teachers. 
This group represents the highest level of mathematical 
culture and while it does not necessarily follow that the 
mathematics transmitted by them (outside their professional 
capacity) is any wider in content, there is a chance that 
·• 12. The technical Tiew, generally associated with the profess-
ional middle-class means that on the whole, children are 
generally better motivated to learn and parents to 
instruct them. The largest pressures on teachers comes 
from this social group since professional parents seek 
to preserve the social structure in which they have 
succeeded; but a full discussion of this is beyond the 
scope of this work. 
13. Intellectual• here are intended to be thoae who think about 
••thematics and the mental processes involved in doing 
matheaatic•• Thia i• ia contrast to reaearch ia •(ound-
atioaa• where th• attempt• to tormali•• mental processes 
have evolved into technical diacuasiona. 
the attitudes conveyed will be 1111!ore •,..pathetic. Those 
·~ -:, .• c-'. « 19.1 • ·.;: l.ll ::-~;_. "'l.U l .• • 
ensac•d in •athe•atical research, tor• what •igbt be called 
· n . r ! !. · · . ~. l r- ) .";; . 1 
th• body ot working •athematiciana who usually act like the 
technician, applying, developing and transmitting specialised 
aections oC •athematica, but can adopt the attitudes oC 
the intellectual. On such occasions, considerations may 
concern the methods, or the nature oC the •athematics used, 
but usually only_ occur at critical points in the solution 
.. 14 
oC a problem, or the development oC a theory • . ' 
Most original contributions to the body of ••thematic• 
derive from th• working •athe•atician, but so•e can alao be 
suggested by the technician who, on occasion, has invented 
. 15 procedures or even theories to solve his proble... Little 
oC this1 however, Cinds its way into the general culture 
nowadays except in the rather special Corms of •modern• 
14. These critical points can occur at all levels, Crom 
the contemplation oC a child solving a problem to the 
development oC subtle changes in concepts or the bases 
of prooCs (which generate arguments aa to what is or 
is not mathematics, and what is or is not allowable 
procedure). For further discussion see Section 3. 
15. For example the re-appraisal of the meaning oC function 
due to Fourier's work, Dirac's specially defined 
functions for Quantum Mechanics, ·and the use oC 
logical forms derived from Computer Science by 






. 8. ". 
•thematics.taught ia schoola. 1~ . '• ~ . . "'• ·' u 0 ~ . ' .· . .. •• ti. . ' t :_ .•. .I .·• :• 
The kind.a ot contributions made tall into two broad 
·"' • r : ·• 
categ~ries (i) those adding to the body ot mathematica~ 
techniques and theories and (ii) those influencing mathe-
matical philosophy as a consequence of these new techniques 
and theories. 
The transmission of both ot these kinds of contributions 
to the general culture is practically zero. This is not 
surprising since few mathematicians see this kind of communi-
cation as part of their function, inde·ed academic popular-
isers are regarded with some suspicion by pur~ scientista. 17 
Thus the image of mathematics conveyed to the majority 
of the population is largely practical and technical, and . 
the popular image of the mathematician is one of cold 
precision with intellectual powers not given to the common 
man. 
:~- 16. It might be argued that the use of electronic calcu-
lators is an example of modern mathematica being trans-
mitted to the general culture, but this is only a 







the individual in mathematics already transmitted. 
Such devices do not necessarily increase understanding 
or appreciation, and can often increase the mystery. 
', ~~ 17. The image of the mathematician bas been a cause for 
concern recently, primarily because the low recruit-
ment to mathematics courses and to mathematics 
teaching threatens the security of the academic. See 
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.. 
'!J;· x~est~igat1on'~t'.,..at1t:ftu'.tt~a ·towards' alatheaatics~ J.nt P.oup.s 
0£ st~denta' entering..:teachin:g by'Mauthester University 
' . 
School of Education shows that· the majority consider it 
to be the study of numerical calcu1ationa with practical 
applications and at least halt the' sample view mathematics 
h 6' • 18 wit · dis.a.avour. We might say this implies the practical 
view is held with some idea of technical applications. 
Considering preferred age-groups and sex dift'erences, it is 
no surprise to find that women who are potential pri•ary 
teachers have the poorest attitude ot' all. 19 There i•"· no 
reason to auggest that the situation has aignificantly 
20 improved. 
In a report by members ot the ATCDE, one· ot' the main 
factors investigated is •second-order thinking'; described 
as 'The act of' considering the child's reply in terms of' 
21 
the possible range of' the child's thinking ••• • The realisation 
18. Manchester University (1968)(37-52) 
19. If' this is any indication of' the general position, the 
genera~ view of' mathematics (compared with other school 
subjects) conveyed by mothers to their children must 
be pitiable. See Kerslake (1974) Lumb (1974) and 
Rogers (1974) for a general discussion of' female 
entrants to teacher education. 
20. Recent reduction in teacher entry to colleges may 
raise the general standard, but that is no guarantee 
that mathematics will be any better of'£. 






~" t•111:t1•1'· PD•~• ·OW'D'. attempts at. aolving. prob·l•m•,1:as 
well ••·· regarclii;t& other people, co••s aa a surprise to 
•&nY• It is suggested that this aecond order thinking 
correlates with aathematical ability. originality and 
22 teaching skill. If this ia •Y•n approxi.mately true, 
thtn.the realisation that second-order thinking is possible 
in mathematic• is a vital contribution to a positive 
attitude. One of the ways this might be encouraged is 
by emphasising the evolutionary process, and the cultural 
connections of aathematica. 
Th• aajority of teachers aaintain and trans•it th• 
practical or the technical Yi•• either implicitly or 
explicitly according to the.ir use 0£ mathematics. 23 This, 
together with its abstract nature, reinforces the de-
humanisation of mathematics and the belief in the unchallenge-
able nature of mathematical truth. Teachers of mathematics 
with the practical view are rarely able to engage in second-
order thinking in mathematics, while the intellectual 
approach is beyond them. Thoae with the technical view 
are often in a similar position, though both groups may be 
capable of a high degree of second-order thinking within 
their own subject area. 
Added to this, mathematics is a compulsory subject 
£or a very large proportion of the time a child spends in 
22. Loe. cit. 
Thi• means t•achers of all subjects; the historian 
by ignoring the hi•tory o~ aathematica, the engineer 
by conYeying only rule•• 
i• included in. a7l:l:abusea £or •oti ••Ii wbich '· 
,ue aalaly utilitarian. Becau•• ot thi• utilitarian 
emphasis there ia a great deal of: technique to be trans-
•itt'ed and little time giYen to ways in which children 
aad •tudent• can :find out about mathe•atics. 24 Having 
to endure thia situation can hardly encourage positive 
attitudes. 
Balancing the tormality o:C •athe•atics with our 
appreciation o:C its human and cultural aspect• is one 
11. 
way in which we can tntroduce a broader view to teacher• 
and children. Thia is adTocated by a number o~ educators2 5 
and their proposals suggest three areas tor conaideration. 
i) The development of mathematics as a body 0£ knowledge. 
Thi• can be regarded as covering the history of mathe-
matics, the evolution o:C mathematical ideas and the 
problems ot what topics to choose and bow to teach them 
at various levels. This might seem fairly straight-forward, 
the availability of reliable sources :for the history of 
various topics has improved considerably over recent 
years, and more general interest is being shown by mathe-
maticians and students in the history of their 
24. This does not necessarily mean that the teaching o:C 
techniques should be abandoned (see Section 3). 
25. For example various points o:C view are found in 
Kline (1970) May (1971) Newsom (1972) and Aiton (1972). 
12 .• ' ' - ;r ... 
26 
aabJec~. RoweYer, .ttrhi·l..e • tb41 .-s:t.tu~tioa i• ;coll.ege11.r.ad. 
qiversitiea may be improYing tbe. position.· 0£· the teacher 
in school is much more di£ficu.l.t. Not only ia it bard to 
find time to include any Corm of history in the mathe-
matics curriculum, but while the preaen~ school exadltnation 
systems prevail, pupils are leas likely to be interested 
in non-examinable or less immediatel.y rewe:rding topics. 27 
Within such a system action of official bodies is often 
required to giTe aanction to changes, and this is eYen 
more the case where radical changes lliigbt haYe to be made 
to introduce another subject into the curriculum. 28 
26. I cite as examples the recent increase in frequency 
of articles on the history of mathematics and the 
evolution of subject areas published in journals 
and the willingness of the mathematical community to 
support Journals such as Archive for the History of 
the Exact Scien~es and Historia Mathematica, and the 
Open University Course in History of Mathematics. 
27. There ha~e been examinations in history of mathematics 
at school level (see Section 5), but there is, to my 
knowledge, no syllabus in history of mathematics 
offered by any 0£ the national school examining 
board~ at the present moment. 
28. For example, an official report supporting the teaching 
of the history of mathematics Crom a teachers organ-
isation; er a revised syllabus, as now seems possible 
with the introduction 0£ N and F level examinations. 





I . , ' ' ' .. . . ..r?<'' 
by practising teacher• in~the history ot •a"the•atics, and 
their ma·jor problem appears to be the aYailability ot 
easily usable source of material. 29 
ii) The evolution of mathematical curricula. 
This concerns the influence of the body of aathematical 
knowledge on the mathematics taught• and also the philo-
sophical, social and economic influences that shape the 
demands and expectations that society makes of the education-
al system. This is usually a significant portion of a 
specialist aathe•atics teachers course but empha•i• ia 
given mainly to the atructural aapect or aathe•atics and 
the recent changes in •yllabus content, while the other 
aspects are usually neglected.30 It is. also less 
likely that the college teacher will have available the 
kinds of sources that give accounts of these latter 
aspects 31 particularly with regard to the large 'popular 
tradition• of mathematics education.32 
29. Kno~ing of its existence is the first step, finding 
it 1s quite another. Hallerberg (1969) and Rogers (1975) 
are two attempts to a•sist. (See Section 5). 
30. One sees a large number of studies and comparisons 
of the content of various syllabuses but rarely on• 
on their origins. 
31. Two recent publications are welcome here: Griffiths 
and Howson (1974) and Frendenthal (1974) help to 
proYide auch needed background. 
32. See 'W'alli• P. and Wallis R. ( 1975). 
• 
iii) The formation of mathe•atical ideas. on the individual. 
The individual is here concerned both a• learn.er. and .  
creator ot mathematics. Again courses tor teachers include 
some such study but the main empqasis lies in the area of 
psychology and not in epistemology or a study of the 
origins of mathematics. 33 Investigating the origins of 
mathematics we can be interested in both the evolution of 
mathematical forms 34 and the inception of ideas in indivi-
duals. 35 
33. I wish to make the distinction between the history 
ot mathematics and the origins ot mathematics. The 
former consists of the study of problems, both 
practical and theoretical, and their solutions; the 
latter is the investigation of the fundamental forms 
of mathematics and the ways in which we can recognise 
their functioning in individuals. The origins of 
mathematics has an historical aspect in that we can 
be interested in both the evolution of mathematical 
Corms. and the inception of ideas in individuals. 
(For further discussion see below, Section 3.). 
34. For example, the identification of the origins or 
the evolution of a mathematical concept as in Boyer (191*6). 
35. Both Hadamard (1945) and Koestler (1959) investigate 
this aspect, but neither seem to give a satisfactory 
account. Hanson (1958) on the other hand, produces 
some interesting ideas from the point of view of the 
philosophy of science. Popper's approach is discussed 





Que•tiona. to be· aaked ia tbia-, context iacl:a.~: 
Does a knowledge 0£ the history oC mathematics suggest 
any general activities Cor the classroom which are likely 
to encourage CruitCul mathematical experience ? 
Does the history oC mathematics help us to recognise the 
mental constructs or operations that constitute mathe-
matical experience and are we thereby able to assist our 
pupils to appreciate the nature of mathematics without 
necessarily requiring of them a great deal of technical 
expertise ? 
These three areas have raised a number of problems. 
The history of mathematics course might be better given 
when students have a suf'Ciciently wide knowledge oC 
mathematics to see the significance oC the developments: 
On the other hand, is it possible to convey the spirit 
of the developments in a satisfactory way to those who are 
not mathematics specialists ? Is it legitimate to tell 
historical stories to children, and if so, can this be 
done in both an inter~sting and honest way ? How has the 
mathematics curriculum evolved, and what can we learn 
from a study of the internal and external influences that 
have caused this evolution ? Is it possible, for example, 
to isolate any fundamental factors which can be of use to 
teachers in planning curricula ? And lastly, can the 
investigation of history provide any data for the study 
of the origins of mathematics ? 
None oC these questions can finally be answered here. 
The best that can be done in the following pages is to 
aurvey what has already been achieved and from this •uggest 
a 1lllllber 01' lines 0£ investigation which may be worthy 
•t 1'urther study. 
16 • .. 
Bistort ot liathematics and the Methodology· of 
· Mathematics Teaching. 
Having d~fined the general problem areas we now turn 
to some of the available material to see which questions 
have been tackled and how the history of mathematics baa 
influenced the teaching 0£ mathematics. 
The simple view of history, as a 'study of the past•, 
gives tbe impression that past mathematics baa little to 
do with the present. The reasons for this are aa mucb 
to do with a basically chronological view of biatory36 as 
with tbe belief that only present aatbeaatica i• correct. 
Intrinsic interest in tbe biography of individuals, or tbe 
history of mathematical topics is not suf£icient to persuade 
holders of the practical or technical view of mathematics 
that there is any long-term advantage in spending time in 
the study of the history 0£ mathematics. 
Aspects of mathematical education that appear in 
contemporary courses include the learning of algorithms, 
practice in problem solving, appreciation 0£ structures 
and possi~ly some opportunities to create original mathe-
matics. Rarely, however, do we find opportunities £or 
discussing the activities 0£ mathematics, or finding out 
about matbematics.37 
36. Further discussion 0£ the nature 0£ history appears in 
Section 2. 
37. I do not deny that this occurs in some classrooms but 
there is little official sanction given to this kind 
0£ activity at school level• largely due to th• 
probl••• of '~Si!ralld -~~,11uch activities. 
. ·~ 17-.. 
It seems_ th~t in general t~e. exclusion of history , 
of mathematics from school syllabuses38 is due not only 
to the apparent irrelevance of past mathematics foZ" 
present topics, but also to the fact that a study of its 
history can lead to the discussion and investigation of 
the nature of mathematics.39 
If we consider the range of aspects of history avail-
able we have a two-level structure, the first dealing with 
the •tacts• of history, and the second with the theories 
ot historical interpretation. 40 On the first level we 
can identify biography, and the reference to the first 
appearance and content of proofs, papers, books and theories, 
a kind of •who discovered what' approach, the main emphasis 
being chronological. On the second level we have a 
comprehensive discussion of the development of particular 
topics and the general evolution of mathematical ideas 
41 
where the emphasis lies more on philosophy. 
38. There have been school examinations in history of 
mathematics. These will be discussed further in 
Section 5(a) below • . 
39. Time is another factor but if any subject is agreed to 
be relevant time will be found to teach it. 
40. If teachers have only the practical or technical views 
or are unable to engage in second level thinking their 
confidence in discussing such matters will be impaired. 
41. Crudely, chronology investigates historical ordering 
while philosophy investigates conceptual ordering. 
,- ' i. 
18.· . 
Clearly to be in a favourable position, to study th11f 
history ot mathematics the student (at whatever level) 
must be able to appreciate some philosophical aspects 
su££iciently well. This means that either history 0£ 
mathematics should be excluded £rom courses because students 
are incapable 0£ philosophicai activity, or that it could 
be available in some form in order to encourage the develop-
ment 0£ such awareness and widen the student's experience 
42 0£ the nature 0£ mathematics. 
For the teacher an added dimension appears. Since 
much 0£ the teacher's interest lies in the manner and order 
in which mathematical co:a.cepts are developed in the indivi-
dual, any information which helps to piace contemporary 
mathematics in a wider context, whereby the relative 
importance of concepts and areas 0£ mathematics may be 
judged, can be most useful. While psychology may suggest 
a pedagogical ordering £or certain mathematical concepts, 
this can be tempered with a knowledge 0£ the origins and 
nature 0£ the mathematics itself so that alternative 
interpretations may be possible. 43 Teachers need to be 
aware 0£ the changes in mathematics and the ways in which 
these have intluenced both the content oC syllabuses and 
the views oC psychologists. The interest in the development 
oC mathematical concepts Cor teaching purposes is relatively 
42. Suggestions £or suitable Corms at school and college 
leTel are to be found in Section 5 below. 
1'3. J"or ex-ple, see Section 4(b). 
~.t9. 
recent~.'i ·and signifies an important phase in the. evolution 
of mathematics teaching. 
The change from private and piecemeal mathematics 
instruction to nationally organised mathematics teaching 
began in the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
Commercially based interests45 gave way to more intellectual 
ideals as mathematics became part of the public school 
curriculum, to be accepted, with classics, as an instrument 
of mental discipline. This mathematics included arithmetic, 
algebra, and the geometry of Euclid; the latter a require-
ment for university entrance which dominated school mathe-
matics and the teaching of geometry in particular, until 
46 the early part of the present century. The fight against 
Euclid, initiated by the Association for the Improvement 
44. 'Formation of the Association ~or Improvement of 
Geometrical Teaching in 1871 marks the beginning of 
collective awareness by teachers. 
45. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the popular 
trad~tion was strong and mathematics instruction wide-
. 
spread and in the bands of many 'practitioners' who 
taught the arts of surveying, navigation, accounting 
etc. See Taylor E.G.R. (l'fS"lf.) and Wallis (14?S'). 
46. Significant developments in school mathematics in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are 
sketched by Siddons (1936) and (1956) and Wilson (1921) 
while Hollingdale (1974) describes some changes in 
University mathematics 0£ the time. 
.,.. . .............._._ 
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0£ Geometrical Teaching, (A.t.G.T.) 47 appeared to be 
motivated by a wider appreciation of mathematics as well 
as by the interests and abilities oC the learner.
48 
Gradual introduction oC new content and new approaches 
into a systematic course aimed to show mathematics as 
a connected whole, and a number oC texts were written Cor 
schools by well-known mathematicians in the spirit oC 
this reCorm. 49 
About this time advocates Cor the inclusion oC history 
oC mathematics in school syllabuses appear but their argu-
ments are not very Corce£u1. 50 Later, a more CruitCul 
47. Founded 1871. Rawdon Levett•s letter to Nature of 
26th May, 1870 appears to be the Cirst public state-
ment oC the aims oC such an association. See GriCCiths 
and Howson (1974) p.128. 
48. Wilson (1921) (243-344) 
49. Wilson's Geometrical Texts were Cirst, but Lamb's 
Calculus, Lamb (1897) (Reviewed in Math. Gaz.1 (13) 
1898) is perhaps the most enduring oC these, the last 
reprint being 1949. 
50. The main thrust oC the early reCorms were directed to 
mathematical content and organisation. When history 
was suggested to occupy only an 'outside illustrative 
position' (Heppel (1893)) it stood little chance oC 
being taken seriously. 
21 • ... 
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approach was initiated by Caj~r~5 ~ who produced a text 
intended £or teachers where he claims that teachers should 
not only have an acquaintance with the history 0£ mathe-
matics, but that it provides material relevant to the 
classroom, both in the explanation 0£ content and in the 
application 0£ the 'Biogenetic Law•.52 
51. Cajori (1896) 'A History 0£ Elementary Mathematics 
with Hints on Methods 0£ Teaching'(underlining mine). 
The 'hints' are general re•arka on the importance 
0£ practical work, observation and experiment, the 
logical and psychological di££iculties 0£ some texts 
(especially geometry), and the legitimate use oC 
algebra or arithmetic to solve a geometrical problem. 
52. The 'Biogenetic Law' claims that 'the genesis of 
knowledge in the individual follows the same course 
as the genesis 0£ knowledge in the race' or •ontogeny 
recapitulates Phylogeny•. Cajori (1896) in his 
preface quotes Spencer (1894) p.122. who attributes 
the first enunciation of this principle to Comte. 
See Cavenagh (1932) (78-87). Lakatos (1963/4) p.6. 
attributes the idea to Haeckel. Mathematicians of 
considerable standing at the time use this principle 
to justify the use oC history 0£ mathematics, for 
example Poincare (1908) p.437, and Klein (1932) 
Vol. 1. P• 268, to suggest that mathematics instruction 
should in general be modelled on historical develop-
menta. 
,J. .U. L £ I •. • 
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The work'.' of D.E. Smith on the Teaching of Elementary 
Mathematics 53 bas a strong historical bias. He intends 
to help teachers "•• to know something of these great 
questions of teaching, - Whence came this subject ? Why 
am I teaching it ? How has it been taught ? What should 
I read to prepare for my work ? The subject is thus 
considered as in a state of evolution, while comparative 
method rather than dogmatic statement is the keynote.u 54 
The growth of arithmetic, algebra and geometry is considered 
in turn, so that some statement of the nature of these 
subjects and reasons Cor teaching them may be made. 
Surveys of teaching methods then suggest necessary revisions 
of the syllabus and the approaches that might be used.·The 
final chapter "The Teachers Bookshelf"55 contains references 
to books and periodicals in the History of Mathematics. 
While Cajori's work was clearly a version of the 
elementary part of his larger History of Mathematics 56 
with some added sections on school texts and teachers' 
organisations, and a largely implicit philosophy in the 
'hints'; Smith's is much more down to earth - a concise 
53. Smith D.E. (1900) The Teaching of Elementary Mathematics 
the first American textbook on the teaching of mathe-
matics (Bidwell & C1ason (1970) p.120). His better 
known History of Mathematics (1925) and Source Book 
in Mathematics (1929) were largely motivated by a 
desire to make both the history of mathematics and 
some of the original work o'C mathematics more widely 
accessible. 
Under 1 ining mine·. Smith ( 1900) p. v:fl,;t.~ 
S•ith (1900) (297-305) 
Cajori (1894) 
'! 23. 
argument from_ a trainer of teachers. The general philosophy 
of Smith's work is indicated by the following remarks 
from the Editor's i~troduction, "Mathematics ••• studies 
an aspect of all knowing and reveals to us the universe 
as it presents itself, in one form, to mind. To apprehend 
this and to be conversant with the higher developments of 
mathematical reasoning, are to have at ban~ the means of 
vitalising all teaching of elementary mathematics. In 
the present book, the purpose of which is to present in 
simple and succinct form to teachers the results of 
mathematical scholarship, to be absorbed by them and 
applied in their classroom teaching, the author has 
wisely combined the genetic and the analytic methods. 
He shows how elementary mathematics has developed in 
history, how it has been used in education and what its 
inner nature really is."57 
Smith's use of history, to investigate the 'inner 
nature' of mathematics and then to see how best this can 
. 8 
be communicated, has much to commend it. 5 
The influence of new attitudes to learning is clearly 
seen in the works of Benchara Branf'ord?9 Here the central 
preoccupation is the balancing of theoretical and practical 
work where " • • • all the branches of elementary mathe-
matics, pure and applied, theoretical and experimental, 
57. Smith (1900) (xi-xii) 
58. The method of investigation is fundamentally independent 
of any particular philosophy of mathematics or of 
teaching. It is the data from which these are constructed. 
See below. Sections 2 and J. 
59. Branf'ord (1908) 
' and uses its mathematical conceptions and processes as a 
. r 
beautiful, well-ordered and powerful whore,· ins~ead of a 
thing of shreds and patches.n60 Intending to give practical 
and theoretical advice to all teachers of mathematics', be 
suggests a realistic approach and states that, "All 
educational principles are, in effect, ideals; and the 
degree in which they are realisable must depend upon · 
; actual circumstances ••• The realisable is ultimately the 
.•. ., 
,. 
resultant of two forc~s - the strength 0£ the ideal' and' 
the resistance of the actual. n 6~1 He is of the opini:on 
that mathematical history has had little influence on 
teachers, and "••• has rarely been interpreted as an 
integral part of the historic movement of racial experience •• n
62 
In view of his advocacy of the biogenetic law, a knowledge 
of history is essential to teachers. The influence of 
current theories of child development63 and the recent 
struggles of the A.I.G.T. are clear in his statement of 
some of the fundamental conditions of teaching: 
"I. The pa~ticular mathematical experience which forms 
the material of the educational process must, at every 
stage, both in quantity and quality, be appropriate to the 
60. ibid p. (vii-viii) 
.;. 61. ibid P• (ix) Branford was a school inspector at this 
time, in a good position to know the practical and 
beauracratic difficulties facing a zealous teacher. 
~~~ ibid P• (~~ We might_ share t~i~ .. ~fi&fo~ ~ven .. todaJ:~. 




to' the present capacity of'. -the individual wtio''is ·expected 
to a11simi1ate. it·. . .. 
!!•The correlation between the different branches of' past-
mathematics themselves, and between these latter and' the 
manifold applications of mathematics must be natural, 
closely interdependent, interesting and continuous throughout.n64 
These conditions are achieved in theapplication of the 
biogenetic principle (called culture-epoch principle by 
Branf'ord): "The path of moat e.:ffective development of 
knowledge and power in the individual coincides, in broad 
outline, with the path historically traversed by the· race 
in developing that particular kind of knowledge and pover."
65 
Obvious and simple as it may seem, this principle can 
be attacked on psychological, historical and mathematical 
grounds. Likening the infant's mind to an animal's and 
judging past mathematics in terms of contemporary theories 
for example, are views unacceptable today. However, whether 
such theories are acceptable or not, the appearance of this 
book, and others of a similar nature shows that the teaching 
of mathemat~ca is becoming a significant field of study • 
. 
The use of history in teaching mathematics is further 
developed by Toeplitz66 who advocated the •genetic' approach 
in his textbook on calculus. The genetic approach was an 
attempt to answer questions concerning the motivations for 
theorems, definitions and techniques in mathematics text-
~ books and syllabuses by showing their historical derivation. ,, 
. ' 
64. Branford (1908) p.243 
65. ibid p.244. He claiD!'!.-~~~ _y~~idity of this principle 
i's tiorne ou.t by te-acher'S t..,exj)4sriencit as --~l -as•.tti;e. 
opinions of a number of philosophers, scientists and 
.. · ... 
educators. 
66 • Toeplitz (1963) 
1





Toepli tz takes the iiilportani:":- -.a-'themll't1ca1·"; i.deas - :1.11·1 the 
context of contemporary development·- as concepts. torbe~~ 
' exp.lained by examinat·ion of a number of aspects of a parti-
cular concept as it developed in· the past. His aim is 
"··.. to select and utilize Crom mathematical history only 
the origins of those ideas which came to prove their value ••• 
It is not history for its own sake in which I am interested, 
but the genesis, at its cardinal p'oints, of problems, facts 
and proofs. 1167 Thus the content, structure and level of 
rigor is decided by contemporary standards, and History is 
used to provide explanations of the •why' and 'how' ques.tions 
that arise. 
For example, the fi:rat chapter on "The Nature of the 
68 ' 
Infinite Process" begins with @reek infinitesimal ide~s, 
the appearance of irrationals, and an intuitive theory of 
, . 
. '' infinite processes. The theory of proportion is. then intro-
duced to motivate a continuity axiom which makes the method 




number has its origins in Greek mathematics, and Archimedes• 
measurement of the circle is seen as the first step in· the 
development of trigonometric formulae and infinite series 
for the calculation of functions of angles. All this is a 
preface to the real purpose of the chapter, a discussion 
of infinite series and modern definitions of limits and 
Ji. convergence. Toeplitz' aim is a clear exposition of what 
be considers to be the basic concepts and hence does not 
always either follow the historical development or use 
historical ideas. 
67. ibid. p.(v). The outline df his idea was ·£irat; 'gi.Yen- .. 
in 1926. 
68': ibid ( 1-42) 
. . 
I. ... ' - ~ 
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While the advantages of this approach encourag&. 
•tudents to realise that mathematics has a history, the -
disadvantages include the strong implication that past 
mathematics was only an imperfect form of present theory, 
and the deletion of a great deal of material, bothmatbematical 
and cultural, due to the prevailing fashions in theory and 
intentions of the author. 69 
The pedagogical lectures of Felix Klein, translated 
as "Elementary Mathematics from an Advanced Standpoint"70 
first appeared in 1908 and contained a large number of 
references to the history and development of mathematics. 
In considering the content of mathematical curricula, 
Klein identifies two approaches: "Plan A is based on a 
{ more particularistic conceetion of science which divides 
the total field into a series of mutually separated parts 
and attempts to develoe each eart for itself ••• its ideal 
is to crystalise out each of the partial fields into a 
logically closed sxstem ••• Plan B lays the chief stress 
upon the organic combination of the partial fields, and 
upon the st.imulation which these exert one upon another" • 
• 
The ideal here is "the comprehension of the sum total of 
mathematical science as a great connected whole." 71 He 
compares the current school syllabus to 'plan A' and advocates 
the adoption of 'plan B' as a basis for reorganising the 
content and methods of mathematics teaching. 72 
69. For further remarks on fashions in mathematics see 
Section a(.b). 
70 •. Klein (1932/9) 
71. Klein ( 1932/9) Vol I p.78. Under;.-UO~ in these quota-
tions is italics in Khein's text. 
72. Klein is, of course, referring to German school syllabuses 
but bis remarks could well have been echoed in England. 
::c. 2s· '. . 
In order to gain a 'complete understanding ... 0£ the j ·;· -n·1 
developm&nt of mathematics', Klein introduces a third 
rl 'plan c• which is the algorithmic process, described as· 
'-: 
:.;" 
"a quasi-independent, onward-driving Corce, inherent in 
the Cormulas, operating apart Crom the intention and insight 
of the mathematician, at the time, oCten indeed in opposi-
tion to them. 1173 
Using these three plans, he then proceeds to analyse 
mathematical history, stating the dominance oC plans •·At , 
'B', or •c• at diCCereat times in the past. 74 His closing 
remarks in this section suggest that since school mathe-
ma tics has bee·n for so long under the influence of 1 plan A• 
any'reCorm must come Crom a swing to the most universal 
'plan B1 where: "In this connection I am thinking, above 
all, oC an impregnation with the genetic method of teaching, 
oC a stronger emphasis upon space perception, as such, and, 
particularly, oC giving prominence to the notion oC £unction, 





ibid (79-85)• This particular kind oC exercise can be 
regarded as a •mathematical' analysis oC history Crom 
Klein's own viewpoint. A similar analysis appears 
in Bontroux (1955) who appears to have had some 
inCluence on Piaget. See Section 4(c). 
75. ibid p.85. The translator oC Toeplitz (1963) connects 
Klein's plan with Toepiitz• intentions in the descript-
ion 'genetic 1 • 
Not only do· we: have here 'a belief'· in: tbe,~releYance of history 
for mathematics teaching in -genera1, but. alao a' clear. 
indication of the importance oC the structura·l Yiewpoints 
Cor the improvement oC curricula derived Cro~ a wide 
knowledge of the deYelopments in.nineteenth century mathe-
matics. 
While Klein's suggestions Cound acceptance because 
oC his stature as a mathematician, other in€luences Crom 
; 
outside mathematics were already at work contributing·to 
the cultural background and easing the task of the innovator. 
The theories 0£ Froebel and the work o·:f' Peat·alozzi have 
already been mentioned,76 but apar't £rom educational theory 
some purely political and economic decisions had been made 
by governments to reorganise their education systems and 
provide the means to supply their nations with mathematicians, 
engineers, scientists and soldiers. 
The Coundation oC the Ecole Polytechnique aCter the 
French Revolution77 and the reorganisation oC Prussian 
education in the early nineteenth century78 are examples 
76. See Note 63. 
77. Napoleon oCCicially recognised the importance oC 
mathematics to military training, particularly in 
artillery and engineering. We associate many leading 
French mathematicians with this establishment, both as 
teachers and as Cormer pupils. 
78. Gerstell (1975) suggests a l.ist oC some €i£ty mathe-
maticians :Crom 1716 to 1875 who coul.d: have been 
encour~ged: iin so•e· way; ·by a1ich a· move·. 
0£ the encouragement of the deT .. lopment ot •athematic11· 
for political encts. 79 Although a large amount of pure 
research derives Crom such situations the view oC the 
politician is largely practical or technical, in desiring 
the results oC the applications oC mathematics. Thus, 
while the status oC mathematics in the culture may rise, 
the general view of the nature of mathematics Cor the 
. . t . . 80 ma3ori y remains a practical one. 
What teachers need to realise is that mathematics 
teaching has a history and that a study oC the inf'luences 
on the curriculum.and methods oC teaching both Crom within 
and.without mathematics can provide insights which may be 
useful in the wider professional sense.
81 
79. It would be rash to suggest that the work oC parti-
cular mathematicians is the result of such political 
decisions, the most outstanding would probably have 
flourished in any case. On the other hand, official 
encouragement has an obvious effect upon an individual's 
circumstances, and the general status oC mathematics 
in the culture. 
80. The social history of mathematics cannot be investigated 
in detail here. Wilder (1965) and (1968), Curtiss (1937), 
Dresden (1942) and Fisher (1966) contribute in various 
ways to the idea that mathematics does not arise only 
Crom internal problems or Crom problems associated 
with science, industry or commerce. Further remarks 
on this subject can be found in section 2.(b) 
81. Some Cundamenta;t a~guments will be sketched in Sections 
2 and 3, while Grit£it~s & Howson (1974) contains 
much material ot a more general nature. 
It' is easy to collect recommendations tor the Yalui 
ot the history of mathematics for teachers and pupils,82 
and a summary of these may be made under the headings of 
Chronological, Logical and Pedagogical reasons. 8 3 
Chronological Reasons 
These deal mainly with historical facts about defini-
tions and names and the general sequence and timing of 
82. An early exhortation is Heppel's (1893) address to the 
A.I.G.T., and a number of reports of the Mathematical 
Association contain reference to the usefulness of 
historical material in specific contexte, for. example 
in the Secondary School (1959) or in Calculus (1951). 
These uses tend to be either as biographical anecdotes 
and general background, or fairly specialised subject 
history. Notoble exceptions are the M.A. Report on 
. Mechanics (1965) where some of the wider issues are 
suggested, and the I.A.A.M. (1957) where the sections 
on history and philosophy ot: mathematics, emphasise 
history and questions of the nature of mathematics as 
a part ot: mathematics teaching. The Ministry of 
Education (1958) pamphlet contains and elaborates 
many ot: the previous arguments and concludes (p.154) 
that mathematics can only be taught and understood 
properly against a background ot: its own history. 
These points will be reviewed in Section 5. 
83. These beadings are taken from Jones (1969) and the 
following summary includes the reasons given in 
Ministry of Education (1958) (134-154). 
'. 
"' ' -.. 
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dJ:1irfoi'eries:z!i) B.°'J~e~ we tind· reascins to~· the p:sychol~gical . ·;;~1 -· 
basl.Jl of' ·iiatbemat"ical· systems"' the Jieceissi ty ot det'irii tions"' 
and the arbitr~rines~ of undefined terms. For example, 
the eYolution of the meaning ot' the word •number• can be 
traced, shoving the dif'terent ways it bas been interpreted 
or understood. 
Logical Reasons 
Here we consider the derivation ot axiomatic systems 
and mathematical structure in general, the development of 
8't 
forms of proof and the mistakes, paradoxes and contro-
versies t·bat have arisen in mathematics. Illustrationa 
here include many techniques used to solve· problems long 
before the methods employed were supplied with logical 
t:oundations. 
Pedagogical Reasons 
The reasons given here Call into three areas concerned 
with content and methods, cultural connections and the 
nature ot: mathematics. 
Content and Methods include the ideas that historical 
knowledge ~ay help in the selection, presentation and 
connection ·ot mathematical topics in the curricul~, and 
that knowledge oC patterns oC discovery may improve a 
teacher's heuristic method. Knowledge of history also 
provides illustrations of the development of' mathematical 
models and the applications oC ideas unf'orseen at the 
time of their inception. 
83. These headings are taken £rom Jones (1969) and the 
following summary includes the reasons giYen in 
Ministry of' Education (1958) (13'1-151'). 
8.lt. An outstanding1example Crom a largely logical point 
of' Yiew is given by Lakatos (1962/3). 
.--,-
··•, ,,_ 
Cul.tural connections can be made by discussing the relations 
between mathemat.ics and other subject areas and the various 
• • 
stimuli for mathematical ideas. The way in which mathematics 
has influenced the culture, both in its applications and 
modes of thought are also to be included here. 
The mathematicians views of the nature 0£ mathematics 
change with time and the realisation of this fosters 
intellectual curiosity and dispels £ear by suggesting that 
mathematics can be questioned. 
These claims all raise further questions: 
i) What is the nature of history that it is claimed to 
be such a significant yet absent factor in mathematics 
education, and what general approaches are possible ? 
ii) How does mathematics relate to our culture and how 
are we able to descr~be the evolution of mathematical 
concepts in cultural terms ? 
iii) Does a critical philosophy of mathematics, which 
includes historical data, provide models useful for the 
teaching of mathematics ? 
iv) Is it possible to isolate any fundamental ideas, 
activities or processes from mathematical history which 
may be used as a basis Cor the development 0£ the mathe-
matical curriculum ? 
These questions will be examined in more detail in 
the following sections. 
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From History to History 0£ Mathematica 
a) 1.Understanding and Explanation. 1 
- • f." f •. f'-"."' 
The process 0£ understanding and explaining 
events is an activity common to history and to science. 
Since the growth 0£ the interest 0£ scientists in History 
0£ Science and the Philosophy 0£ History, attempts have 
been made to £ormulate a philosophy 0£ history which is 
seen to be •scienti£ic' by employing scienti£ic method to 
£ormulate generalisations about historical events. 
It seems to me that attempts to produce a scienti£ic 
< method £or history (at least in the traditional sense) 
,_ 
arise £rom misunderstandings about the nature 0£ the 
activities 0£ understanding and explanation in history 
and in science. Most 0£ the study 0£ history 0£ science 
is carried out by scientists who carry over much 0£ the 
methodology £rom science to history. The criteria £or 
f judging 'good' £rom 'bad' history 0£ science are o£ten 
more scienti£ic than historical. 
In order to produce a scienti£ic method £or history 
it is argued that the nature and purpose oC understanding 
and explanation are the same both in history and science. 
I claim that not only are they di££erent, requiring di££er-
ent modes 0£ thought, but that in the traditional sense 
1. The notes in the £irst parts 0£ this section on the 
nature 0£ the study 0£ History and 0£ History 0£ 
Science £ollow the di££erent types 0£ historical 
explanation to be £ound in Dray (1957), Walsh (1958), 
Carr (1964) and Hempel (1965). The extensions 0£ these 
ideas into History 0£ Mathematics are my own. 
. ' 
'•cientific ••thod' produces a restricted Yiew oC the . ' 
nature of scientific enquiry. 
This discussion leads into one ~oncerning the nature 
of the history of mathematics, suggesting reasons why 
one might study it, four styles of interpretation, and 
what one might learn from such a study. 
2. Events and explanations. 
History is concerned with the study of the human past 
and is interested in the activities of individuals, but 
not totally •r exclusively in their activities. These 
activities are of interest to the historian only insoCar 
as they have what one might call significant consequences. 
It is, of course, part of the historians task to decide 
what the significant consequences are and which activities 
2 led to them. It is said, then, that the task of his~ory 
is to establish and understand the facts. This involves 
the historian in giving explanations. 
Because of the apparent similarity with science, it 
is held by some that we are able to use historical explanation, 
the explanation of f.!!! events, as a guide to future action. 
k.e. tha~ in some way we can learn from historyJ 
We may be able to learn from history, (~ we learn 
and how will be discussed later) but this first crude 
generalisation is generally considered to be unjustified. 
2. It is worth noting that since history can be said to 
deal with unique events, the significance of events 
and their consequences may change radically due either 
to new evidence being discovered or a change in the 
culture, attitudes, philosophy etc. oC the historian. 
In thi• sense history is lesa permanent than acience. 
(I••• historical explanations can be more easily 
changed than scientiCic ones.) 
.36 •. ' 
3. Explanationa and Laws. 
ScientiC:k:explanation concerns events which are 
predictable since they are considered to occur as ill8tancea 
oC general laws. These general laws are considered to be 
universal empirical statements, and their construction 
conforms to a standard deductive pattern. Having formulated 
a law in science we are then in a position to say when a 
particular series of events may lead to a certain outcome. 
This at least is the standard picture of scientific explan-
ation and the model to which scientific history should be 
considered to conform.3 
Historical explanation aims (in aome respects at least) 
at showing that an event was not merely a matter of chance; 
that in some sense it had to happen, or that.it was not 
surprising that the event did happen. 4 IC this ia true 
historical explanation has at least a deductive aspect, 
even if some would not admit it to be wholly deductive. 
This kind of explanation gives reasons (a reasonable 
explanation) for the particular course of events turning 
out as it did. Clearly, one can argue that a certain amount 
of hindsight is necessary to furnish explanations at this 
level. 
It is important to note that most historians claim 
that prediction is not attempted in au historical context -
what predictions occur are really in some other area. 
A large part of economics, for example, can be thought of 
3. It might be argued that we also make generalisations 
when we are unable to produce a law. 
' '· 
~. Other ways oC considering historical explanation will 
be discussed later in this section. 
a• hietory in this predicttY• sen••· 
This kind of explanation I will eal.l retroapecti't!e:-
deducti ve, because it is concerned with demonstrating why 
a particular event or series of events had certain conse-
quences. This is only possible after the events have 
occurred, by the very nature ot historical enquiry. 
Historical explanation does not deal tn generalisations 
or universal statements. 
4. The Uniqueness of Historical Events. 
The laws of science apply to kinds of events, and 
aspects of the event• so classified are essentially regular 
and repeatable. 
It is argued that classifying events in this way leads 
to a destruction of history. Historical events may be 
classified (for example, a •revolution•) but the kind of 
classification involves a general conceptual framework, or 
a structural procedure (the French revolution, Industrial 
revolution, Copernican revolution etc.), rather than a 
precisely identifiable sequence of events. 
With the.emphasis on the uniqueness of historical 
. 
events one mode of explanation ha• been to try to give more 
complete details of the events. (This, taken as an ideal, is 
the basis of the Inductive theory oC history. The more 
complete detail we give, the more inevitable or obvious 
the result.) This position may at first appear attractive 
but is philosophically untenable if only because of the 
problems it poses concerning the nature and status of what .. 
may be admitted as detail or evidence. 
Tb• historian •i•h•• •o aohi••• a reasonable explan-
ation Eretraspecti••-deductiT• ), on. tbe streagtb ot what 
in the •oieuti•ts '• terms is •inimal evidence (i.e. only 
f#o' ;8 • 
.J ~· • 
!!! event}. In giYin.g thi• explanation, al.l· ki~da. of; 
scientific laws are implied. The historian ~owever., i-• 
not making laws, but using them in a rather special way. 
It is the intention with which a law is used that decides 
the status of' the result of' its application, and the laws 
of' science, as applied in history (e.g. in sociology, 
economics, psychology, physics, astronomy, meteorology 
etc.,) are generally used in a secondary - even unimportant -
role to make the explanation reason - able. In many cases 
the 'laws' invoked are more like commonsense principles 
than acientif'ic f'acts. 
It may be argued that such a conglomeration ot scientif'ic 
laws will in f'act produce a logical conjunction which may 
be regarded as a new law, manuf'actured, as it were, f'rom 
the others. Apart f'rom the logical dif'f'iculties involved, 
we should bear in mind that it is not the historians 
intention to mana.f'acture such laws, least of' all to test 
them in anything approaching a scientif'ic way.5 
The scientist is not interested in events as unique 
events but a- prospective member• of' a class of' events 
. 
to illustrate a universal statement. In a rather special 
sense, also, the universal statement may be anticipated 
bef'ore many events are investigated. Scientists admit to 
concentrating on particular aspects of' complex events in 
order to obtain repeatable observations. 
The historian, interested in the unique event, is 
There is also the possibility of' obtaining an explan-
ation reasonable to an historian, but which might use 
laws deriYing trom l•gically incompatible scientific-
theories. 
also interested in the complex detail su.rroun~ing them, as 
a means to giTing, ideally, a complete explanation, or more 
realistically, a plausible story, but the ideal of historical 
explanation suggested is never reached. 
5. The Flow or Continuity of Events. 
Another aspect of historical explanation is to consider 
the flow or the continuity of events. (The word pattern is 
often used in this context, but obviously in a very different 
way from the use of pattern in establishing a scientific 
law.) Another way of suggesting the structure sought here 
is to use ideas like the interweaving or the interrelations 
of events. The historians intention here is to show how 
one event follows from another, or how one follows (i.e. 
is the result of) many others. While the historian may be 
able to give what he considers to be a reasonable explana~ion, 
it is difficult to define precisely how events are related 
to each other, and so any scientific explanation meets 
with difficulties. 6 
As before, a complete explanation is impossible in 
principle, n..ot only are the precise connections between 
the events impossible to define precisely, but much of the 
(historical) evidence is lost. 
6. The Rationality of Actions. 
This kind of historical explanation consists in the 
historian somehow putting himself in the mind ot the person 
(or persons) involved, or knowing someone else's thinking. 
The historian here must re-think the agent's thoughts to 
6. This is another aspect of retrospective-deductive 
explanation where the historian is using general laws 
to give a reasonable explanation. 
1:1:.P ... 
• - f'rom the agent• s point of' .view - what wa,s the thing 
at the time. If' this is possible to any degree, 
the historian's activity consists in absorbing the 
oC the period in question. and getting to know the 
problem in a rather special way. 
In general this will not do. Few historical actions 
were the results of' reasons consciously entertained by the 
agent, and some are well-known to be the results of' quite 
irrational actions in the normally accepted sense. Another 
4•if'f'iculty here is that historians talk of' nations, 
institutions, moTements etc., and would have to account 
f'or this collectiTe thought in terms of' the thoughts ot 
the individuals. It seems that this mode of' explanation 
poses many problems f'or the historian. 
On the other hand, it looks as though this is what 
history of' science tries to do. History of' science attempts 
to show that the theories of' the scientists in history were 
the result of' rational thought (by the nature of' the 
activity we call science) and tries to discover what their 
considerations were. 
The rational action to be considered here consists not 
only of' consciously entertained ideas, cultural influences, 
deductive logic etc., but also the mental functions of' 
induction, intuition, etc. which help the scientist to make 




A naive assumption often wrongly taken as a basic 
principle 0£ history of science is that it is possible to 
know what an individual was thinking about. ci.e. exactly 
how a scientist arrived at an argument or made a discovery.) 
This is all the more plausible when we consider the nature 
oC science. Scientific events are well-defined (at least 
in principle), and limited to particular aspects of the 
world. Furthermore, they are defined in such a way as to 
be repeatable in terms of specified observations. All 
this might suggest that the activities of past scientists 
are the same (in principle) as those of present practiaing 
scientists. Because science is apparently so limited, it 
is assumed that the science (or scientific activity) of 
the past is the same as contemporary science. This leads 
to a situation where the past activity and its results 
is judged by the present criteria. 
In considering the history of mathematics we may regard 
it as an investigation into mathematical thinking, and in 
view of the.discussion above, trying to find out what an 
7. Kepler's discovery of eliptical orbits is an interest-
ing example. We see in his accounts how influenced he 
was by the Greek-Copernican circles, and of his struggles 
to Cit the evidence to the theory. It was only after 
many years that he was able to break out of the circles 
and 'discover' the ellipse. His own account of his 
mental struggles is unique and is the kind of ideal 
explanatio~ that is ~:tten sugge11ted her~,. An account 




~ ~ ,.._ 
Thia· interpretation of' the history of' mathematics 
encounters th.e same dif'f'iculties as those of' history of' 
science. Judging past mathematics by contemporary standards 
makes even the most signif'icant breakthrough look trivial. 
Moreoever, there is also the question of' the status of' 
' 
mathematical thought. activity and results. 8 The kind 
of' evidence we are dealing with in the history of' mathematics 
are the results of' a mental activity. The results written 
do1111 are the end of' the story: if' we are lucky we have 
something of' the starting points., the original problems, 
but what can we say of' the path between ? Attempting to 
answer this question poses enormous diff'iculties when we 
have contemporary mathematicians to talk to; with historical 
figures it is impossible. 
If we are able to demonstrate the rationality of' a 
scientist's or mathematician's actions in an historical 
context completely, we will then have solved the induction 
problem. Since this demonstration of' rationality of' action 
can be rela~ed to the whole question of providing explan-
ations in history, it is clear that another rationale for 
the study of' history must be found. 
7. Non-Universal Generalisations. 
The following are other attempts to describe situations 
where historians may be engaged in forming weaker versions 
of' the scientific law.9 
8. 
t .;. ' 
These are discussed in Section 3. 
.. ti''" ... t' , ... " ,. .. 
9. These attempts, like the oD.ea above, try"'to ... caat the 
historian in the id«ral moul"lt ot the acienti•t, to 
• ': ~ + 
make history respectable, as it were. 
~ : ; if,: ~ ·1, ;·. .. _.,..... _ _.,.. 
.  t. ·.. ... - ~ '\, . 
isation which> is. not: iDYa·lidated- by the occurrence of one 
or more counter-exalliple#JI or exception• to the law. (AD'. . 
interesting argument arises. here concerning the status of' 
scientific laws within science itself'. It can be argued 
that all scientific laws are statistical laws, and that 
their certainty is only deduced by the f'act that no counter-
examples have yet occurred. In f'act; in many scientific 
laws counter-examples do occur and they are either ignored, 
or the law is changed to accommodate them. The f'act that 
a counter-example may be. f'ound does not invalidate the. law 
in any case;. it only means; logically, that the exceptions 
have turned up sooner rather than later.) 
(ii) Laws of' normal circumstances. These can be 
considered •common sense' laws, or working generalisations 
f'rom immediate experience, pa.s·t or present. These might 
conform to an accepted standard of' behaviour. If' so, it 
is dif'f'icult to see them as different f'rom rational explan-
ations considered above. 
(iii) Limited or restricted generalisation. These are 
intended to be laws based on a deep knowledge of' the period 
being studied, and applicable only to that period. What 
may be true of' one period may not be so of' another. 
These weaker versions of' law-like statements seem to 
be rather 'ad hoc' procedures to patch up an inadequate 
theory, but it is claimed that whatever we may think of' 
them as inadequate, they have a certain counterf'actual 
force. to I think this is 'faking· logical justi'f'ication too 
~ ... -;.· . 
tar. How do we know, tortjexample, that a limited general-
.... .. 'f 
4 • ,_. ')/.,,.... .... r<~ _··t.., 
.."' __ ~~· .. 
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10. t.e. they imply something about events that might I 
Ir 
, • . (· '\ ..... ' " • . t .. 1 ~ • • . • • 
haYe occurred but did not. 
.. ·i 
.-•.:..: 
generalisation·i•'iluppoeed to 1'ollow f'ro• the coactitions 
of the period. Testing the truth of' this brings us back 
to the application oC supposed laws. 
(iv) Generalisation applied to a named individual. 
This idea is based on the characteristics oC the more 
important agents. Leaving aside the problem of' deciding 
who the most important agents were, we have a situation 
where the explanations oC events are based on the explan-
ations oC the dispositions of' individual persons. Simple 
dispositioDSt (for exaJ!lple Newton's avoidance 0£ controversy 
may be cited as a reason Cor his not publishing the 
Principia until 1687) 9 may be suggested, but even simple 
dispositions are more complex than they seem at first, and 
to attribute an individual'• action to a particular tendency 
means we also need to check this action against all other 
possible reasons to make sure this was the most reasonable. 
This procedure is unlikely, even if' theoretically possible 
and so these so-called dispositions commit the, investigator 
to further assumptions. 
8. The kinds oC questions answered bl Historl• 
It was stated earlier that the historian is interested 
in the signif'icant consequences of actions of individuals. 
If' this is so, the task of' history is seen to be deciding 
what the significant consequences are, establishing and 
understanding the events leading up to them and Curnishing 
11 rational explanations £er their occurrence. 
11. That. the actions of'. an individual in history •igh~ .. not 
b:81. rati:ona:l do•• not· •ean that th• explanation of' these 
actions is not rational. 'That be was mad' is a perfectly 
rational explanation. 
• ,; Tiie··aigni'f'~caat: conseque~ces~'cbose'1f for :tU:..e·at't'gation 
by the· historian can often· depend 'on the historian' i!r -. .. •. :~ ; 
cultural background and attitudes, particularly so it the 
object of' study is the growth of an institution or an idea 
rather than some more well-def'ined event. 12 In these 
cases, the significance of' the consequences of' an indivi-
dual's action or thought is seen in the light of the 
contemporary state and importance of the concept •. 13 This· 
is particularly true ot the history of science: although· 
we may be careful to try 'fo judge the value of an indivi-
dual's contribution by standards of his own time, the 
choice of what we examine is largefy determined by our own 
ideas of what was (or is) seen to be important. The mean-
ing of understanding in this context is that we suggest 
a chain of' events or pattern of' thoughts from one signifi-
cant stage to another. It is often the case that different 
historians £orm different chains, in fact it is, in a sense, 
their business to do so and o£fer these different explan-
ations to the public. These explanations C"annot be tested 
in the ord1nary sense because the experiments are . 
i1 unrepeatable. 
This is a very dif'f'erent activity from the scientist 




A •well-defined' event could be the outcome of' a battle 
Cor example. 
The calculus, and all that bas sprung from it, forms a 
large part of contemporary ma~hematics. It would 
generally be admitted that these significant consequences 
can be regarded as t~e r~~"l°!: ·:~f ~e ac~iona .ot,•1'"·:--
like Newton and Leibniz. 
experiments· in order• to pre·dict th• outcome; ot •i.milar -
circumatancea. In hi• activity, th• scientist is asking a 
'Why ?• question. 'Why does this happen ?' 'It happens 
because ••• ' The historian on the other band, is asking 
what I call a 'How ? 1 question. 'How did this happen ?' 
•It happened like this •••' The intention of the scientist 
is to explain classes of events, the intention of the 
historian is to explain unique events. The unique events 
are seen to be reasonable in that they conform in general 
to the known laws of science, and so they can be deduced 
14 by hindsight as it were. 
The 'How ?' question was first used aboTe in discussing 
the flow or continuity of events. The 'How ?' question 0£ 
history is answered not by showing that an eveut had to 
happen, but by showing that there was no reason to suppose 
that it should not have happened. The whole emphasis has 
changed. 
This interpretation of understanding and explanation 
poses many fewer problems than the 'scientific method' 
approach. We are able to consider the growth of ideas, 
arguments~of individuals, the formation and disollution 
of societies, the publication of journals etc., in a much 
more fruitful way. Since the problem here is not to demon-
strate the necessity and inevitability of events, there is 
no need to subsume the occurrence of events under a law of 
any kind. Here we demonstrate the possibility of the ' 
event by remoTing the basis for the expectation that it 
would not happen. 
The historian may then go on to ask •why ? 1 questions 
but there is no necessity to do so. The anawera to.these 
- ; ...... .::>-
t 4. This is why I have called historical explanation 
retrospective-deductive. 
questions lie more within the f~~lds of soci~log1~ economics 
1 ' . , , . 
and so on, where scientific method is more l~kely to be 
applicable. 
9. The Interpretation of Historical Events. 
We see now that in view 0£ the preceeding discussion 
and the present idea of the 'how ?' questions, the inter-
pretation of historical events is not so much discovering 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of 
an event, but more likely to be the activity of relating 
parts to a whole. In fact, the very nature of history is 
the collecting, compounding and relating of unique events 
into a unique whole. The kind of explanation offered is 
in terms of the synthesis of the parts into a new whole. 15 
This is a particularly useful idea when the subject of our 
study is something which is still continuing, for example, 
many branches of mathematics had their origins centuries 
ago, and are still flourishing today. In the study of the 
history of mathematics we are relating the ideas of indivi-
duals of the past to the ideas of present mathematicians. 
This continuity of idea is an important factor in the 
building of mathematical structures. However, although 
the structure we may build is unique, it may not be the 
only possible structure. 
15. This is very near to the synthesis of a kind of 
epistemological structure. Epistemology tries to 
answer the question 'bow we come to know•, history, 
at least part of the time, tries to answer the 
question 'how this came about•. The methodology i• 
similar, while the subject matter is different. 
~ 
10. The Reliability of Historical Explanation. 
As we have seen, the 'why ?• question of science is 
secondary to the 'how ? 1 question and the relating ot 
parts to the whole in historical explanation. Although 
complete explanation may theoretically depend ultimately 
on the discovery and use of universal laws, the main 
emphasis in historical explanation is the relating of 
events one to another so that the 'how ? 1 questions may 
be answered. Generalisations thus made are not intended 
lt8. 
to be universal laws (they are not generalisations at all, 
in the scientific sense), but to be plausible working 
principles by which the parts are related to the whole. 16 
Since such generalisations are not intended as laws 
there is no reason to attribute the same kind of reliability 
to historical explanation as to scientific explanation. 
The consequence of this is that it is much easier to change 
historical explanation without sacrificing much in the way 
of rationality or plausibility. 
11. The Nature of the Subjects of Historical Enquiry. 
It is·important to clarify the nature of the subjects 
of historical enquiry. An historical event may be considered 
as something that happens instantaneously or over a fairly 
short period of time (like the outcome of a battle), as 
something that happens over a long period of time with a 
recognisable beginning and end (the first world war), or 
as something which began in the past and continues to occur 
and develop now (democratic society). All these are the 
subjects of historical enquiry. However, one might equally 
t6. There are·•maxima• of historical invest:igation aa 
there are in other subjects. See Polanyi(1964) and 
Section 3 note (38). 
.\9. JJ. 
argue that these.kinds of events ~oo ara the subject matter 
ot science. We get nowhere- by trying to apecif'y types 0£ 
events as subject matter for one discipline or another, 
the difference lies in what use is made 0£ them. For 
example, the comet 0£ 1682 was, to Halley, the astronomer, 
a scientific event. He was interested in classes of' 
similar events and with the aid of' Newton's gravitational 
theory was able to predict its return in 1758. To the 
historian o~ science the comet was a significant event in 
Halley's career and in the scienti£ic community at the 
time, because it brought to the fore a class of phenomena 
which were seen to be susceptible to mathematical analysis 
.and which bad hitherto been considered to be unreachable 
in the accepted sense of' scienti£ic experiment. To the 
historian the comet's signi£icance lies in the subsequent 
changes 0£ attitude towards science and the role of' 
scienti£ic thought in in£luencing the culture. 
Tli.e most important thing to recognise here is that 
the historian 0£ science, while describing the inter-
relations 0£ ideas in the historical sense, bas also to 
carry in some way the classi£ications of' the scientist, and 
the purpose 0£ scienti£ic activity both then and now. 
It is not surprising that historians 0£ science carry over 
scienti£ic methodology into history and look £or laws to 
govern historical events. 17 
It is o£ten £orgotten that because the major part 0£ 
the study 0£ history, and history 0£ science particularly, 
concerns the interrelations of' concepts and ideas, that 
17. A contemporary source of discussion along these lines 
can be round in the work surrounding the •structure 
oC scienti£ic revolutions•.Kuhn (1962)JLakatoa and 
they are not· at afl: susceptible. to the. traditiona1 method-
ology oC science •. It is impossible to state necessary and 
suCCicient conditions for the emergence 0£ a democratic 
society or a scientiCic revolution because our concepts oC 
demoeracy and science are so 1eneral and subject to 
constant development. 
When our subject oC historical study is mathematics 
we have to be exceedingly careCul. Mathematics itself 
is, in a sense, the most reliable and the most certain of 
the sciences. So Car as we can discover, there is some 
way in which, throughout history, this has always been so. 
Even though contemporary mathematics limits this reliability 
and puts conditions on consistency; the results oC mathe-
matical activity are mental constructs and as such have no 
necessary connection with the real world. (Even though 
starting points for these ideas may be found in practical 
18 problems.) It is just because this reliability is 
independent of the real world that any attempts to explain 
mathematical invention in terms oC scientiCic laws are 
doomed to failure. Mathematics as a body of knowledge 
can be explained in terms oC its own logic, but mathematical 
invention cannot be explained in terms oC mathematical logic. 
Similar·ly, it is impossible to analyse scientiCic activity 
totally in scientiCic terms. 
18. Contrast this with science whose reliability is 
measured by how well it matches with the real world • 
. -.. 't: 
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(b) The Four Histories ot Mathematica. 
1. Introduction 
When we talk ot 'History ot Mathematics•, there is 
often an idea that it bas something to do with 'who invented 
what• or how a particular theorem or theory came to be 
like it is. This is fairly representative of the popular 
but naive idea that history of mathematics bas little to 
do with the real mathematics taught today and is, to some 
extent, a luxury afforded only by research departments. 
The fundamental pupose of Histery, the general study of 
change through time, is highly relevant not only to the 
mathematics we study today, but also, more importantly, 
to the communication of mathematics at all levels. 
In the study of the history ot mathematics we are 
concerned with two general aspects which are ot equal 
importance. First, the 'past• itself - the documents, 
records, events, the 'facts• because they form the basis 
of mathematical theories from which today's theories and 
techniques are derived. In reading mathematical papers 
and other documents we attempt to discover the state (or 
nature) of concepts involved, so the importance of the 
records in mathematics concerns .not only arranging them 
to determine a sequence of events, but studying them to 
discover the empirical facts about the problems, and the 
theoretical facts about the solutions to those problems. 
In this sense, concepts form part of the basic data of the 
history ot mathematics. Secondly, from the data we then 
have attempts to reconstruct and interpret the past. 
The importance ot a particular event or concept, the 
raising ot its status from a mere tact about tbe past to 
52. 
a Cact oC history, 19 depends entirely on the interpretation 
we might want to put upon that Cact. These interpretations 
range Crom the conscious accounts oC events and attempts 
at reconstruction by historians oC mathematics, through 
to the unconscious interpretations by the working mathe-
matician or teacher communicating mathematics. We might 
deplore the ignorance oC history and lack oC sensitivity 
in the impressions given oC mathematics springing ready-
made into existence, but at least as bad are the uncritical 
statements still Cound in abundance like 'Newton invented 
the calculus•, or 'Galois invented group theory•, which 
are reinCorced by our habit in mathematics oC naming a 
theorem or technique aCter its so called inventor, oCten 
contrary to even the most obvious historical evidence. 
The axiomatic view oC mathematics
20 
is a major 
contributing Cactor to the lack oC regard Cor the history 
oC mathematics; we are so anxious to show that mathematics 
is about anything that we Corget the something that gave 
19. Carr· ( 1964) ( 10-13) Facts about the past are all the 
undiC~erentiated pieces oC evidence we may have available; 
Cacts oC history are Cacts about the past which have 
relevance and meaning when they are used to describe 
or explain other events. For example, the writing oC 
a book by a mathematician may be a Cact about the past, 
while the inCluence oC that book can be a Cact oC history. 
20. This is epitomised in Russell's Camous quotation 
"•• mathematics may be deCined as the subject in which 
we never know what we are talking about, nor whether 
what we are saying is true." (N•wmann (1956) p.1577). 
:\ 
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rise to it; and Cormany purposes mathematics is.regarded 
to have begun in the middle oC the nineteenth century. 
The relevance oC the history oC mathematics Cor the develop-
ment and communication oC mathematics has been argued else-
21 
where, what I wish to oCCer here is an outline for classi-
fying, and hence criticising, difCerent types oC approach 
to the history of mathematics. 
Amongst all the writing, research, discussion and 
popular exposition, it is possible to distinguish Cour 
hostoriea oC mathematics, each dealing with recognisably 
diCferent aspects of mathematics and its communication, 
and each deserving recognition. These Cour aspects I am 
calling Empirical Reconstruction, Conceptual Reorganisation, 
Socio-economic Development, and Patterns oC Discovery. 
Empirical Reconstruction is perhaps what most people 
understand to be the history oC mathematics; it consists 
of the attempts to reconstruct past mathematics by the 
examination of documents, etc. and the motivations Cor 
this mathematics by discovering the relevant problems of 
the time. Xhis kind of approach shows the development oC 
mathemati.cs in history, the physical and mathematical 
problems tackled, the new mathematics resulting from 
research, and the application of this new mathematics to 
both physical and theoretical problems. 
Conceptual Reorganisation concerns both current 
mathematics and the interpretation put on the past. 
Contemporary mathematics inCluences value-judgements about 
past mathematics by describing the past in terms oC current 
concepts, and by decidinc~_conaciously or unconsciously, 
21. See Wiider 1972. ,. 
'I".; . ' 
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whether a particular piece oC mathematics has relevance 
·1.. ~ 
or merit·,· or whether a particular theorem is prove~ ~igor-
ously or not. Judging the past in terms oC the present 
is a danger common to all aspects oC history, not only 
mathematics, but it is particularly dangerous in mathe-
matics and diCCicult to avoid because oC the concept oC 
mathematical structure. The structures oC mathematics 
raise deep philosophical and psychological questions, 
only seriously tackled by writers like Beth and Piaget, 22 
and relevant to mathematics history not only because the 
group was probably the Cirst recognisable abstract structure, 
but also because we are concerned with the central concepts 
by which structures are described, how they came into being 
and to what extent they may be complete or still evolving, 
and the contingency or inevitability oC their rules oC 
operation. 23 
Socio-economic Development looks at history Crom the 
general standpoint oC Corces external to the theory and 
structures oC mathematics. It examines how social changes 
can determine the centres oC mathematical development, how 
various kinds of' patronage encourage the Cree development, 
the priorities and the Cashion& oC mathematics, the 
influence oC individuals on research programmes, the 
technical and social problems considered ameanable to 
mathematics, the demands oC investors and the restrictions 
imposed by economic conditions. These influences are 
important, Cor while they may not decide the detail of' 
mathematical theory, they of'ten 4;letermine i ta genera1, .. " , 
·. ·: .. \: .. . · . ' . 
22. See Beth and Piaget (1966). 
23. The Influence of' Axiomatics on the Structuralist 
philosophy is seen in Piaget (1971). 
55. 
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Patterns oC Discovery concerns the attempts to build 
i.,.'· 
a Philosophy oC Mathematics25 and inv~stigates the creative 
intellectual processes oC individuals, and the contributions 
history can,~ake in the Cormulation oC a logic ~£ discovery 
in mathematics, and a psychology oC invention. This area 
tends not to be taken seriously by mathematicians in 
general, which is surprising when we consider that the 
greatest single problem mathematics has is communicating its 
relevance to the culture at large, and making itselC intellect-
ually accessible at all kinds oC levels. This cannot be 
done without a good philosophy oC mathematics, which, in 
turn, must draw on history Cor much oC its data.
26 •27• 
More historians oC mathematics are becoming aware oC 
these Cour histories oC mathematics and are either attempting 
to encompass all oC these aspects, or making their position 
clear at the outset. The most diCCicult task, that oC 
24. Many examples come to mind, like the strategic necessity 
Cor o.perations research, or the investment in the 
compu~er industry. 
25. This is contrasted with both research in •coundations' 
and what are commonly called philosopies of mathematics; 
logicism, Cormalism and intuitionism, because none of 
these pay much attention to the history oC mathematics. 
26. The contributions oC Hadamard (1945); Polya (1945) (1954) 
(1962); Meschkowski (1964), Lakatos (1963/4); and Davis 
(1967) are all attempts to tackle this field • . 
27. A strong plea for a relevant philosophy of mathematics 
., ... • - ~ _ { ~ ~: \ ' L (. .; ' • ~ 4 ... ji: 
and aathematic• teaching is aade by Thomas (1972). 
,'~ .. ..,1 .. 1~--.t&..":~.;...; \_. -·c·~t..-,~- J-t;-;f.~ ... -~~1\.!'7..-
··,)";·;, ... _ J " .. "I n .. ~ -~I ~ j, !·- ( ~ 1 ) • ' 
r ,. 
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encompassing all,.· ha! b_ee~ begun by Wilder28 where ·the 
concept of culture has been adapted to form a fruitful. 
context for the discussion of the general evolution of 
mathematics. 
Each of these four aspects of history will now be 
considered in turn, to form a basis for :further discussion. 
2. Empiricai Reconstruction 
The example taken here will be the history of a parti-
cular problem; the determination of the modes of vibration 
of a stretched string, over a period of about fifty years 
at the beginning ot the eighteenth century. The 1>.eriod 
i tsel:f is we·11 documented29 , the mathematicians well-
known, and the following outline is drawn mainly from 
readily available histories.30 
The mathematics of music, begun by Pythagoreans, 
continued to be stud~ed by a number of notable men in the 
seventeenth century. Their approach was mainly experi-
mental and no significant new results were obtained from 
the mathemat~cal point of view. By about 1700 it was well 
known that a ~tring could vibrate in a number of modes,. 
and that the tone produced by a string vibrating in k 
t . th kth h . par s is e armonic. Brook Taylor, using the method 
of tluxions derived the :fundamental :frequency rel.ation and 
solved the :fluxional equation: 
28. Wilder (1965) (1968) (1972) (1974) 
• • • ~ • ,,. • ( • +.. ~ 
Learned societies and their-Journals have been ... tounded 
·-. .I • ~. ' ·IL~-' I , ~. 1,. j;••-:.. .' t, 4 ~:~1- .ii_.;..,"l .• _,. ~_;-., i\. tn 'f•••t;, 
and the convention ot publishing papers is beginning. 
~ ( .. 4 .. •,, ·: r--1 , t • \.: "• I... • - ~ ~ .,,. ~l f 1: ... _ ~ - - •" ,."! - I. 
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where 
•2 · ·-' - • · ·'·"I···; ,. •er , ....... y and the £luxions are -~ith respect 
to time, which gave a result of the form: 
y =A sin r:x. 
T 
for the steady state, t constant. 
This breakthrough began an attack on the general problem 
which was to have far reaching results. 
Mathematicians on the Continent, eager to prove the 
power of the differential techniques, took up this, and 
various related problems. John Bernoulli considered the 
motion of a weightless elastic string loaded with a number 
of equally apeced masses. He recognised that the for.ce on 
each mass was -k times its displacement, and solved the 





he then tackled the continuous string, showed, like Taylor 
that it must have the shape of a sine curve, and solved 




Both Taylor and Bernoulli treated only the fundamental 
frequency at this stage. 
About this time we have evidence of the systematic 
study of second order differential equations in the work 
of Euler, showing the techniques of substitution and 
transformation, and the introduction of the exponential 
function, vital ~o the solution of second o~der equations. 
Daniel Bernoulli investigated the hanging' chain ·~ · 
problem and suggested.bi.a· solution was ~ppiicabl;:~~o't&.i· 
. vibrating .atrthg. He~ had tackled· th~-:.roble~·'.-01'· th~,_,:;- ._-. 
• t .., • 1 •• - ...l ·-
58• . 
massless •tring loaded.with two weights, calculated the 
frequencies of the two modes and showed that when there 
are n weights, there are n diCCerent modes. He then 
extended the theory to the continuous heavy cord and 
showed there were inCinitely many modes oC vibration. 
While he suggested the application and showed be knew the 
theory Cor the s~retcbed string, he published nothing on 
it till much later. 
Euler's research in the theory oC diCCerential equations 
began to bear Cruit in a series oC works on the theory oC 
music, the hanging loaded string, and the harmonic oscillator 
in particular; he popularised the use oC partial diCCerent-
ial equations and obtained the results: 
dz 
i)z dx , z d = - + ~x "TY y • • • • • (i) 
and 
~2z = ~2x 
~x~y by~x • • • • 
(ii) 
Cor a Cunction oC two variables, x and y •. His techniques 
included ways oC integrating (i) Cor various Corms oC the 
coe·ccicients dx and dy.3 1 
Parti~l DiCCerential equations had already been used 
by D'Alemb~rt in his TraitJ de Dynamique oC 17~3, when he 
31. Euler's notation was that oC 'diCCerentials', the 
relations appearing thus: 
dz dz d dz = dx x + ay dy and ddz dxdy 
ddz 
= dyax 
Concepts and techniques have altered since that time 
and the question arises whether our •modern' partial 
diCCerential notation is really •equivalent' to Euler's. 
In Cact the basic concepts and techniques that Euler 
was employing were very diCCere'·nt Cro• ours. For an 
t' 
interesting discussion of this point see Bo .. (1972) 
and (1974) 
.. ·-5·9• 
later applied them to the string prolirem and obtained the 
= 2 a 
2 )- y 
ax2 
( t ,x) 
2 - T 
(where a. = ;;. , and r = the mass per unit length). 
For the string :fixed at x = O and x = ./J, . wh_edre y = o, 
:-n 
and zero velocity at t = O, he showed that every solution o:f 
the partial di:fCerential equation above is the sum oC a 
£unction o:f (at+ x) and a Cunction (at - x). He derived 
the solution: 
y(t,x) = F(At + x) + S(at - x) 
The reasoning we use today to obtain this solution, 
is Camiliar and the Corms oC general :functions are used in 
many contexts, so that we accpet this expression without 
t protest. But to the eighteenth century mathematicians 
•' 
,;;.,.,,. 
these 'general' Cunctions were suspect, not suC:ficiently 
justi:fied by the Cact th~t they 'worked' when they were 
di:f:ferentiated and substituted in the original equation. 
Wllat was the nature oC the :functions F and G ? To 
D'Alembert, all the :functions used in the •olution were 
'continuous•., they obeyed the 'law oC continuity•. This 
'law o:f continuity' was a principle, basically geometric, 
which was invoked by mathematicians to justiCy proof's, 
to explain techniques and to assist intuition :frequently 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. 32 In our terms, 
continuous in this context means 'diCCerentiable 1 • 
D'Alembert's Cunctions were analytic expressions Cormed 
by the operations o:f algebra and the calculus (i.e. in:finite 
32. We still have this about today as an intuitive 
description o:f situations in analysis. For :further 
discussion see sections 4c and 4d. 
60-:: •. t ,,.., 
algebr•ic process,•sl o~ algeb.-aic f'ormulae... Re garde~ in .... 
this way, as a calcul.ua of operators, all algebra~c expl'."essions 
gave a def'inite result af'ter the operations. Since the 
calculus operations could be described, and at least in 
principle carried out in detail (the result• of' the inf'ini':"" 
tesimal processes being intuitively obvious), and since 
algebra was in ef'f'ect, a kind of' generalised arithmetic, 
mathematicians were generally happy to develop their 
techniques, believing that the obvious consistency of 
arithmetic lay behind it all. Thus, £orJltAlembert•s 
analysis of' the wave equation, if' two :functions agreed in 
one interval, they must agree in all intervals, and this 
was su:f'f'icient to show that they were the same :function. 
On the other hand, Euler, on seeing D'Alembert's 
• 
solution tackled the problem by a similar method, but 
had a totally dif'f'erent idea as to what :functions could 
be admitted as initial curves, and theref'ore as solutions 
of' partial differential equations. Well before this time, 
Euler had allowed 'functions' :formed by piecing different 
parts of' well-known curves together,33 and he used the same 
idea here, arguing that the initial condition - and hence 
possibly any number of' subsequent positions -.must be a 
function with a •corner' to allow f'or the initial plucking 
of the string. Euler realised that ••considering such 
:functions as are subject to no law of' continuity opens to 
us a wholly new range of' analysis." 34 
33. At least by 1734. 
34. Euler to D'Alembert, 1763 Dec.20. Quoted by Truesdell, 
1960 P•276 =Opera 2,11 sect. 1,2. 
; 
~ 
Euler'• 'di·scontinuous• or 'mixed'' carves (see below) 
were criticised by D1 Alembert, who was uneasy about what 
happened at· the corners. In modern terms the second 
derivative is not de:fined at that point. Euler's use o:f 
in:finitesimala35 enabled him to :find a solution and obscured 
the di:f:ficulty raised by D'Alembert. Euler claimed that 
anyway, since the vibrations were small, the corner angles 
would be small, and the curve would be only in:finitesimally 
di:f:ferent :from a continuous one. 




















di:f:feren t iabl e 
Euler di:f:fers :from D'Alembert in admitting all kinds 
35. Euler had derived in:finitesimal relations like: 
a+d.x = a, /dx + dx = /dx, dx + (dx) 2 = dx, :for di:f:ferent 
powers o:f the in:finitesimal dx. These appear in the 
Institutiones calculi di:f:ferentialis, 1755, St.Petersburg 
=Opera 1 1 10. 
36. A:fter Grattan Guineas (1970a)p.7 
37. •contiguous• is a nineteenth century label, dating :from 
at least the time o:f Fourier. Neither Euler nor D'Alembert 
would have had cause to use a :function like this in r 
their analysis 0£ the problem. The con:fusion is still 
posing quite a lot o:f di:f:ficulty a century later, see 
De Morgan 1852 (40-45), 'section 4(d) below. p • .2.&lf. 
'I 
oC initial curves - the individual modes whose periods 
are fractions of' the fundamental, but D'Alembert allowed 
only analytic initial curves and their solutions and 
insisted that a solution was possible only"••• f'or the 
cases where dif'f'erent shapes of' the vibrating string can 
be included in one and the same equation. In all the other 
cases it seems to me to be impossible to give y in a general 
f'orm. 1138 
Soon af'ter, Daniel Bernoulli, continuing ideas he had 
expressed earlier, claimed that"••• all sonorous bodies 
contain potentially an infinity of' sounds and an infinity 
of' corresponding ways of' making their regular vibrations ••• 11 3
9 
By physical argument based on the idea of' the superposition 
of' frequencies of' vibration he obtained an infinite series: 
y( t, x) = -.sin 7['X 
.I. 
cos lfCt ·+ p sin 2rxcos211ct + ••••• 
.1. T T 
where each fundamental mode gene.rated " ••• multiplies an 
infinite number of' times to accord to each interval an 
infinite number of' curves ••• 11 39 He gave no mathematical 
proof of ~he generality of' the function y(t,x), and 
suggested that the constants etc., could be chosen 
carefully so that the series would agree witn any given 
function at an infinite number of' points. However, he 
gave no method for actually calculating these coef'f'icients. 
There ensued a great deal of' discussion between Euler, 
Bernoulli and D'Alembert over the next f'ew years in letters 
and journals as to the nature of' the solution, and the 
38. Mem. Acad. Sci. Berlin 6 1750 (355-360) Publ.1752 
39. Hist d• L'Acad•de Berlin 9, 1753, (147-172),(173-195) 
pul;Jl •• 1755. 
~· 
~f 
·~ J;11sti:f'ication of' their .approaches. Later, Lagr.ang~ and 
Leplace.o£fered solutions, Lagrange's being perhaps nearest 
to what we might call 'Fourier coef'ficients'.40141 The 
justi:f'ication of the general solution, however, seemed 
at this stage to be so intractable that apart :f'rom attempts 
at problems of' non-uni:f'orm heavy strings, the vibration of' 
drums, and other musical instruments, the general problem 
itself' :f'ell out of' :f'ashion because at the time it seemed 
that the mathematicians lacked su:f':f'iciently sophisticated 
techniques. The fact that much of' this was due to conceptual 
di:f':f'iculties and di:f':f'erences, as to technical problems is 
a story we can only tell by hindsight. 
The routine solution we teach now derives :f'rom Fourier42 
and was discovered by him on experimental investigations 
into the conduction of beat, the f'ashionable problem at the 
beginning of' the nineteenth century. 
This one problem and the attempts at its solution in 
the :f'irst half' of' the eighteenth century highlight a 
number of' signi:f'icant developments which were to have 
, major importance in the subsequent evolution of' mathematics, 
not only ib terms of' the solution of' the problem itself', 
but also in their wide relevance :f'or other, at :f'irst 
apparently unrelated, :f'ields. 
The di:f':f'erential and in:f'initesimal techniques yielded 
40. Kline 1972 (510-514) 
41. Grattan-Guinness 1970 (13-21) claims that Lagrange 
could not have spotted the terms as 'Fourier coe:f':f'icients' 
because of' his conceptual position over the problems 
of' peri.odici ty_ • 
•. _.. I ~ .. 
42. Grattan-Guinness and Ravetz (1972) 
•igniticant results, but increasingly trom this time mathe-
maticians wer~ being pressed, and themselves pressing tor 
greater rigor of the operations 0£ the calcuius. 43 Thia 
brought into question the whole class 0£ operations of the 
calculus, and their justification in ter~s of a kind of 
'algebra of infinities and infinitesimals•. 
The ~uestion oC periodicity, a local problem in terms 
oC the wave equation, had two basic aspects, the geometric 
problem - the obvious continuous nature oC the string, the 
Corms it takes, and the question ot whether there existed 
an algebraic expression to represent its shape; and the 
algebraic or analytic pro~lem - that ot the formulae represent-
ing possible and sensible shapes, the possibility ot compound-
ing these in analytic terms, and the question oC what we 
now cali oddness and evenness oC £unctions. The conflict 
oC geometric intuition and analytic precision is still with 
us today. 
More obviously general is the notion oC the definition 
oC function. During this period we are moving Crom the 
idea that 'function' is a label applied to single algebraic 
formulae which completely describe a curve, to the idea 
that a function can be defined by piecing formulae together, 
which eventually led to the more analytic idea that one 
variable depends upon another, and that the nature oC this 
dependence is a matter oC arbitrary definition. 
The principle of continuity, another geometric 
intuition, was taken seriously well into the nineteenth 
44 century. Here, the continuity intuition applied to 
43. See Section 4 d. 
44. See Section 4 c. , . 
. . ' . 
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begins to call into question intiniteness ot 
' 'eries and their convergence, the calculation 0£ coe££icients, 
.~be comparative size 0£ terms, and the anomalies of their 
: 45 
·"use. 
It is not the case that the easiest problems were 
tackled £irst, though we can only say this in the light 
0£ history, and in a perverse kind 0£ way, because the 
di£ficult problems tackled did not yield to the techniques 
available, this was to the advantage 0£ mathematics as a 
whole, where further deep questions 0£ the existence of 
mathematical entities, the role of intuition and the 
nature of proof, the de£inition 0£ concepts and the nature 
0£ operations, came to the sur£ace and have remained 
important to this day. 
It is interesting to comment on the possible interpret-
ations of the fifty years we have examined in the context 
of the different historical accounts that have been given, 
an that are possible. Giving a general history of the 
period, or even of the problems, in inductivist terms, 
is impossible~ 46 One has to be selective and the available 
accounts show the respective interests and interpretations 
of the writers. Kline, 47 in the context of the general 
development of mathematics in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, shows the story as aspects of the development 
45. Examples of Euler's style of reasoning, with contemporary 
·· commentary is given in Polya ( 19 54) ( 17-22) and 
(90-107) (Vol.I) 
46. Inductive history of science or the inductivist 
programme, consists in giving an impartial account 0£ 
•all' the £acts. 
47. Kline (1972) (502-522), (468-501) 
.. A 
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o~ differential equations: Grattan-Guinnesa 48 is ··ahich .... 1· 
more interested in the conceptual problems in analysis 
and their implications for futur• developments; Manheim'19 
sees it as a stage in the development of the concepts ot 
point sets and the arithmetization of analysis; and Truesdell50 
as a passage in the history of rational mechanics. Th& 
relative importance oC each particular event in this period 
depends on the interpretation we want to put on it; for 
example, we could write the period in terms of the history 
of notation and the concepts carried with and implied 
by the notations invented at the time;5 1 if we were to 
write a history of the theory of functions, the beginning 
of the eighteenth century would have significance. This 
was also a great period in the debate about the nature 
of proof, the reliance of geometric and algebraic arguments, 
and also of a deep change in the philosophy of mathematics, 
questioning the nature of mathematical objects and their 
relation to the physical world. 
Social changes also influence the development of 
mathematics ~ere; national economies are flourishing to 
the extent tnat it is desirable and prestigious to fund 
the individuals conducting research, to found learned 
48. Grattan-Guinaess (1970), (2-21) 
49. Manheim (1964), (35-65) 
50. Truesdell (1968), (107-110),(112-114) 
51. Cajori (1923) and (1921) are hardly histories, more 
catalogues or chronologies. A good history of mathe-
matical symbolism has yet to be written. This is also 
the view of Dr. Cecily Tanner~ in a paper. given at the 
Internati:ona.l. Congre•s on MathematicS Education, 1972. 
1 ' 
academies, to finance and publish journals; and.many of 
those taking part also found themselves involved in public 
and military duties. With these changes the relevance of 
mathematics to physical problems, and the consequent need 
to communicate this mathematics to many different people 
became important, and so it is also a period of relevance 
to the teacher of mathematics, in terms of the development 
of mathematical education.52 
Finally, taking an overall view, these factors and 
others could be examined in terms of the general evolution 
of mathematics, and the place of mathematics in the culture. 
3. Conceptual Reorganisation 
A sad comment given on the general impression 0£ 
university mathematics courses reflects the difficulty of 
communicating the nature of mathematical concepts at differ-
ent levels of sophistication: "Mathematical concepts cannot 
be rationally criticised, either because they are considered 
arbitrary or because they are considered to directly reflect 
reality. Thus the concept is there because it's there. 
All there is in the history is successive elimination of 
deviations.from today's rigour." 53 A much more detailed 
critique from the historical point 0£ view54 reflects 
the tendency of text books to write out the history 0£ 
mathematics completely. This, often unconscious, elimination 
of the background of mathematical concepts, might make 
mathematics harder to learn, not easier. 
I£ the remarks are in the context of a history 0£ 
mathematics there is a tendency to judge past mathematics 
52. This was first mentioned in Section l.p.29 
53. Thomas (1972) p.188 




by contemporary standards of' rigour. Historians of' mathe-
matics tend to be much more caref'ul today, but the danger 
still exists. 55 It may be an interesting exercise to 
identify the origins of a particular concept?6 but the 
implications of even the title may be misleading. For 
example, Manbeim's book, 'The Genesis of Point Set Topology' 
suggests that he has identified the conceptual origins of' 
a branch of contemporary mathematics, and since the general 
idea being investigated is 1 nearness •,57 be is able to 
connect the infinitesimal problems and limit definitions 
of the seventeenth century through to the notion of' an 
abstract space, and the axioms of' Hausdorff'. 
A recent paper by Marie Goldstein is entitled 'The 
historical development of group theoretical ideas in 
connection with Euclid's axiom of congruence• and is intended 
to show that "group theoretic ideas have been present in 
the minds of men since ancient times".58 The problem with 
this kind of approach is that as the structures of mathe-
matics themselves become more abstract and more general, 
they become· more easily applicable to the past. It seems 
much easier now to identif'y powerful concepts of', say, 
abstract algebra in past mathematics, than it was fifty or 
55. See, for example, Cajori (1919) p.238, the remarks on 
Euler's use of infinite series, and Bell (1945), (462-463) 
on the principle of continuity in nineteenth century 
geometry, while Scott (1958) abounds with similar remarks. 
56. Boyer (1949) is a classic example of' this kind of writing. 
57. Manheim (1964),p.1. 
58. Goldstein (1972) 
"': .l . 
69. 
even twenty years ago. This problem was touched on above,59 
and it seems very di££icult to avoid getting into a situation 
where we may claim that certain mathematical structures are 
innate,
60 
which may give us licence to analyse the past in 
terms of the present. 
A careful analysis by Boyer, 'Proportion, equation, 
function; three steps in the development of a concept'6l 
suggests that the changes occur when algebraic expression 
of relations becomes possible and the proportion, previously 
verbally expressed, becomes identifiable in an algebraic 
principie or 'law'; the function concept appears when the 
'law' is generalised into an anAlytic definition motivated 
by both the current problems in physics, 62 and the inconsist-
encies in the algebra. Thus, rather than emphasising the 
unity of the conceptual pedigree, Boyer is attempting to 
point out periods when the concept which we now identify 
as 'function• underwent its evolutionary changes. This 
enables us to criticise the account in terms of contemporary 
mathematics, if we wish, while having regard £or the mathe-
matical concepts and procedures of the time. 
The classic description of conceptual change over time 
is given in Lakatos, 63 where the versions of 'Euler's 
theorem• for polyhedra are examined over a period of some 
three hundred years. Lakatos suggests different motivations 
59. Above, p.54 in comments on structuration, and note (23) 
60. Chomsky (1968) suggests that some of the structures of 
language may be innate. 
61. Boyer (1946) 
62. See, for example, the discussion on the stretched string 
problem above. 
63. Lakatos (1963/4) 
for the changes in concepts' internal to mattiematics' and ·• 
to do with the distinctions between the procedures of proof 
(i.e. 'demonstration• or articulation of a thought-experi-
ment) and the concept of proof-analysis (the logicai criticism 
of the proof), arising in the early nineteenth century.64 
While the distinction between proof and proof-analysis and 
the rigour of proof and the rigour of proof-analysis is 
clear from about this time, any mathematician following the 
argument becomes aware of the existence of changing standards 
of proof applicable at all times in mathematical history. 
The relevance of this for the present dis~ussion is that it 
is possible, and important, for mathematicians at all levels 
to be aware of changing standards of rigour, and thus to 
avoid both judging the past in terms of the present, and 
imagining that rigorous mathematics is only a hundred or 
so years old. 65 
The outcome of the unthinking application of modern 
standards of rigour to history is the complete writing out 
of history from the contemporary standard textbooks. This, 
in itself,. can be taken as a writing of mathematical history 
by implication. Not only does the textbook tend to reverse 
the historical order, be beginning at the currently fashion-
able definition and then attempting to 'criticise' these by 
raising unmotivated and often incomprehensible objections, 
64. For example, Lakatos (1963/4) note P• (59--60). 
65. Grattan-Guinness (1973) (442-444) remarks on analysis 
give examples 0£ the impressions and also the incorrect 
and misleading in£ormation given cbeerf'ully in. many texts. 
. . 
' :+ • 
it also removes the background of mathematics, the important 
'memory' of the mathematical culture, which today is avail-
able only to a few.66 
With every phase in mathematical history comes a 
reformulation, a consolidation, a new beginning. This is 
often considered necessary purely from the practical point 
of view, the proliferation of writing is such that for .sheer 
efficiency of communication choices have to be made. 67 The 
latest textbook begins at the new beginning, and often has 
difficulty in relating to the past, in fact this is hardly 
ever attempted. 
Students are thus cut adrift from the background of 
mathematics - particularly so at the transition from school 
to university where often unmotivated rigor is suddenly 
introduced as the proper way of doing mathematics, and the 
more intuitive operations and proofs of school mathematics 
are no longer respectable ._68 69 It is important that 
teachers and students should be aware of these dangers. 
Another important point that follows from a realisation 
66. For the •memory' argument see Marwick (1970)(12-19). 
67. The two important tacts, that mathematics develops 
itself by generating abstract structures, which are 
then applied to select mathematics necessary for 
learning; and the questionable pedagogical value of 
this procedure are investigated in Section 3. 
68. It is important to stress that it is not an argument 
for banning rigor Crom school mathematics, rather for 
introducing intuition and heuristic into university 
courses. Good heuristic can motivate rigor. 
69. See Thomas 1972, p.188., and Grattan-Guinness 1973,p.443. 
I I 
I 
'Gf the dangers of a modern interpretation of the paat. is 
'that since mathematics now bas many apecia1i ti ea within 
itself, a mathematician working in one area may have a 
Yery different view of what is important or significant 
from one working in a different area. This point is made 
by Fisher (1966) and bis example will be discussed next. 
4. Socio-Economic Development 
A number of examples can be given of particu1ar develop-
ments in mathematics being arrested or encouraged by factors 
1argely external to the structures of mathematics. In terms 
of Wilder•s analysis 70 the factors I want to identify have 
come under the forces 1isted as Environmental Stress, 
Cultural Lag, and Cultural Resistance. 
Environmental stress, in its most general form, can 
be seen, in the first place, as the creation or lack of 
conditions which foster the activity of mathematics. 
For example, mathematics, as with other academic studies, 
was kept alive in Europe during the Black Death and the 
Hundred Years War, largely by the monastic tradition which 
preserved the only conditions in w.hich learning could 
survive. It is largely when individuals are able to rely 
on others for support that creative work is possible. 
Active encouragement of individuals in the form of the 
patronage of a ruler or state, of groups in the form of 
the founding of a society or a journal, or of institutions 
or universities for motives academic, practical, political 
and prestigious, is only possible when there is a section 
oC the community with enough economic and social independence 
to provide both the means to achieve this encouragement, 
7o. Wilder, 1968 p.169; 1972 p.488. 
' I 
the capital, buildings, etc., and the people to take advant-
age of it. For· example, only towards the end of the n1neteenth 
century did the United States begin to make any significant 
contributions to pure mathematics. The picture drawn by 
Hogan71 of the pioneers in the 'howling wilderness' shows 
that only the obvious and most important applications of 
mathematics; simple computation, calendar calculations, 
surveying, map-making and navigation, were at all .. wideil.7 
practiced, and even the well-known scientists like Benjamin 
Franklin were principally concerned with the practical 
applications of mathematics and considered 'theoretical' 
pursuits a waste of time. 
Cultural lag and cultural resistance can both be 
exemplified in the introduction of the written Arabic 
numerals to Europe. For practical purposes the abacus 
worked well enough, and the fact that merchants were slow 
to change was due largely to the established tradition in 
calculation, the lack of obvious advantage in the written 
mode, and to the scarcity and expense of writing materials. 
Disputes between 'algorists• and 'abacists' were common, 
the practical advantage often going to the abacists, while 
the advantages of the algorists• methods were often out-
weighed by the feeling that symbols were suspicious objects; 
(they were strongly connected with magic), they disguised 
the reality of the counting, and were easily altered. 
Only the standardisation of the written numerals through 
the medium of the printing press, and the increase· in the 
supply of cheap paper overcame both the natural lag and the 
active resistance to the new symbols and the methods of 
71. Hogan 1974 p.155. 
72 calculation. 
7~. 
Mathematical theories are made by individuals, but the 
acceptance or otherwise of these theories depends on social 
groups and their psychological condition. Precedents and 
preferences are often as much to do with group psychology 
as with mathematical rigor. It is not necessarily the 
case that the currently accepted theory is any more correct 
or rigorous than its rivals - nor even may it account for 
the facts any better. 73 The crucial factor is social 
acceptance by other mathematicians. "Therefore, for the 
observer, both at a particular instance and over time, a 
theory is not a fixed object but a social category which 
changes with the changing perspectives of mathematicians."74 
There are many examples of acceptance and rejection of 
a theory by individual mathematicians. Sometimes the 
positive encouragement of a protege is notable, as that 
shown to Pascal by mathematicians of the 'Mersenne School•, 7 5 
but sadly, and more often we seem to record the cases of 
individual dislike or discouragement, of Galois by the 
. . 76 ~ French edu~ational system and the Paris Academy, OL 
Cantor by Kronecker and Mittag-Leffler, 77 or even the 
casual remark like the words of Gauss over the work of the 
young Bolyai. 
72. Menninger 1969, in particular, (431-445) 
73. This thesis has been discussed variously by Hanson (1958), 
Popper, (1963), Kuhn (1962), Lakatos and Musgrave (1970). 
74. Fisher (1966) p.137 
75. Boyer (1963). 
76. Sarton (1937). 
77. Grattan-Guinness (1971). 
75., 
On the who.le there are few cases where indi vidua·l 
mathematicians have delayed or diverted the development of 
mathematics for long. Much more often this "has been the 
result of the work of a group, though we may identify parti-
cular individuals as (spokesmen or) leaders of a group 
(at different times). A good example of this is the theory 
of invariants which flourished in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, only to be 'killed off' by Hilbert 
in 1896. 78 
Fisher defines the social existence of a theory in 
terms of two categories of mathematicians: those who are 
known practitioners of the theory and who actively contri-
bute to its development; and those who do not contribute 
directly, but who recognise that the theory has a valuable 
contribution to make to their own specialism, or to mathe-
r matics in general. 
i-: 
If numbers of the former group decline, the theory is 
only keptalive by the latter group. Since none of these 
actually practice the theory, they may soon find that they 
can do without it, forget about it, and it dies. (That is, 
it passes 011.t of social existence.) (Inhabits the third world.) 
In the example of invariant theory, it seems to have 
been called into existence in 1841 by Boole, and over the 
next fifty years mathematicians such as Cayley, Sylvester, 79 
Hesse, Eisenstein, Clebsch, Gordan, 80 Lindemann, Hermite, 
Brioschi, Peano, Klein, Lie, Hilbert and Noether all made 
contributions to the field. The fact that all of these 
are well-known mathematicians who made important contributions 
78. Fisher (1966) p.145; -
79. Called by Bell (1937) the 'invariant twins•. 
80. Student of Clebsch and tutor to Emmy Noether. 
76. 
to other fields, most of which still survive, seems to 
indicate that, at the time, it was considered an important 
and respectable part of mathematical theory. 
Cayley's definition of the general problem "to find 
all derivatives of any number of functions, (called quantics) 
which have the property of preserving their form unaltered 
after any linear transformation of the variables. 1181 set 
the scene for investigations which, starting with two-
variable functions and originally geometrical in character, 
evo~ved quickly into abstract algebra as the problem was 
generalised to functions of any number of variables. 
As often happens, crucial theorems are proved by 
newcomers to the field and this was the case when Hilbert 
produced his proof that a finite system of independent 
invariants existed for quantics in any number of variables. 82 
Hilbert did not find any systems of invariants, nor did he 
give any procedures for finding them, he just proved there 
were finite systems of invariants for a given quantic. 
:ve may remark, in terms of the development of mathe-
matics, that what Hilbert had done was to avoid one problem 
(the finding•of the invariants) by re-defining it (monster-
adjustment) and solving the new problem. 
Gordan's reported remark: "That is not mathem•tics, 
that is theol.ogy." seems to be open to different interpret-
ations, 83 but whatever is actually correct, it shows he 
recognised a major conceptual change, whether he was ready 
to accept it or not. 
81. Cay1ey, 1846, quoted in Fisher 1966,p.142. 
82. See Reid ( 1970) (247-253.) for a summary 0£ Hilbert's 
contributions. 
83. Fisher, p.145. 
-
77. 
Hilbert's breakthrough within mathematics - the .application 
oC a piece oC mathematical technique Crom one area (the 
Cormal logic oC the existence prooC) to a diCCicult problem 
in another area (which originally required geometric imagery) 
also ~ad consequences Cor the existence oC invariant theory 
as an identifiably separate piece oC mathematics. 84 
Hilbert later terminated the social existence oC 
invariant theory by Cirst suggesting that there were three 
stages in the development oC a mathematical theory: naive, 
Cormal and critical, and that whilst all other contributions 
belonged to the Cirst two stages, only!?.!!. belonged to the 
third; 85 and secondly, in another paper he publicly pro-
nounced invariant theory dead: "with this, I believe, are 
attained the most general goals oC Cunctional Cields oC 
invariants. 1186 
Hilbert's three stages are an over-easy generalisation, 
disputed at the time 87 but the public pronouncement and 
private shi£t 0£ Hilbert's interest were enough to persuade 
most mathematicians that there was no point in pursui:q.g 
the problem·.. Some 0£ the old guard oC course remained an4 
still trained research students. Gordan was one oC these, 
who tutored Emmy Noether, and she later produced a series 
0£ papers in invariant theory dealing with aspects Hilbert 
had not considered. These aspects, however, became increas-
ingly more, general and abstract, and coming under Hilbert's 
influence she generalised invariant theory out 0£ existence 
84. Reported in White (1899) 
85• Hilbert (1896) 
86. Hilbert 1893, Fisher (1966) p.145. 
87. Meyer, 1897. 
as a standard result in the theory of rings. 88 
It is difficult, if not impossible to play a 'what 
might have been' game with history, for we are set with our 
own conceptual framework. It might be true to say that any 
contemporary mathematician, brought up on abstract algebra, 
might not be able to'see' the problem that confronted 
people like Cayley, and so it may not be possible to carry 
on mathematics as it were, say, from where Gordan left off. 
Be that as it may, we have here an example of the extinction 
of an area of mathematics which, because of the conceptual 
reorganisation involved, has been completely written out 
of the text books. This occurred largely through the 
efforts of a single mathematician, David Hilbert, whose 
prestige and influence was enough to put an end 
88. Fisher, p.148. An ironic remark here is to notice that 
Emmy Noether was assigned to the 'unfashionable' Gordan 
who was on the edge of retirement. This was a natural, 
but perhaps administratively convenient selection, 
becaus~ he was a friend of the family. Her thesis, a 
•· 
formidable piece of invariant theory, is in strong 
contrast to her later work in abstract algebra. Gordan 
dug the grave, Hilbert pronounced sentence, and Noether 
performed the rites A biographical account of 
Noether•s training, work and influence is given in 
Kimberling (1972). 
to it. 90 
We can consider not only the social destruction but 
also the social creation of areas of mathematics by 
prestigious individuals or groups. This may raise an 
interesting point for philosophy: if a theory is suggested, 
it can be mathematically existent. If it is not accep"ted 
by the mathematical community, it is not socially existent, 
and therefore has no influence on the subsequent development 
of mathematics, though it is possible that mathematics may 
develop in reaction to the new theory. ·The theories may 
inhabit Popper's 'third world', but only influence the 
development of mathematics insofar as they overflow into 
the 'second world' of the belief-systems· of mathematicians 
and their dispositions to act.9 1 
Some theories may apparently return to life. The· 
social rebirth of an area 0£ mathematics is exempli£ied in 
the theory 0£ in£initesimals. I£ we consider the period 
£rom the seventeenth century to today, the theory of in£ini-
tesimals was socially assassinated by respectable mathematics 
. 
90. Invariant theory as distinct £rom the mention of 
'invariants• appears to survive in a number of di££erent 
areas 0£ specialisation: the theory 0£ the general conic 
(Barton 19SI ) in advanced level geometry; Algebraic 
geometry, Continuum mechanics, Quantum £ield theory. 
(Fisher 152-3). None ot these (except perhaps the first 
two) seem to know 0£ the existence 0£ the others, and 
their individual techniques are very di£ferent. 
91. See Section 3. 
80. 
in the nineteenth century, kept alive as a heuristic in 
nineteenth and twentieth century textbooks, and.revived in 
an acceptable form in the twentieth century in non-standard 
analysis. 92 
We can consider the migration of mathematicians as a 
factor in determining the course of mathematics, and have 
an interesting example in the movement of mathematicians 
from Germany to the United States in the 1930's. 93 This 
occurs principally as the result of political acts and 
racial persecution of non-Nazis, particularly the Jews, in 
those years. 
Felix Klein's teaching at Gottingen, the &rlanger 
Program unification of geometry, and the·careful planning 
and administration of the Mathematics faculty, prodeced a 
unique situation at the time~ Klein•s idea of Gottingen 
as the centre of the scientific world found support, and 
the university was gradually ringed with a series of scientific 
and technical institutes which became "the model for 
scientific-technological complexes which were later to grow 
92. See case study: Calculus: Metaphysics and Practice. Sect.4(d) 
Historically speaking, it is not the same theory of 
infinitesimals in spite of the fact that Robinson sees 
himself as the successor of the seventeenth century 
mathematicians. (Robinson 1966 Chp.10). 
93. Of course, not all went directly or even finally to 
the United States, the pattern is exceedingly complex 
and requires much deeper analysis than is possible 
here. 
81. 
up around various universities in America."94 
By about 1895 there was an American colony of mathe-
maticians in Gottingen, drawn by advertisements of Klein's 
courses in the Bulletin of the American Mathematical 
Society. The fact that both Gottingen grew in prestige and 
that many mathematicians from all over the world were able 
to attend courses there was due as much to the socio-economic 
factors in ~urope and America as to the brilliance and 
popularity of the teachers there. The American contacts 
made in the last years of the nineteenth·and the early 
years of the twentieth century were to have significant 
pay off about thirty years later. 
Attracted by the general intellectual atmosphere, and 
by Klein in particular, a number of outstanding mathe-
maticians came to Gottingen, and when Hilbert began tQ play 
the major role, this tendency continued. Thus Klein, and 
later Hilbert, were able to influence a large number of 
mathematicians and students who were already, or who later 
became, teachers and professors in universities throughout 
the industrialised west.95 
It is g~nerally considered that Hilbert founded the 
formalist school of mathematical philosophy, and it is 
inevitable that the methods implied by this view, if not 
the view itself, would have a strong influence on his 
94. Reid 1970, p.95. 
95. An interesting comparison can be made here with the 
famous artistic centre Bauhaus, and the teachers and 
students there. 
82. 
' 96 students and collaborators. 
To make a list 0£ all the mathematicians influenced by 
the formalist school would be a formidable task, but it 
may be possible to describe a, trend, and list a few 0£ 
the outstanding mathematicians who might be said to have 
had the most influence on contemporary mathematical practice 
and philosophy. 
In the 1930's Nazi Germany began the process 0£ 
banishing Jews and other academics with Jewish and radical 
sympathies. Fortunately, the ground was already prepared 
£or their ready acceptance in other parts 0£ the world, 
particularly in the United States. Not only were the 
American universities able to support them with facilities 
for work, money £or projects, and publication outlets, 
but they were on the whole favourable to the general under-
lying mathematical philosophy that they held.97 These 
refugees also formed formalist 'schools', and began to 
prepare a second generation for formalism. This second 
96. Klein's views were very different, more in the 
Kronecker constructivist tradition, while there were 
a few who opposed Hilbert like Brouwer and, for a time, 
~eyl, on the intuitionist side; and Russell, who began 
the ambitious logicist programme, was an occasional 
visito~. 
97. This sympathy may also have been assisted by what one 
might cnadely call the gene~al pioneering-opportunist 
attitude 0£ American society. Enterprise is rewarded 
by gain in mathematical as well as commerical fields. 
r• 
83. 
generation oC teachers and professors has had a strong 
influence on U.S. university and school mathematics programmes. 
As a particular example, Emil Artin leCt Germany in 
the early 1930's and stayed in America during the second 
world war, to return to Germany some twenty years later. 
His name appears heading a list oC 11 \iorking group experts 
to draw up a synopsis oC a modern curriculum for school 
mathematics. 11 9 8 99 
Due to the economic growth of the United States, and 
the various aid and advisory services, formalism in school 
mathematics has now spread to many countries. England and 
other countries where the possibility oC 'internal' reforms 
exist are not immune; it is almost inevitable that any 
official programme embraces something of the formalist 
h ·1 h 100 p 1 osop y. 
More obviously, political and economic causes give 
rise to new areas of mathematics through direct encourage-
ment by government or industry. For example, the use oC 
mathematicians during the second world war in various arms 
of the services to solve apparently unrelated problems like 
98. O.E.E.C. report 1961 p.307. Texts mentioned in the 
appendix to this report include Modern Algebra by 
van der Waerdan, who was a pupil oC Emmy Noether. 
99. Dresden (1942) lists the refugees, their origins and 
American appointments Crom 1933 through to early 1942. 
100. This is perhaps underlined by the Camous 'declaration' 
by a numper oC eminent teachers that formalism and 
abstract axiomatics had had too great an influence on 
the teaching oC mathematics. See GriCCiths and Howson 
(1975) (235-236) and individual contributions like 
Kline ( 1970). 
1 a4. 
~ J those of the protection of the atlantic convoys, or the 
b b . d . E i t t · h lOl om er rai s in urope gave r se o opera ions researc ; 
the contemporary funding of the computer industry by govern-
ments and business has produced a vast increase in software 
methods; research interests in logic, particularly model 
theory; and an application of computer technique to many 
probiems previously thought intractable because of the sheer 
volume of calculation. It also raises interesting questions 
about proof methods and the nature of mathematical truth. 102 
Mathematical education has much to do with social 
movements, the founding of the Association for the Improve-
ment of Geometrical Teaching, its evolution into the 
Mathematical Association; the breaking away of the Association 
for Teaching Aids in Mathematics which in its turn became 
the .\ssociation of Teachers of Mathematics, through their 
journals influence the styles of future teaching, and the 
mathematical and pedagogical content of many school programmes. 
The student protest movement of recent years is represented 
by the paper by Thomas referred to earlier, l03 which is 
a comment on the teaching of university mathematics, and 
shows how youn~ people are objecting to the insensitive and 
unmotivated catechization to which many of their number are 
subjected. This contains an economic element, for in order 
to maintain department staff, student quotas must be main-
tained, and so courses must be made attractive. This not 
only means developing new courses, more 'relevant' to 
today'~ needs (though this is questionable) 104 but also 
101. ~w"addington ( 1973), wa:s originally written as the official 
monograph for Costa! Command, R.A.F. in 1946. 
102. See Davis (1972). 
103. Thomas (1972) 
104. Bondi (1975) discusses the supply & demands of University 
examining the methodology of mathematics teaching, heuristic 
techniques, traditional standards of attainment, the 
content of syllabuses, and so on. 
There is a sociological character about some contro-
versies in the historiography of mathem.:itics. .\n example 
here is the dispute between Freudenthal and ~rattan-Guinness 10 5 
over the possibility thut Cauchy might have drawn on some 
of 8olzano's results involving thedefinition of convergence 
and the concept of continuity witl1out acknowledgement. 
This is not tuc place to go into the mathematical 
details of the dispute, but only to point out that the 
argument not only depends on conceptual and interpretational 
differences, but also on the admittance or non-admittance 
of sociological and psychological evidence: namely the 
circumstantial and inferential details of the relationships 
existing between mathematicians of the French .~cademy at 
the time. That such evidence might or might not b~ admitted 
to an historical account is a sign of the changing aware-
ness of historians of mathematics to what .. -ilder calls 
. 106 
'cultural-environmental stress'• .. -e see it occurs not 
only in the period in question, - (the eighteenth century) but 
in the historical accounts and interpretations of that period 
as well. 
10~. Freudenthal (1971) in criticism of Grattan-Guinness 
(1970b). The former not only attacks the latter's 
interpretation, but also his conceptual and mathematical 
analysis of the situation. This is the kind of personal 
attack one imagined last occurred in the nineteenth 
century, a tremendous piece of polemic ! 
06. iilder (1968)(169-170) 
86 •. 
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.There are a number ot possible aspects of the history 
l. • • •• : •• 
of mathematics that could be studied under the general 
beading of 'fashions in mathematics•·. 
Is it the case, for example, that national character-
istics broadly determine the style of mathematics which 
predominates, or the aspects of mathematics which flourish 
in different countries ? It is often remarked, for example, 
without much evidence I feel, that Indians are much better 
at calculation and worse at geometry than the Englisb. 107 
However much such remarks may be due to a ~egree of national-
108 ist bias, or sweeping over-generalisation, while we may 
claim that they are less true today with our opportunities 
for communication and cross-fertilisation, they may have 
been true to some extent in the past, because the mathematics 
produced by a country or civilisation is an aspect of the 
~ 
~ total culture, and would consequently be expected to contain 
evidence of the evolution of that culture. 
Communication in one form or other is an important 
vehicle for the fashions of mathematics. At different times 
t' 
it bas been fashionable to travel to different places to . 
learn. techDiques and skills from the masters. In the early 
107·· This kind of generalisation is often made by teachers. 
Perhaps one might cite the story of Ramanujan; here it 
is clear, for example, that he did not have the Cambridge 
concept of mathematical proof. 
108. For example Duehm (1954) sees 'deep' and 'ample' minds 
as national characteristics of the French and the 
sevente~nt~ ~~~tUz't t>ur~ti:·travelled to Italy 'to ·~b~ .; ·: '1 : 
instructed i:J.l the my~teri~.il of p~rspective constructio~; 109 
' . ~ 1 
at tl'gt turft of the·last century young American mathematicians 
110 tended to take their PhD degrees in Germany. Travelling 
to centres of mathematical leartiing is easier and even more 
frequent today. 
Journalltoo, make their contribution to the fashions 
in mathematics. The obvious contribution is the nature 
and content of the mathematical papers they print, btit 
there are hidden inCluences they may have on the style and 
practice ·of mathematics. First, it has' now become a ·require-
ment for mathematicians to publish research - not nec'essarily 
because the research contains any startling new discoveries 
but because they must be seen to be 'useful' by the 
administrators. Many institutions operate an 'efficiency 
bar•. The pressure to publish produces an enormous back-
log of papers for the more prestigious journals. This has 
a number of consequences. New journals are founded to deal 
with new specialist areas, or even because the authors 
cannot get them published in existing journals. 'Preprints' 
are.now becoming more common, where authors circulate their 
papers privately before official publication; and th.3e more 
fortunate with time and finance can bypass the blocked 
official channels by attending small gatherings, symposia, 
() 
colloquia and conferences. 
We can talk of fashions in notation. A good example 
is the use of "f" : the . and the "dx" are from 
109. Panofaky (1956). See also case study on perspective. Sect.4(c) 
110. Curtiss ( 1937) p·.559 
:. """ .. 
I ' 
b8~. 
the · i'1fini4•aimal . *•cbniqu••·_.. ot'_, Leil:taiz:, the detini ter-
"11'• integ,t'al .. · 
0 
· .::.>tro•:·Fouierr·&r-eentury' lfl.ter; the reaso!lfl ... n..: 
for the introdUction 0£ these particular symbols are 
of'ten not g1 ven, eyen·; if' they are known, the concepts have 
changed, yet we·happily continue with. ~·ainxdx because 
by eTolving convention, we somehow 'kn.ow• what it means. 
Because of' its widespread use, and particularly because 
it appears so much in print. there is t.-emendous •cultural 
re.sistance• 1.11 to Menger' s atte•pt at the rationalisation 
oC the calculus notation where this particular expression 
would appear a~, 1:inX 1~ Menger reg.ards the. calculus as 
. 0 
a calculus or differential and integral operatioa· on 
£unctions in the modern sense, 113 and wants to change the 
notation accordingly. 
Analysis of' the quantity and type of' published mathe-
matical literature can show fashions in types of' problems 
tackled; even suggesting reasons f'or basic changes in 
direction of' mathematical activity, as after Hilbert's 
1899 paper on the foundations of geometry,
114 
or reasons 
why a field.died out as a major field of' interest, 1ike 
> i 115 the theory of' determ nants. 
It is even conceivable that eminent mathematicians 
writing •survey• artic1es might suggest future develop-
ments and fashions. This was so in the case of' Hilbert's 
famous twenty-three problems, and could also be the result 
111. Wilder (1968)(176-179) 
112. Menger·(195~/3/5) typescript preface p.4. 
113. Menger . ( 190.6·) sWD111ary. 
" .J' , , " ~ • 
t.14. Cur.:tisa ,~ .1937) p ~ .. 5631J · 
1·~""'"~.' .", .. ' -
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o•~Ditiuaonne • s • "opeil proble••" at ·th• •nd. oe?hill· ·pap•t"-011.1.: 
the-·history of' algebraic geoaet.ty'-~~ ~~ Birkhoff' s "Current 
Trends in Algebran. 117 
• -.11 
It would be interesting to discover to .what extent 
these people were able to identify the significant problems 
and to what extent they determined them. 
5. Patterns of Discovery. 
Thie approach contrasts directly with Conceptual 
Reorganisation in that it is concerned, in the historical 
context, with past creative acts. -TbesetcreatiYe act• them-
selves can be regarded a~ the: conceptual r•organtsationa of 
mathematicians in history: the acts-of abstraction; general-
isation, symboling, consolidation and selection that produce 
recognisable (and often spectacular) breakthroughs in 
problem-situations. The problems can be empirical, 
physical situations - in which casetthe mathematics is 
usually 'applied' , in the sense .that it is used as a tool 
Cor discovery after the creative act of modelling the 
physical situation; the majority of accounts available 
come from the. areas of astronomy and physics, a prime 
example being the investigations into the la• of free 
118 
Call, or they can be conceptual problems, like the 
problem of continuity, a problem in 'pure' mathematics. 
The distinction, if any, between 'pure' and 'applied' 
mathematics is entirely one of function, for both are 
concerned with the world of reality, and a piece of mathe-
116. Dieudonne (1972) 
111" Birkboff'_ ( 1973·l ·• ... ,.~ 
·. ·-· '" I .... ' . 
118. Jto7re..: ' 19-5 5) -.xaaine• tbe, doeuaeatary evt.•ace:.1'or · _ 
the gradua;l. conceptual cbang•• :trom Jtepler to Newton 




mattes can be •pure• or •applie~~according to the function 
'"" 1 ... ';;· • ',_. ·: ·~ -· !" .•J:~ t~ • •• ..... ,:', •.• . ;v ·r~. th.·a~ ;:..n.;,i'1t .. 
it haa.lil*a given problem situation. 119 · 
. ' ... . .. ~ ~ _ 1 r r'•~ rt ! • · ' 
Mathematical techniques in science serve as techniques 
for inference-drawing. They serve to draw a picture or 
model of the physical problem which emphasises certain 
' 
aspects that the investigator feels are significant. Thus, 
in many cases, the creation of mathematics is bound to the 
investigation of ·problems in the physical world. 120 
We can distinguish here two )!inds of mathem4tical 
creation, each to do with the function of the mathematics 
involved. Pure mathematics, regarded as an abstract a3io-.. .. t'" • 
matic system, has its creative aspect in the formation of 
concepts, axioms and rules of inference. This is followed 
by the discQvery of theorems which are completely deter-
mined by the axioms and rules of inference. A special case 
of the creative aspect is the application of concepts and 
procedures from one field of mathematics to another -
. . d I' t 1 . ti 121 requ1r1ng a egree o~ concep ua reorgan1sa on. Applied 
mathematics can be regarded as the development and use of' 
abstract systems to describe, exp1ain, and predict events . 
in the physica1 world. Thus creation here consists 0£ the 
formation of theoretical concepts which describe aspects 
of the physical system, followed by the formu1ation o·f 
relationships. which are described by mathematics. The 
mathematics here is either taken over from standard sources 
119. For elaboration of this view,, a.ee discussion of' Popper's 
' . 
"three worlds" in Section 3. 
l."' ' • ' 
i;20. A pr'!~.°1.°=.81~ q~o~e.d: .~pt~P..1:~·-":+" .Fo~i~r,, note 'ta a.1?,~::ve. 
121. The revol.utionan etf'ect, o~ tqe work, of' ~llllDY Noether 
' - - - I ' ' -- ' .. .. ,. \. ~ '\~A j ' 1 : ~ ~ : • • >~ . J T ' ' - ~ ._ ; ;r, 





or adapteci· by- the' exj>erimenter. 122 · Disce>Tery then· "c.oJtsists 
in working through the mathematical model to obtain further 
relationships which are subsequently re-interpreted as 
123 physical laws. 
The application of mathematics to the physical world 
in the seventeenth century gave-rise to a new methodology 
in science which, in principle, enables us- ex"actly to 
describe·, explain and predict physical phenomena·.-
The, con.cept of· exactness lies in the spectacular nature 
of the predictions involved. Astonomical phenomena, way 
out ot-· direct· reach of the individuar, were predicted with 
impressive increasing accuracy. It was a na·tural develop-
ment thd~ ~he ~rinciple that the application and develop-
ment of more powerful (and meant more exact) mathematics 
would provide more precise prediction. This lies at the 
root of our modern concept of the •exact• sciences, and 
the habit of mind we have developed (ably assisted by 
scientific p~ilosophy) that the practical intellectual 
pursuits w~ere exact mathematics is widely applicable are 
122. Dirac's investigations into the wave functions oC 
quantum mechanic• produced Cunctions which 'worked' 
(they described the physical phenomena), but whose 
•existence' was disputed by mathematician11. It was 
largely through Dirac's personal prestige that the 
techniques were accepted (similar remarks apply to 
inCini tesimals, See Section 44). Fourier also, i•-· 
another case in point. 
123. The-- b,1Wric1 distiJlcti.ou- Htwe;epr: 'Cl"•'crtioP--:aA44 discovery 










morfi ·re·speet:able, ·more' deserving of the. claaaiticatfo• :. ·;:;!.) 
•sciencet.:' 
Investigation of patterns of' discoYery·i• the domain 
of' the philosopher as well as the historian, and in a sense 
the f'act that historians may try to f'ind out, a• far a• is 
possible, exactly what theorem a mathematician discovered, 
or what concept he was strugg~ing with, implies the 
possession of an underlying philosophy, namely some belief 
in a logic of discovery. 124 The difference between philosopher 
and historian lies in the empbaiJis o·f interest: the philo-
sopber is primarily concerned with th• ana1ysis of problem 
situations £or the understanding of theoretical· ayatesu. 
and critical arguments: the historian's first concern ia 
the reconstruction of problem-situations. The philosopher 
uses the historical facts as bis data, while the historian 
establishes those Sac ts.. Obviously neither actiwity 
excludes the other. 
There is also an aspect.of such situations which may 
be regarded as the concern ot: psychology, for the reasons 
why a person was disposed to act in such a way, or the 
mental mechanisms involved, augge•t a study of the psychology 
. 125 
of discovery and creation. · 
In investigating an individual the historian of mathe-
matics cannot help using both a logic and a psychology 
of discovery, though these may be more on the ievel of 
. 
124. See Collingwood (1946), (282-302) 'history as re-
. 
enactment 0£ paat experience'; see alao above: 
' . ' - ' . . 
'Rationality of Action.a•. pp(39-~2) above. 
l- l \ ' :.. • ( 
125. See Hadamard (1945). 
. · ..... 
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•orki~g -J)~iuC:ipleS'' ~;.. '.ma.X:1mit:12,6: :t-atti.&r:c tlian.;re;I=l~d~iveloped 
Both c:r-eation and discovery are thti concerns at·· 
pedagogy. Heuristic is used to assist the e:r-eation of mathe-
matica1 conce.pts by- placing the peraon i1f a positioll where 
they may be able to achieve conceptual reorganisations, 
and the discovery of' mathem4tic.- by providing a set of' 
maxims f'or the procedural analysis of analagous situations. 127 
The historian of mathematics baa a particularly cli~f'i­
cult task, tor while on the surf'aCe' he ·1Ef eligageci bi es:tablish-
ing tht'f f'acts ot history ( anc.f tli;is, •~ans·· deciding by some 
criteria which of 'tbe· facts about ·tne past cfeserve. raising 
to that statusY, he is also engaged in a conceptual recon-
struction of elements of the tliird world; th6 past pr'Oblems, 
theoretical systems and critical arguments. 128 
Critical arguments, (the schema of' conJectures and 
refutations) encompass problem-situations and theoretical 
systems, and the history of mathematics may be regarded 
not as a history of mathematical theories, but s:s a history 
of mathematic;al problem-situations and their.· modifications, 
. 
tor every attempt to understand a: theory opens up. an 
historical investigation into the theory and its problem-
situation, thus ..... the main aim of historical under-
standing is the hypothetical reconstruction of' a historical 
126. Polani (1962) (30-31), (49-50) and also Davis (1967). 
127. P~lya (1945) was the first contemporary a~tempt to 
bring· thes• ra:fes to the sU:riac·e·, 'but t'il41t1'-.e ue; many 
othii- .;)ta.bp1es · iti · th6 ·Mstory··c):t' pedagO:gy. l:t:ke :Rec~o~de' a 
·~~ft:e~one 'of. Witte•~ and. De Morgaa•s '"Study and D·if'fi-
·~~-,-':<:'~- ~ ' . "'""· -_,,h -:· ,_._-·. r~ - r.;~-~- ~·""\ - - .,. " 
ctlltfea ··of Matbnatica"· •' i:n ·•Ji~ Penny ·Cycloplledia. 








prot;l~~si.tuatj,o~··" • . . ~ ..,. . . . . 
between, the hypot~~tical recona.truction of' ~lie pr..o~!~':" "''!'.: 
situat+on, which is a conject-Qre about the actual p~~bl.ell\, 
of' the mathema.tician at the time, and the problem 0£.. under-
.·~\. 
standing the reconstruction. Conf'usion of' ~he meta.-problems 
and meta-theories of' the historians of' mathematics and the 
problems and theories of' the mathematicians in history. can 
lead to a great deal of' argument. 139 1.3 1 
Both the bis.torian 0£ mathematics and .the pedagogue 
are keenly interested in f'ailure!t a:•: well 4s su~c•••.•.•.-
f'or f'ailures give clues to conceptual organisationa which 
on examination, become una'1:cep.t~ble .. ~-o- &i ther the individual 
suggesting them, or to the mathema.t.ical community at large. 
Failures give perhaps more clues than successes to the 
processes of' problem-solving employed, f'or the "••• schema 
of' problem-solving by conjecture and refutation or a similar 
schema may be used as an explanation theory of' human actions, 
since we can interpret an action as an attempt to solve a 
132 problem. 11 Galileo's theory of' the tides, which was a 
'failure', shows the importance of' the reconstruction of' . 
Galileo's problem-situation f'or the understanding of' 
Galileo's theory. 133 
129. Popper (1972)p.170. 
130. The dispute reCerred to above (105) contains these 
confusions. Freudenthal accepts neither Grattan-Guinness' 
reconstruction of the Cauchy-Bolzano problem s.1 tuation, 
nor his understanding of' it. 
131. It may be suggested that· most of' the discusaiona in 
•mathem~tical education• are meta.problems and metatheories 
.•; 1' 
\ ' ' 
•I I; 
about understanding problem-situations. 
132. Popper ( 1972.) (underl.iniq mine). . i ~;. 
133. Discussed in Popper ( 1972) ( 170-_18_0_) ______________ _ 
discovery are critically reliant on variations in documentary 
' • ' ' W t I ~ 
evidence. A recent example 0£ a major change in viewpoint 
comes in the accounts of the discovery 0£ the law 0£ free 
Call by Galileo. The ac.Count in Two New Sciences gives no 
clue to Galileo's actual process oC discovery. In £act 
it is misleading, so much so that Crom a diagram 134 said to 
be copied Crom Oresme, and other textual evidence, it was 
inferred that the medieval mean speed theorem was the basis 
oC Galileo's theory. 135 
136 
New documentary evidence suggests 
' 
a di£ferent story. 
Stillman Drake identiCies two types 0£ discovery in 
mathematical physics; D1 , which are systematic deductions 
or implications from the basic theory, un£orseen by the 
original investigator, or unsuspected at the beginning 0£ 
an investigation; this is equivalent to what I have called 
'discovery' above; and o2 , the " • • • perception that a certain 
mathematical r~lationship holds £or physical phenomena 
considered in a certain way." 137 This contains a certain 
amount 0£ conceptual reorganisation, aud corresponds to 
what I have called •creation' above. He considers that 
history consists mainly oC 'discoveries', D1 , with the 
acts of' 'creation• o2 as the rarer but most important £acts. 
134. Galileo (1638) Dover, p.173. 
135 •. vartoCsky ( 1968). The summary in appendix ( 419-473) 
goes into great detail about Galileo,• s discovery 
process based on this assumption. 
136. Drake (1973), (1974). · ·.... :.c 






96 ., .. . •..,I u 
A~cording to Drake• s investigations; t·he redis'c:overy 
of the Eudoxian theory ~f proportion (in the ~ontext of 
Euclid Book V), encouraged Galileo to treat the growth of 
speed as continuous, it provided a new mathematical model 
for a phsical phenomenon. Galileo's procedures were thus 
mathematical, and mathematical reasoning replaced the 
traditional Aristotalian form of argument. This reconstruct-
ion of Galileo's argument, principally from manuscript 
notes and letters where he was trying to explain his ideas 
to a colleague, shows how, in the process of' the attempted 
explanation, the concept of acceleration emerged. 
We see here Drake's attempt to reconstruct Galileo's 
problem-situation in the light of new historical evidence. 138 
Application of mathematics derives theorems which are then 
' interpreted in terms of the problem-situation. 139 The 
reconstruction of Galileo's procedure depends on a number 
of factors, amongst which are: a knowledge of the cultural 
context in which Galileo was working, in this respect his 
change in mode of reasoning was all the more important; 
familiarity- with the mean speed theorem as understood in 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, and the 
conventions of Aristotelian reasoning as applied to it; 
138. The bound, unordered volume 72 of' the Galilean manu-
scripts, notes and letters, contains facts about the 
past. Those mentioned in Drake's paper are now facts 
of history for they are vital to the reeonstruction 
of Galileo's theory. 
139. Galileo, in f'act, derived some correct resultti f'ro• 
false premise-a, but tha't is not· relevant to-: the-present 
argument .• 
previou'~ v~sions ot t2he story have shown 
··-. Galileo might have obtained t• .ll.aw of f'ree fall :from 
mean speed theorem shows how t~ was enough data in 
li.leo•s context to have been abl~ 'to pursue the traditional 
:~nes o:f reasoning and come up witb ~he same answer; 140 
'"'~amiliari ty with Galileo's previous work shows how the 
a 
&udoxian theory of proportion, att~tive as a mathematical 
,theory, sheds light on the vexed ql:l:f.1b;ation o:f time and 
a'pace continuity. 
It is important also to reali~ that Drake's 1974 
paper is a correction of the earli.~ 1973 1 where the basic 
idea in the explanation of Galileo•• problem-situation is 
the same, (the importance 0£ the t~ory of proportion), 
but where a piece of evidence was ornitted. 141 
We have here an example 0£ how the discovery 0£ new 
evidence changes the picture of how Galileo discovered the -
law of free fall, but does not alte~ the previously established 
£act that he did discover it. Thus empirical reconstruction 
is furnished with more data (the id~nti£ication of the 
problem-situation) by means of an iftvestigation into the 
. 
actual process 0£ discovery. 
A reconstruction on a number at different levels o:f 
a discovery by Euler is given in Polya's book on Induction 
t . 142 H and Analogy in Mathema ics. e considers ~uler's own 
140. For example, Warto£sky (1968) ~54-465) 
141. Drake (1974), p.139. 
142. Polya (1954) Vol 1, Chp. VI ia a translation and 
discussion of i Discovery of o most Extraordinary Law 
of the Numbers Concerning tho Sum of their Divisors. 




account is worth studying because be "••• made important 
discoveries •·•. by induction, that. ia 9 .. by obse~vatio~, 
. 143 . 
daring guess, and shrewd verif'ication." It becomes clear 
that the kind of' induction meant is not mathematical induction 
as we know it, but scientif'ic induction which would bopef'ully 
144 lead to a rigorous mathematical proof'. 
Euler's own account of' his discovery as translated by 
Polya, shows two aspects of' the investigation. The terms 
and notations used are f'irst explained, and the law f'or the 
;,_ sum of' the divisors is given. In this, Euler shows some 
anxiety that he is unable to provide what he regards as a 
rigorous proof", and regrets that the best he can do· in thi·s 
respect is to " • • • present evidence •• almost equivalent to 
a rigorous demonstration. 1114 5 
He is virutally advertising f'or someone to come up with 
a more satisf'actory proof', and to assist them, he retraces 
the path he claimed he f'ollowed in discovering the law. 
This consists in his own reconstruction of' his attempts to 
f'ind a proof' f'or the equivalence of' a continued inf'inite 
product of'separate f'actors, and the inf'inite power series 
which results when the f'actors are multiplied out. Euler 
says: "I proceeded as f'ollow. Being given that the two 
143. Polya (1954) p.90 vol 1 
144. Polya (1954) vol 1 p.3 quotes some of Euler's remarks 
on his methodology f'rom Opera Omnia ser.1., vol.2, p.459 
where he caref'ully distinguishes between the results of' 
induction and mathematical truth. 
145. Polya (1954) p.91 underlining mine • 
'·· . . ' .. , 
express-ions::· • '\ "'·.~·\.;t~-
I .• -. s ::s• 
Ir. 
are equal, r got rid of the factors in the first by taking 
logarithms: 
2 3 . . 4 
logs= log (1-x)+log(t-x )+log(t-x )+l~g{t~x ). + ••• ..... 
rn order to get rid of the logarithms, r differentiate and 









x ds x 
-= -+ 
s dx 1-x 
3x3 
+ ~3 + 
1-x 
• • • 
4x4 sx5 
:-4 + -5+ ••• 
1-x 1-x 
From the second expression tor s, and infinite series, we 
obtain another value 
x ds x 2x 2 + = 
s dx 1-x 
11. Let us put 
for the 
- 5x5 




- 7x7 + 12x12+t5x15-22x22-26x26+ 
x5+ 7 12 15 22 26 x -x -x +x +x· - ••• 
= t 
We have above two expressions 'f'or the quantity t. In the 





tiines,-aifttsrexponent.fias divisors, and that each diviso:i-
arises·· iu1·:a coef'~icient of ·the same power of· x. Therefore, 
if' we collect the terms with like powers, the coef'f'icient 
of' each power will be the sum of the divisors of its 
exponent. And, therefore, using the above notationcS'(a) 





+4<5)x5 + ••• 
The law of' the series is manifest. And although it might 
appear that some induction was involved in the determination 
of' the coef'f'icients, we can easily satisfy ourselves that 
this law is a necessary consequence." 1~7 
This connection with the divisor law is made by Hind-
sight. Sometime after, the results of' the investigation 
into divisors brought up the number pattern which was then 
connected with the unproven algebraic identity. 
The fact that he can find a rigorous proof f'or neither 
of' these relations brings out his method of' demonstration, 
of convincing himself and others by rational argument that 
they are correct. 
But what, in fact, he de•onstrates is not so much his 
method of' arriving at a law, but his search f'or a proof' 
of' a dif'f'erent (but logically equivalent) ~· 
The only way in which we can interpolate ~ Euler 
discovered the law of' divisors, is to say that at one time· 
he was investigating particular products and infinite 
series and trying to f'ind a proof' of' their equivalence, and 
that later he happened to remember the pattern of' powers 
and coef'fi'cieilts when he was engaged o:n what was originally 
' 'l .. , 
147. Polya ( 1954) (97-98L 
''. '. j ' .. - .. 
'i \ . ( 
a .very. dit'f'erent .. pr-t>·blem;. ·that~ 0£· the•. clivisora1·of'-nitmtiers ~ 
1 Pol,-a• a·.account ia something elae again; it is a 
contemporary interpretation of the logic of Euler's discovery 
according to Euler. Polya is rationalising Euler's reason-
ing and justifying his proof-methods as a means of obtain-
ing discoveries in mathematics. Polya•s account is a 
metatheory, an attempt at understanding Euler's problem-
situation,. which he then uses to support his case for 
employing heuristic reasoning in teaching mathematical 
discovery. Polya•s work is interesting and valuable, for 
be usee accounts of historical problem-situations to 
suggest a methodology which encourages creation by analogy 
and conjecture, and discovery by heuristic and plausible 
reasoning. 
Perhaps it is even more di:t'ficul t when we have the 
written account of a mathematician of one of his own 
discoveries, for the habit of the polished presentation 
dies hard, and time clouds the memory, so that even the 
personal account is something that may be viewed with 
t . 148 cau ion. • 
6. Summary 
An early critique oC different types of mathematical 
history points out some of the pitfalls of historical 
writing, "It is the impression conveyed by a number of 
1. 
sentences or by whole pages which is the most important 
element of a history of mathematics, and if such a history 
is largely made up of statements taken in substance from 
various sources· withou~· being ful:ly digested it is very 
.•. 'P'" 
~P.t. to ~Qn~~Y· •or,e f'alse Tmi>resiJiona than the actual 
~ ;,. .. \ . .._ . ' ' ... - ,, ' . . 
1::.r· .• ~-... ~,.,~ ...... .I • , ... r-- .-. ~-.. rt.~·· .~ ~ i ~\ .... I. f .. t --------- ~ 
: II 
102 .. +., 
inaccura~ies in individual. sentences would see• to indicate. 
In view·o£ the ~eat v~iety o£~•~bjecta covered in a . '... .... ' ' · .... ·,. . 
. -- --~-
history of modern mathematics, it seems a1most inevitable 
to introduce to some degree false impressions into such a 
his~ory even when each •tatement taken by itself is 
practically correct. The reader who realises this difficulty 
can use to great advantage a work which otherwise might be 
harmful to him. 11149 
We have looked at four approaches to the history of 
mathematics, and though they have been broadly classified 
according to the. conscious (.or unconscious) purpose. for 
which they were written,. we see~that it is both impossible 
for the writer to exclude other aspects when taking a 
particular point of view, and important for the reader to 
be aware what the main purpose of the writing is; empirical 
reconstruction, a straightforward account of the main problems 
and developments; conceptual reorganisation, a largely 
unconscious (and perhaps unintended) account of the past 
in contemporary terms; socio-economic development, the 
examinatio~ of the general reasons for changes, and patterns 
oC discovery, t~e attempt to reconstruct individual mathe-
maticiads problem situations. 
There is no way in which we can achieve Dickson's ideal, 
It ••• what is generally wanted is a full and correct state-
ment of the facts, not an historian's personal explanation 
of these facts. The more completely the historian remains in 
the background or the less conscious the reader is of the 
historian's personality, the better th~;· histo._ry:."~5~~ 
Better honest bias than unthinking error. 
149. Mi~iler· fif2·t)'p··. to. · ·· 1 C •. ··;,\· '. ~ • 
150. ·.o~~cka~n .<~'20) preface. Thia typical inductivist history 
I . 
0£ mathematics ha• a methodology and style which derives 
r ' ' iC! - • ~ - -; ' ... ' r c '. ' .... .., .I'"{.,,., .. ' ....... 
Crom Ranke and :~Jbewe.i).i.1 ;· 
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The Philosophy of·Mathetnatica and the Methodoiogy of 
Mathematics Teaching. 
1. Argument 
The teaching oC mathematics is biased by an individual 
teacher's 'belieC-system• 2 which contains an uncritical 
ideology3 oC mathematics. A knowledge oC the history of 
mathematics helps to turn uncritdcal ideology into critical 
philosophy by providing instances of diCferent levels of 
mathematical activity Crom heuristics to prooCs, thus 
exhibiting the method of proofs and refutations in action, 
thereby suggesting. some critical methodological approaches 
to the teaching oC mathematics. 
2. Some Problems in the Training oC Teachers. 
During a given course the teacher-trainer has to·try 
to impart two main areas of skill; first: methods of 
teaching which can range Crom the general strategies of 
curriculum design to the particular tactics oC classroom 
techniques, and second: aspects oC learning which covers 
the growth ap.d communication oC knowledge in the individual 
and in the group. In the context 0£ the t:aaching and learn-
ing of mathematics, students study mathematics as a subject 
t. This discussion is concerned with epistemology and the 
origins oC mathematics rather than with Coundations oC 
mathematics which has latterly been interpreted as the 
totality· of philosophy. 
2. "Belief-system" roughly· a general1y under-developed 
eognitive schema, or set of ideas, for detai:ls·se'e:'."' 
be1ow P· t'i·5 '· . ' ' . 
3; Idecdogy. Def" = science ot ·fdeas·':(litYre- used more in· the 
seiis_e ot idee fixee or uncritical assumption). 
J 
161! 
wl\ere . pe-ticular t•chJ:iiqiura ·and tdeaa (!.d~tribttte , towar,dN, 
the building· o~ an overall! structure, and 1·f11 doing ·aoi; ... are 
helped to become aware of' their own learning of mathematics. 4 
Such a wide range of' activity is dif'f'icult to encompass even 
with the most highly motivated students with good mathe-
matical backgrounds; :for the majority of' students under-
going a 'method' course the problems are more intract.able, 
not only is the general mathematical background poor,5 but 
:for the majority of' non-specialists (and these are mainly 
primary teachers) the attitude towards mathematics is at 
best indif':terence and· at worst antagonism and :fear. 6 
3. General Attitudes 
The training of' mathematics teacbera at all levels 
comes hard up against popular conceptions of' science and 
mathematics, concept ions which are include·d in the student's 
belief'-system. The popular conceptions run approximately 
thus: Theories of' science are derived :from :facts, or :facts 
:from theories, and as a corollary, theories are accepted 
or rejected on the basis of' :factual (i.e. experimental) 
evidence. The simple conclusion :from these ideas is that 
the scien~ist readily abandons his old theory in :favour of' 
the new, given suf'f'icient evidence~ The simplistic approach 
contains an obvious contradiction. On the one hand, science 
is right - it 'proves' things about the world, while on the 
4. I am attempting to generalise here, to include the 
5. 
6. 
training of' non-specialist primary teachers as well 
as specialists :for secondary schools and colleges. 
It is not necess~y to have even 0-level mathe•atics 
~ t" ~ ' ~ .. ·;~ t, l-
t o gain entry to a teacher•• college •. 
,• . t,. •!", .... , , . -·~• •. ~, 
Manchest~r University Report .. ( 1968). See also.Section' 1 
note 19. 






other, o~~ '?r rejected ~beories are wrong. 7 Few, if" any, 
).. 1· ·~::-:-i_r:s; ~._~:!, •& 
contradictory situations are seriously studied in general 
<; • 
science education, it is more likely that the old theories 
are ridiculed and their history and supporting arguments 
:f'orgotten. 8 
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The situations in mathematics education is much worse. 
All mathematics is right. 'Wrong' mathematics simply does 
not exist, or if it does, it is only possible by contradiction 
of' right mathematics, and is transient and unacceptable. 
So far as the relation between teacher and pupil goes, 
mathematics is transmitted, but not discussed. 9 Can we 
wonder that the majority of students, unable to cope with 
transmission are bewildered or even antagonistic. The 
survivors, so-called 'mathematicians' have their problems, 
:f'or ef:f'icient absorption of' mathematics technique may be 
necessary, but is certainly not a sufficient condition :f'or 
later creativity. 
The actual picture, we know, is much more complex. 
In science, new theories are derived from others by extension: 
7. Whi!e this extreme popular view may be thought to be 
an exaggeration, I would remind the reader of the many 
instances where a scientist is reported as proving 
something right or wroqg. 
8. For example, Phlogiston Theory. Briefly disposed of on 
Sherwood Taylor's popular chemistry text, we can see 
in Agassi (1963) (41-48) how Priestly held on in spite 
of' Lavoisier's alternative. 
9. Again, as in the case of science education, there will 
,. ' 
be many notable exceptions but the old joke about mathe-
, '~ .. :., .... '\:i, \, 
matics go~ng from the blackboard to the student's pad 
..... 1 . \. ... ~ l ~ • -~ !....... ~} ' • • ..; "·.., ~ .. 
without going through the .I.ind of either teacher or 
~ 
pupil still has some currency .. -. 
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by modif'icati.on and re-in,terpretation.. .Th•.oriee ·shape 
f'acts, some are emphaaised, some suppressed and theories 
determine the acceptance or rejection of' f'acts. 
From the practice and the history oC science we see 
that the scientist of'ten attelQpta to 'explain away' anoma-
lous f'acts, and theories are def'ended - of'ten Ciercely and 
against all comers by their supporters. This state of' 
af'f'airs is possible because scientif'ic theories appeal to 
the intellect. They are attempts to provide all-embracing 
explanations or int,erpretations of' the real world. In thi·s 
sense, they are symbolic and objective. 
Pure mathematics with its heavy current emphasis on' 
structure deals exclusively with symbolic-objective Corms. 
The bases of' the constructions of' these structures are 
heuristic, and their evolution is a philosophical historical 
process. 
While f'or both science and mathematics there is 
consensus over a large body of' knowledge regarded as 'true•, 
the actual picture also contains a number of' rival theories 
or other pos&ible interpretations where science and mathe-
matics are discussed and degrees of' truth or acceptability 
are matters of' opinion. 
4. Training in mathematical techniques: Discovery methods 
and Investigation. 
The successf'ul mathematics teacher imparts not only 
knowledge but skill and is able to encourage mathematical 
10 intuition and train problem-solvers·. Using his belief'-
10. Again, this is not only the case with gifted mathe-
matics specialists at higher levels, :t>ut also:with 




I , , 
system the individual teacher conse~ouslr •"ttempts .... to,·,r 
train stu'dents in particular techniques·, •nd more o:Cten. 
unconsciously, gives them some insights into the heuristic 
procedures necessary f'or successCul prob·lem-solving. 
This two-Cold aspect oC mathematics teaching has been 
recognised bor a long time by teachers such as Polya, 11 
and more recently by Biggs, where attempts to develop 
children's problem-solving capabilities were separated 
Crom the routines oC mathematical technique. 12 This latter, 
an example oC the 'discovery method' owes at least as much 
to the developing methodoiogy of' primary education as it 
~ 
does to a critical mathematical philosophy. A continuing 
theme oC such an approach is that children should have had 
relevant'experience' beCore particular mathematical ideas 
or techniques are introduced. 
Discovery methods are not new, 13 the traditional idea 
being to draw out Crom the student the answer supposedly 
lying within. However, the answer is also known to the 
teacher as the correct result, and the path Crom ignorance 
to enlightenment is oCten careCully contrived so that the 
student is allowed to discover only what the teacher knows. 
\Ii th the kind oC mathematical ideology held by most 
primary teachers, it has not been possible to improve on 
a situation which diCCers in no real way Crom the past; 
the body oC mathematical knowledge is Cixed and children 
have to discover it. Primary school discovery methods 
11. Polya (1945),(1954) and (1962/5). 
12. Biggs (1965) and Hartung and Biggs (1971). 
13. The Geometrical Experiment with Meno•s sla•e Plato (1956) 
is taken as the· Cirst example in the discussion o:f 
the evolution oC §iscovery Teaching in Jones (1970) 
108. 
cannot evolve while the teacher's view 0£ the nature 0£ 
mathematic.a is restricted. Because of. this, they lack the 
confidence to accept as respectable mathematics many of the 
valuable and genuine discoveries of their pupils. The main 
difficulty here is the attempt to teach heuristic (problem-
solving) within the context of mathematics. Polya•s attempts 
speak mainly to the trained mathematician and are diffi-
cult to generalise. 14 Rules for problem-solving are like 
the inductive roles in science - applicable often only by 
hindsight. A recent development has produced a scheme for 
suggesting a variety of conjectures or problem-situations, 15 
and might be usefully applied to help break through the 
students inhibitions about the inability to generalise and 
16 solve problems. Problem generation and solution is a 
fundamental mathematical skill and while the problems. may 
not be very interesting to a sophisticated mathematician 
the practice offered to the student is invaluable. 
The place where the teaching of technique and heuristic 
seemed ~o be equally successful appears to be in the work 
of R.L. ~oore, where accounts describe the student as 
having no formal lectures; being set problems but not being 
allowed to consult texts or papers; being encouraged to 
14~ One of the major difficulties is that the communication 
of heuristic is often personal and charismatic. 
15. Walter, and Brown,.(1969) also Brown and Walter (1970) 
describe "What if Not ?" a strategy for seeking problem 
generalisations. 
16. ·The encyclopaediaic possibilities of the what-if-not? 
procedures may be daunting. Choice and Motivation also 
figure highly - see ATM(1966). 
.; 
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engage in public discussion of the conjectur&a ·and· proof's 
oC himselC and his Cellows, .and as a result, oCten finding 
himselC in a position to solve challenging research problems 
and make original contributions to mathematics. 17 
A number oC college teachers were sympathetic to these 
views and developed them in various ways to use as 'Investi-
18 gations' in mathematics courses Cor teachers. Investi-
gations are intended to be original pieces oC research at 
the student's own level and are oCten suggested by a tutor 
to a particular student aCter careCul discussion. Progress 
is monitored in regular tutorials and work is assessed in 
relation to the student's own mathematical background. 19 
With such an aspect oC a course, while students mathe-
matical knowledge and technical expertise may not be so 
great, their independence, selC-reliance and intuition are 
encouraged, and with this training they will hopeCully be 
17. Whyburn (1970). ReCerences to the method are also 
Couµd in Moise (1965) and Wilder (1967). 
18. Nota~ly Bell, Morley, and Sturgess at Nottingham, and 
Caldwell, Leaton and others in the colleges oCCering 
the 'Alternative Syllabus' in the London Institute. 
19. This introduces problems oC the subjectivity oC 
assessment, especially when comparison with most 
traditional courses is attempted. An account is given 
in ATM (1966) and it is an obvious theme in ATM(1967). 
Banwell, Saunders and Tahta (1972) continues to 




able to develop the- ski:lls they may require by themselves. 20 
Attempts to justif'y this kind of' procedure claim that 
mathematics is as much an activity as a set of' results, 
and that traditional mathematics teaching does not do enough 
towards encouraging the other essential skills a student 
requires if' he is to operate as a mathematician. 21 These 
skills, it seems, have been acquired by the gif'ted almost 
by accident af'ter a long period of' initiation. 
Here is the dilemma. Do we solve problems by appli-
cation of' acquired skills, or by a knowledge of' the kind 
of' skills to develop with the means at our disposa~ ? 
The rapidly changing content of' mathematics makes the ~ 
of' thought a much more usef'ul proposition, if we can f'ind 
means to classif'y and communicate them. It is not 
necessarily true that insights into mathematical heuristic 
are acquired only in the context of practice in the techniques 
of mathematics; examinations of the ways in which mathe-
matics arises in the individual and in the social context 
are also valid means. 
5. Desc~iptions of Teaching 
Descriptions of teaching range f'rom teaching as a 
science to teaching as an ~rt', suggesting a wide range of 
20. As with all courses there are successes and f'ailures. 
•Investigations' work against a long established 
tradition and it is not easy to convince students of 
the value of such an activity. It is also vastly 
time-consuming if done at all conscientiously, parti-
eularly with weaker students. 
21 • See Morley ( 197'.5) • - : , 1 .. : • --,~ 
.... '. ' . 
'. { l ;. 
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approaches. Method& 0£ teaching and improving teaching 
que.stion the nature oC science, art, learning, knowledgE[l, 
etc., and in this context, the nature oC mathematics. 
IC we accept that theories oC science and mathematics have 
philosophical bases, then theories oC mathematics teaching 
imply philosophical standpoints. Epistemology, the 
discussion oC the origins oC mathematics and the grounds 
oC mathematical knowledge can be Cound in the writings oC 
22 many mathematical educators. Those views have been 
carried into teaching usually by implication, though more 
recently, explicit statements about the nature oC mathe-
matics have appeared in books written Cor teachers at both 
primary and secondary leve1. 23 Over the last ten years or 
so we have seen a much greater emphasis on the production 
oC material Cor teachers - to interpret that produced Cor 
children. 24 The bases oC these interpretations lie in a 
number of diCCerent areas, Cor primary mathematics the 
major inCluence appears to come Crom developmental psychology, 
while for the secondary school, the influence is more clearly 
derived from the structures of mathematics itselC. 
IC we examine some theories which may contribute to 
the interpretation of mathematics, we Cind that theories in 
difCerent Cields have similar general forms. For example, 
22. For example, those mentioned in Section 1. 
23. In both ATM (1967) and Banwell, Saunders and Tahta 
(1972) teachers are positively encouraged to explore 
the nature oC mathematics and mathematics teaching and 
learning. 
24. For example many secondary textbooksserie• have •teachers 
books' associated with them while the intention oC the 
Nuffield Project waa to provide guides Cor primary 
teachers to methods • material already available. 
B~!r''!~_2escr~p.~~._0::t:_ ~~ _intellectu~l growt~. ·of. ·the 
child
25 
is similar to Polanyi's description of the 
historical development of scientific theory, 26 and these 
both have elements in common with Wilder's ideas.of the 
evolution of mathematical concepts. 27 
While the details of the theories differ, there are 
similarities in broad outline, and the object of this · 
brief comparative exploration is to. suggest that in each 
we become involved in the gradual objectivisation of 
25. BruneT (1968)(5-6) 
~ 
26. Polanyi (1964)(160-171) 
27. ~ilder (1968) (169-181),(207-209) • 
.. .)! I 




28 experience via the use and development or symbols •. 
28. For comparison the theories can be brieCly described thus: 
Bruner 
Intellectual development depends on systematic and 
contingent interaction between teacher and learner via 
symbols. This growth is characterised by: (i) Increasing 
independence oC response Crom the immediate nature oC 
the stimulas; (ii) Ability to internalise events into 
a pattern or system that corresponds to the environ-
menti (iii) Increasing capacity to use symbols to 
bring order into the environment and to deal with 
several alternatives simultaneously. 
Polanyi 
Stages oC scientiCic belieC have their own values and 
vision oC reality. Science embraces a consistent 
pursuit oC gradually changing, ever more enlightened 
elevated intellectual aspirations. (i) Bases oC belieC 
lie in nwnbers and geometrical Cigures, as, Cor example, 
in Pythagorean and Aristotelian science; (ii) Mechanic-
ally constrained masses Corm the basis oC gravitation 
theory and corpuscular theory in the seventeenth century; 
(iii) More recently, the bases oC scientiCic theories 
have been in systems oC mathematical invariances, as in 
wave theory, quantum mechanics and continuum mechanics. 
ITTl~r 
There exist historical laws which govern the evolution 
oC mathematical concepts. There are two main in£1uences; 
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Footnote 28 continued •••• 
in a number of ways acting at all times, to a greater or 
·1esser degree. Phases· of development can be distinguished, 
. • . . . ·.·{ . 
. ..... 
in individual mathematical topics, for example in the 
evolution of number concepts we have : 
(i) Distinction of units, tallying, ideograms; 
-(ii) Numerical systems and operations; 
'J,' (iii) New number types and logical analysis of structures. 
,_ 
I/.. 
' .. ~· 
- .. ':: .-.~- . · .. , ~ .. ' ' 
. ' 
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From these examples it may be gathered that there are 
. • ' • .. + 
theories 0£ science and the development 0£ knowledge that 
may be useful - though not originally intended - £or teaching. 
These theories concern the descriptions 0£ intellectual 
processes via critical dialectic arguments concerning the 
growth of knowledge. 29 
6. 
as 
Models useful for teaching mathematics and examining 
the nature and development of mathematics. 
a) The Teacher-Belief-System 
The idea 0£ a teacher 'belief-system• is briefly 
'30 follows: 
i) A teacher's perception and interpretation of 
sensory data and decision making is shaped by a 
belie£ system; 31 
ii) We can influence a teacher by understanding and 
modifying his belief-system; 
iii) Modifications of belief-systems are allowed only 
reluctantly. Bxperts in modification are counsellors, 
psychiatrists, psychologists etc.; 
29. For example the work 0£ Kuhn (1962), Lakatos (1963), 
• and Popper (1963). 
30. Davis (1967), p.12. 
31. An alternative here might be to use •cognitive schema'; 
where a schema is a mental structure which (i) integrates 
existing knowledge, and (ii) is a tool for the aquisi-
tion of. new knowledge. However, I think it is important 
to include affective aspects like awareness, control 
oC attention, measure of responae, attitude, .~f valuing 
besides the more usual cognitive £actors li~~ lm9wl~dg~, 
~ . ~ .. 
comprehension, analysis, synthesis and evaluation. 





iv) W'e must :find a rbetoric 32 which makes use o:f the 
sensory data available to the teacher to improve 
discourse - on the level o:f •practitioners maxims';33 
v) Consideration o:f belie:f-systems allows contact with 
relevant data wherever it may be :found.34 
vi) Education is the modi:fication o:f belie:f-systems. 
The idea that we should be able to borrow the skills already 
available in other :fields, develop a media :for communication, 
and widen our awareness o:f what data may be relevant is 
power:fully argued in Davis' monograph. An obvious modi:fication 
in this context is to suggest that a mathematical belie£-
system may be worth considering. The use o:f the word 
belief' suggests that it may be largely uncritical, at least 
initially, and contains, among other things, an ideology o:f 
mathematics which is a priori with regard to :facts, 
utilitarian with regard to processes and in:fallible with 
regard to truth. 35 The commonly-:found mathematical belief'-
system contains little or nothing about the development o:f 
mathematics36 and no way in which the teacher or student 
32. Rhetoric def' = art o:f persuasive or impressive speaking 
or writing. 
33. Polanyi (1964} see below P• 118 
34. Relevant data includes the history o:f mathematics as 
discussed in Section 2. 
35. This ampli:fies the crude classifications o:f practical 
and intellectual attitude in Section 1. 
36. Except inso:far as this is used to provide data :for 
theories o:f mental development. Correspondences attempte_d 
between the development of mathematiGs and the deve.lop-





can easily obtain~.aiil"'oriEiAtation in or understandiog ot 
the general mathematical environment.37 
37. A brief' summary of' the justi:f'ications of' historical 
study in providing social orientation and contextual 
4. i-
understanding from Marwick, (1970), (14-18) is as 
:f'ollows: 
(a) "• •• history is necessary: it meets a basic instinct 
•, 
} and need of man living in society."(p.14). 
(b) History has two aspects: 
(i) Functional. It meets the need which society has 
to know itself' and understand its relationship with 
the past and with other societies and cultures. 
(ii) Poetic. It satis:f'ies the individual's innate 
curiosity about the past. 
(c) Justifications related to these aspects are: 
(i) A strong social element. History is the necessary 
recollection of' tne past which enables the individual 
and society to orientate themselves. 
(ii) The study of' history is part of' man's attempt to 
understand his environment, physical, temporal and 
social. 
(d) History is useful in new situations. 
" ••• not because it provides a basis :f'or prediction 
but because a :f'ull understanding of' human behaviour 
in the past makes it possible to :f'ind :f'amiliar 
' ..... 
elements in present problems and thus makes it 
- + - • ~ ·~ 
possible to solve them most intelligently-.»· (p.18). 
. : 
b) Practitioners Maxims38 
t • • '! r~ 
Descriptions oC the act of teaching mathematics 
are at this level. Many situations are at present only 
incompletely described by sets of rules, directions and 
procedures
39 
which can only have full meaning from an inside 
38. Polanyi (1964). 
(a) "Maxims are rules, the correct application of which 
is part of the art which they govern ••• maxims cannot 
be understood, still less applied by anyone not already 
possessing a good practical knowledge of the art • 
They derive their interest from our appreciation of 
the art and cannot themselves •ither replace or establish 
that appreciation." (p.31). 
(b) "Rules of art can be useful, but they do not deter-
mine the practice of an art; they are maxims, which can 
serve as a guide to an art only if they can be integrated 
into the practical knowledge of the art. They cannot 
replace this knowledge." ( p. 50) • 
(c) "To learn by example is to submit to authority. 
You follow your master because you trust his manner of 
doing things even when you cannot analyse and account 
in detail for its effectiveness. By watching the 
master and emulating his efforts in the presence of 
his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up 
the rules of the art including those which are not 
explicitly known to the master himself." 
(p.53 underiining mine) 
\. 39. Notwithstanding the most careful and well-intentioned 
. ' 
analysis by psychologiests and other researchers • 
. ' " -~ 
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knowle:dge of'~ tli.e art. The classic example here is· the 
fact that descriptions of' the mechanics~. of' bicycle riding 
do not help someone to learn to ride a bicycle. In this 
context, learning a particular mathematical technique does 
not necessarily enable us to apply it to problem situations. 
Motivations, appreciation of' classes of' problem.-situations, 
and an ability to select and modify appropriate techniques 
are also important. The student's difficulties in applying 
techniques to solve problems is a well-known experience· oC 
teachers at all levels. The application oC mathematical 
techniques is often learnt ·by example :trom practitioners· 
or teachers. The method of' Cluxions in England and the 
methods oC diCf'erentials on the Continent in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century were learnt by following the •masters 1 • 40 
There is a wealth of historical evidence to show that the 
transmission oC mathematical techniques by the use of' 
practitions maxims is the way in which heuristic or 
41 metaphor is taught. 
40. Technical misunderstanding by certain individuals 
exaggerated philosophical and logical dilemmas. 
See Section 4(d). 
41. The heuristic or metaphor is the underlying intuitive. 
idea or· th~.Qt"Y• Practitioners maxims asaist the 
s-tudent with exampl•• o'f"·the •pp1icat1.on of the 




(c) The Three Worlds 42 
• 
In relation to the pre•ent discussion, Popper's 
42. Three Worlds. (Popper (19 )(106-152) A brief 
outline of the argument is aa follows: 
a) Three Worlds are: 
{i) Physical objects or physical states. 
(ii)' States of consciousness or mental states or 
behavioural dispositions to act; (belief-systems, 
including pra~titioners maxim). 
(iii.·) Objective contents of thought. This third 
world is man-made and changing and exists only as 
a consequence of (i) and (ii). It contains; 
theoretical sy•tem•, problems, problem situations, 
conjectures, refutations and critical arguments 
(i.e. the state of a discussion, demonstrations, 
justifications and proof-processes). 
b) Knowledge related to the three worlds is as follows: 
(i) "I exist" objects exist. 
(ii) ftI know" - subjects know. This is knowledge 
or thought in the subj~ctive •ense. (Heuri~tic 
knowledge.) 
(iii) Knowledge or thought in an objective sense. 
Problems. theories, arguments - independent of 
anyone's claim to know, belief or disposition to 
assent, assert or act. It is knowledge without 
a knowing subject. Thia knowledge ••ists in the 
same way that the content• of a library exist 
indep,eadently ot anyone knowinl tbea. , 
ll'ootnote 42 contd/ •••• 
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(c) The existence of mathematical structures - produces 
two classes of problems: 
(i) Structure problems. 
The study of the structures themselves, the third 
world axiomatic theories and their relations to 
other structures. 
(ii) Production problems. 
The study of the methods· used· in their construction, 
and the problems concerned with the acts of 
production which are in the second world. 
(d) The study of the third world can throw light on 
the second world of subjective consciousness, especially 
on the subjective thought processes of mathematicians. 
1221.z:; 
three worlds concern: 
i) Physical objects:\ :atitt'"es and potential problem-
situations ot mathematics~ In· a sense these are 
neutral and can only be recognised and acted upon 
by individuals. I ~ 
ii) Creative processes of mathematicians. their 
belie:f'-systems and the ·transf'ormations possible upon 
them. Here lie the practitioners maxims which enable 
the transmission of he~itrtic 1. the whole a subjective 
phenomenon. 43 
43. The belief that maxims can serve as objective rules 
is at the root ot many problems of teaching mathematics: 
"We can learn more about the heuristics and the 
methodology and even about the psychology of research 
by studying theories, and the arguments offered for 
or against the~ than by any direct behaviouristic 
or psychological or sociological approach. In general, 
we may learn a great deal about behaviour and 
psychology from a study of· the· products." (Popper 
(1972) p.14.) No theory is ever •complete• but we 
examine the quasi-complete stages and probe the · 
logical and methodological difficulties, and at each 
stage we can make discoveries about the creative 
,processes of mathematicians. Psychology and sociology 
help to give the background to these developments • 
..... i -
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iii) Mathematical structures and the formal processes 
for the production and practice of mathematics. These 
structures are often largely autonomous. For example, 
once the integers exist, we also have a large part of 
number theory waiting to be 'discovered'. 
Much of mathematical teaching has been traditionally 
concerned with structure problems (merely communicating 
structures). Mathematical learning, however, is concerned 
with production problems (problem solving is a subjective 
situation). Understanding, in this context, is the 
individual subjectivisation of objective knowledge. 
d) Proofs and Refutations. 44 
The method of proofs and refutations concerns the 
discussion of mathematica1 conjectures and the improvement 
and modification of theorems. This method exposes the 
f evolutionary dynamic dialectic of mathematics in contrast 
to the inhibiting traditional view. Popper's idea that 
44. Lakatos (1963/4) proposes the method of proofs and 
refutations as a development<·of Popper• s philosophy 
of science and Polya•s heuristic methodology: 
"••• mathematics does not grow through a monotonous 
increase of the number of indubitably established 
theorems, but through the incessant improvement of 
guesses by speculation and criticism ••" 
The example he uses to demonstrate his thesis is the 
development of Euler's theorem for polyhedra, 
F + V = E + 2, known to Descarte in 1639, and 
stated by Euler in 1730 to apply to 'all' polyhedz:a• 
A typical contemporary modification 0£ the statement 
/~ ... 
~ ""12'1 - .. 
l. .• "' '. 
Footnote 44 contd ••• 
of the theorem appears in Hilbert and Cohn-Vossn 
Geometry and the Imagination, Chelsea 1952, (290-295) 
as "For a simple polyhedron, simply-connected, 
F + V = E + 2 Lakatos exposes the two hundred or so 
years of 'guesses, speculation and criticism' 
involved in the words simple and simply-connected. 
The theorem is still called Euler's theorem when 
generalised in many dimensions as in Coxeter, 
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mathematics grows thr~ugh the criticism.of guesses and bold 
informal proofs encourages a search behind the accepted 
statement of a theorem, to discover what may have been 
the steps in its development. 45 
Traditional teaching of structures often begins with 
a contemporary theorem where the historical process ends. 
Motivations for and insights into the nature of the mathe-
matics involved can often be furnished by beginning with 
an early statement of a theorem, at a convenient point in 
the historical process, and encour.aging a parallel, 
'imitative' development. 46 For exaniple, the idea of a 
limit can begin as being the loose idea of •near to' and 
can then be taken through s-~ techniques to neighbourhoods. 47 
45. Popper's critical philosophy of mathematics (Popper 1972 
p.136) presupposes the (third world) linguistic-symbolic 
formulation of the guesses and proofs. Here language 
is more than a means of communication, it is an indis-
pensable medium of critical discussion, where the 
obje~tivity of the statement rests on the criticis-
ability of the argument. The processes whereby these 
formulations are made are second world inhabitants 
and the concern of the teacher. 
46. One need not go back to the 'beginning', only far enough 
to make the point about dialectic being involved. For 
a similar view see Grattan-Guinness, (1973). 
47. A typical formal progression can be found in Smith W.K. 
( 1964). 
The idea that an examination of third world proof• . : .. 
can throw light on second worid heuristic i• used by 
Lakatos in an attempt to communicate that heuristi~ by 
critical examination of facts, theorems and structures~8 
In contrast, Polya's heuristic method is too simple and 
not very helpful. Its main use is in teaching problem-
solving strategies, but for students (and others) there 
lingers a strong feeling that in order to develop the 
method one needs to know the result at the beginning. 
The attempt (if any) to place these strategies in the 
third world and thus produce general problem-solving 
l~b 
methods has not been successful. As such they are 
commentaries on epi•odes in mathematics, 49 and are really 
maxims, inhabitants of the second world which can only be 
fully communicated by individuals.5° 
7. Historical Studies and Mathematics 
':le are now in a position to make some further comments 
on the relevance of history to the study of mathematics. 
If we accept the general principle of the 'three worlds' 
we find that we have a useful metaphor for the study of 
mathematics; for they help to separate for individual 
attention the formal processes, the heuristic devices, 
and the problem-situations. The construction of mathematics 
as a body of knowledge concerns the structures of mathe-
~8. Lakatos is concerned with the growth of the second 
world arguments while Popper (1972) maintains that 
the third world is the only respectable study. (P.114) 
49. See Thomas (1972) 
50. Both third and second worlds are susceptible to analyeis. 
The third worl.d to traditional logic and the second to 




matics as logico-mathematical entities themselves. The 
study of struc~ures and proofs at this formal objective 
level is the official activity of the research mathematician, 
but besides advancing mathematical knowledge qua mathematics, 
it can also indicate the path !2, this advancement, the 
stages that the proofs went through, in order to reach 
their currently accepted validity. Old theorems and 
incorrect proofs are still objective, and so the evolution 
of mathematical structures is potentiaily, if not actualiy 
available when we study current theory. The proof-forms and 
theorems are data for the historian and the mathematician 
as the objective products of current cultural and philo-
sophical climates. The structure of mathematical culture 
lies in the third world. 
The creative processes of individual mathematical 
activity lie in the subjective second world. \fhile the 
third world provides the formal data; the philosophical 
standpoints, the belief-systems and the heuristic processes 
all contribute the means whereby the mathematical culture 
evolves. This provides the functional activity whereby 
the student of mathematics can begin to understand its 
relationship with the past, with other mathematics, and 
with other subject areas. 
To assist this understanding, we need data from the 
first world; knowledge about problem-situations, the moti-
vations for and generation of techniques, algorithms, etc., 
from physical problems; the general mathematical climate 
created by the societies, journals, communications, 
institutions and the general socio-economic background. 
An important aspect o~ this description is the 
realisation that the status of a particular piece of mathe-
---------~---
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matics may vary according to the part it plays in a theory. 
For example, inCinitesimals Cor sevente~nth century 
mathematicians were Cormal constructs or inhabitants oC 
the third world; later, as philosophical climates and prooC-
Corms changed, they became relegated to second world 
heuristics.5 1 The 'reinstated' inCinitesimals oC non-
standard analysis are new and diCCerent inhabitants oC the 
third world. Objects called by the same name are not 
necessarily the same entity, but this lesson is oCten not 
easily learnt in the history oC mathematics. 
The status oC a piece oC mathematics varies according 
to the use we wish to make oC it: the Cormal theory oC 
arithmetic lies clearly in the third world, but the 
algorithms required in a particular calculation are Cirst 
world inhabitants. It is the distinction oC the use and 
hence the status oC particular areas oC mathematics that 
-make the liCe oC the teacher both diCCicult and challenging, 
Cor he needs constantly to be aware oC the Cluctuating 
situation applied to individuals. 
8. Maxims.Cor Mathematics Teaching and the History oC 
Mathematics. 
There are three general groups oC maxims Cor the 
teaching oC mathematics that can be derived Crom the Core-
going discussion; these concern: 
a) The teacher's belieC-system which is altered and 
developed by involving the teacher in the criticisms 
oC mathematics; 
51. Note that the Leibnita inCinitesimals remain third 
world inhabitants. The evolved and less believable 
inCinitesimals oC eighteenth and nineteenth century 
mathematics'lie in the second world. 
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b}_· The teaching 0£ mathematics which is improved 
and developed by active participation in the method 
oC prooCs and refutations; 
c) The practice oC mathematics which is the application 
of incomplete or inconsistent theories and their 
critical development. 
The history of mathematics can provide data Cor all 
three classes oC maxims, and i£ a theory 0£ teaching can 
be derived, such that a critical-evolutionary approach to 
the learning of mathematics is encouraged, we will have an 
in-built instrument Cor curriculum development arising 
Crom the nature 0£ the activity of mathematics itsel£. 
·'!'Case Studies £rom.tbe History 0£ Mathematics 




'Modern mathematics• is an ambiguous label •. It 
can be ·.understood in a number of dif'ferent ways, depending 
on the level and context of teaching, and the individual 
~ preferences of the teacher. Bef'ore attempting to def'ine a 
common denominator_·f'or discussion, it may be useful to 
distinguish f'our general interpretations that are common 
t·oday. 'l• 
Firs~, tbe content of a course may be modified by the 
introduction of new material.which could be historically 
new, or could recently have acquired new significance. 
Second, the re-thinking of' traditional material is a 
modernisation both with respect to the place of that 
material in the context of mathematics and the current 
changes in teaching methods. 
Third, emphasis on the immediate relevance o~ mathematics 
taught, sometimes called the 'utilitarian' attitude, aims 
to show students that mathematics contains applicable tools 
as well as abstract ideas. 
Fourth, the development of psychological theory and methods 
influences mathematics teaching not only by suggesting 
shifts of emphasis, like 'learning' or •teaching•, but also 
by focussing our attention on the acquisition of particular 
concepts at different levels. ' ·1 , 
Since .tbe t~acbing.o.t mathematics nee~sto take into 
acco~t- .f!lil. .t:f£ "the•.,-.' ·••P.•at_. :.\;t _can be(tseelJi tq':t '?·~th.tn.g 
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n~icessary renewal of' matile•a:t~c• for teach;i.ng, for if we 
replace one list. o.f require~ents,by another. we are making 
only a marginal and temporary change, and to argue that 
this may be a permanent advantage is questionable. 
The modernisation of mathematics is a continuous 
process, and continuous renewal requires an attitude 0£ 
mind that accepts the idea. 0£ a developing, lively subject, 
relevant not only to sophisticated applications, but also 
to the individual's way of regarding and structuring the 
world. It is relatively easy to say that deep concepts are 
most important, and it d9ee not matter much bow these are 
put across, but it is often dif£icult to decide what the 
really significaAt concepts are, and by what means they 
should be communicated. 
One can make a case £or the inclusion of almost any 
mathematical topic or subject area at di£ferent levels in 
mathematics teaching. To engage in such arguments, on the 
whole, seems rather pointless since championing a particular 
topic often -depends on the individual's personal taste 
rather than any substantial pedagogical argument • .. 
Deciding what is important or si.Sllif'icant in contemporary 
mathematics and choosing the content of a teaching programme 
appropriately depends on the teacher's sensitivity to the 
four interpretations given above, and besides being as well-
informed as possible of contemporary developments, an 
essential ingredient of the teacher's repertoire is the 
maturity and hindsight that history can provide • . •' . " . . 
We have '5e•n, over recent y;ear~, tile intrqduction of' 
• : , • • k '· ' • ~ ~ •• ,,.4 .... 1 l 
a ~i:d~ yarie~~y ,.~f topics, .. t~f:;Jlt<J:pes.!. ~~~9~s .a~dt~J"!Jects 
co1!"~·~ing. t.~e :-~h91:~ F.•nge ~~ ! ~~l_!o~~ !".11~ t ~~11.ege mat"t;Lematics. 
~ • ,, ' . #' . - ~ 
more important~, whichi techilique essentf'al, .-when t"ac'e<f:''.£· 
with the who·le re•structuritt~ of a syl:'lal>us,. or the demands 
of the examination at the end of a term ? 
With the· depth of view given to us by a knowl:'edge of 
the historical development of mathematics parallelling our 
knowledge of the contemporary developments, we may be 
better able to judge the importance of' different aspects of 
mathematics to our pupils. 
For the sake of the present discussion, I take the 
emphasis on the general concepts ot: algebraic structure to 
typify what is· generally understood to: be: •modern mathematics• 
so f'ar as this· label app-lies to the content of' contemporary 
mathematics teaching in schools and colleges. The emphasis 
here is on the f'i:rst and second interpretations given above; 
the introduction of structural concepts requiring the 
reworking of traditional material, being a major fact of 
the history of mathematical education. An examination of' 
the origins of structural concepts will hopefully assist 
us in our attempts to answer the •w-y• and 'hOW' questions 
,, 
that may be Af'Ound when we look at modern mathematics today. 
2. General Background. 
It is possible to discern many of' the most general 
and powerful ideas in contemporary mathematics emerging 
in the first half of the nineteenth centurz. I make this 
claim because, not only do we have a number of sig~if'icant 
breakthroughs occurring in the separate .;fields of' geometry, 
algebra, analysis and logic, but we· have a deep- change in 
social and philosophical attitude •hicli recognis•• and 
accepts .. bo'fli .the· need '·fo.- unifying concepts and their 
discussion by the mathematical community at large. We 
may speculate that this general attitude was motivated 
by social m~veineri.ts like the Fre11ch \ Re'Vol:uti·oif.·· bu:t~ 'the1 r;; ·.? 
fact that it began and gained momentum through the nine.:..[ 
teenth century is important in the development. 0£ western 
culture, a signf'icant part of' which is mathematics. 
A consequence of' the app1icatfon of mathematics in 
the eighteenth century to more and more complicated 
physical problems was the emergence of' the idea of' the 
mathematical discipline as and end in itself'. 1 Foundational 
problems emerged, the existence and status of' infinitesimals 
being probably the most outstanding, and the more mathe-
matics that was done 1 the more it· c:rieatecf problems tot-
itself'. Gradually the connection between the frontiers of' 
mathematical research and the physical world become more 
and more tenuous, so that by the beginning of' the nine-
teenth century, mathematicians were ready to admit that 
in some sense at least, parts of' their discipline had no 
necessary connection with reality. These changes in atti-
tude allowed the bolder creation of' objects and operations, 
the discovery of' principles or laws, and the hitherto 
unsuspected ~elationships between dif'f'erent parts of' 
mathematics. The nineteenth century is dominated by an 
emerging need to simplify and consolidate the wealth of' 
mathematics discovered earlier; we may even consider it 
a psychological necessity for the mathematical culture 
to search for some kind of' unifying approach to help 
1. Formation of' societies, foundation of' journals, and 
instruction in the applications of' mathematics 
... . ' 
encourage this view. 
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them- collle. to t~rtns --with' the ~·mathematics thef~ hadr ei-&at~Ci. 2 
Probably the most'weli-known events or mathematicai· 
history of the nineteenth' century are the discovery ot 
non-euclidean geometry, the arithmetisation or analysis, 
and the foundation of the theory of sets. As achievements 
they are outstanding, but equally important, and generally 
less well-known (apart from passing references to Abel 
and Galois) is the emergence o( the idea of algebraic 
structure. Because of their abstraction and generality, 
structural concepts underlie all areas of mathematics, 
and consequently are difficult to trace in detail, while 
the consequences of their application are manifest. 
In the first halt of the nineteenth century we have 
a chance to see these structural concepts emerging, 
initially as vague guiding principles, or as :fruitful 
methods, to be examined and refined into the concepts 
familiar today. By way of preparation, I should make 
some remarks about those well-known events mentioned 
earlier. 
3. No~-Euclidean Geometry 
By the end of the eighteenth century it was fairly 
well-known among mathematicians that the long history of 
investigation into the independence of the parallel post-
ulate had produced a situation where alternative geometries 
were logically possible, and 'the only way of justifying 
2. ~ilder (1968,1974) carefully distinguishes between · 
cultural, psychological and social influences on the 
development of mathematics. His (1974) examines 'Here-
ditary stress' as a force in the evolution of mathe-
matics, but I.know of no work that specifically deals 
with the social psychology of mathematical history. 
-, ! I f 
I I ! 
' ' \ 
~­
' ' ' 
the parallel postulate was to suggest that its truth was 
' ~. 
derivable from experience. 3 Euclidean geometry was generally . 
considered to be an idealisation of experience, even an 
4 innate property of the world, and the acceptance of a 
logically consistent but anti-commonsensical geometry as 
a valid piece of mathematics took a long time. Lobachevsky 
and Bolyai were the first to publish complete systems and 
claim them as a new geometry, but it was the change in 
atmosphere that allowed them to make public what Gauss 
preferred to keep untold.5 
The two greatest general consequences of the publt·c:tty 
of the new geometry for the early nineteenth century were 
the gradual acceptance of the idea that mathematics was not 
necessarily about objects in the real world, and that it 
was possible to construct logically consistent systems 
3. Lambert (1766) 'Theorie der Parallelliqien' see 
Kline (1972)p.868. 
4. Kant (1781) 'Critique of Pure Reason'. The section on 
'The metaphysical exposition ofspace' c1aims the princi-
ples or £uclidean geometry as 'a priori synthetic' truths. 
5. There are a number of studies of the discovery of 
non-~uclidean geometry; as a preface to a concise 
work on modern geometry in Blumenthal (1961), a 
popular exposition in Reid (1963), a detailed technica1 
discussion in Eves and Newsom (1966), historical 
accounts in Boyer (1968) and Kline (1972), and trans-
lations and commentary on Bolyai and Lobachevsky 
in Bonola (1955). 
. ' 
1367 
from an arbitrar.y collection of axioms. 
~. The growth of' Rigor in the calculus 
The spectacular developments in the calculus in 
the eighteenth century, particularly in applications of the 
new techniques to physical problems, had emphasised the 
need for a logically rigorous basis for the fundamental 
processes. The belief that some basis would eventually 
be found contributed to the development of the •metaphysics 
oC the calculus' which attempted to deal with such problems 
~s the existence and status of the 'infinitesimals' that 
the new subject contained. Justification of the infinitesimal 
processes had been a serious problem right Crom the 
beginning, but it was not until the nineteenth century 
that new difinitions for the processes appear that begin 
to do away with metaphysics and introduce logic in its 
stead. Most outstanding in this period is the work of 
Bolzano, Cauchy, Dirichlet, Abel, Riemann and ~leierstrass. 
In general the period is fairly well documented, but from 
the historical point of view there are still a number of 
controversia1 and unsettled issues. 6 
In contrast to the appearance of a new geometry, 
developments in the calculus were initially much more of 
a tidying up process, new definitions giving rise to 
clearer concepts and preparing the way for the next set 
of problems. In broad terms, developments in the calculus 
were probably more influenced by the change in atmosphere, 
allowing mathematician& to experiment with more abstract 
def'initions, rather than having a great influence outside 
6. Simple interpretations ot the stor.y can be found in any 
standard history book. Kline (1972) gives most general 
detail, while the studies of' Boyer (1959), Manheim (1964) 






analysis at this time. 
5. The Theory of Sets. 
The development of set theory can generally be 
regarded as a consequence of the detailed investigations 
in analysis, algebra and geometry, and as such falls out-
side the period under discussion. Cantor's work on the 
theory of sets can be said to have been motivated by his 
investigations into the representation of functions by 
means of trigonometric series, a problem originating with 
.the work of Fourier some sixty years before. 7 While a 
consistent set theory did not appear until the latter 
part of the century, we can say that mathematicians were 
beginning to talk about what we today would call sets, 
relations and operations - using set language - in the 
earlier part of the century, particularly in relation to 
8 the developments in algebra and logic. Again, it is in 
the early developments that we see the increasing willing-
ness to consider abstract definitions and arbitrary laws 
as the basis of mathematical theory. 
6. Pr~jective Geometry 
The subject of projective geometry appears now 
to have fallen out of fashion as a part of courses in 
7. Cantor's first paper on the theory of sets appeared 
in 1874. For a detailed investigation into the back-
ground of this development see Dauben (1971) and 
Grattan-Guinness (1971). 
8. Bolzano's work on the arithmetical theory of real 
~ • ' L. ' r J • 
numbers dates from the 1830's, and his 'Paradoxes 





matb~maticit, surviving o~ly occasionally.9 To my: view, 
this is. unf'ortunate since it developed as a distinct branch 
of' mathematics in the nineteenth century, providing many 
of' the concepts and methods alive in modern mathematics. 
The f'act that these concepts and methods have largely been 
taken over by algebra, is part of' the evolutionary story of' 
mathematics, but the f'irst occurrence of' these ideas in a 
geometrical context provides an interesting and relatively 
simple introduction to these general and powerf'ul ideas. 
The story of' the emergence of' projective geometry in 
the seventeenth century Crom the theory of' perspective 
10 
appears later, and while the tradition of' Desargues and 
Pascal had been kept alive, mainly by the work of' La ilire 
11 
and Bosse and the applications in technology, the texts 
themselves were lost, and the mathematicians of' the nine-
teenth century re-created most of' projective geometry bef'ore 
the original work was recovered. 
It is considered that the man who provided the main 
motivation f'or the revival of projective geometry was Monge, 
a great prop~nent of' synthetic methods in geometry in 
, opposition t~ the analytical applications of' ~artesia~ 
9. Projective geometry survives in some courses f'or 
teachers. It might be interesting to discover the 
~ motivations f'or the inclusion of' this topic in such courses. 
10. See Section~(~). 
11. Bosse (16~8), La Hire (1685). Pascal's short (16~0) was 
recovered in 1779, and Desargues' (1639l was f'ound in 
a manuscript verai<?,JJ. JDade b)! La. Hire hy. Chas:l.e~ in 
- r - .... 
! ' 
tlie ·:time. t'MongiF·bei'came ·a military engineer, 
and.· the 'kind 0£-""calcalations:necessary in that context 
required simple; practical' procedures. He developed what 
is known as 'descriptive geometry', and might be called 
the originator or the techniques or engineering drawing. , 
At the turn or the century he was teaching at l'Ecole 
Polytechnique in Paris and had a direct influence on the 
next generation ot French geometers who were to revive and 
develop the new branch or mathematics. While Monge provided 
the inspiration, many or the resul ter and theorems derived 
rrom·La Hire, who had developed th& work or Desargues and 
Pascal. I think it is appropriate to give a brief summary 
of the achievements or the seventeenth century in order to 
indicate the main ideas that were developed later. 
Desargues' basic ideas are as follows: 
t. Every family of parallel lines meets at a point at 
infinity:points at infinity define a line at infinity. 12 
2. A relation between points on a line, involution, was 
defined which was invariant under the operation or projection. 13 
3. Developing this, conjugate points were defined, a real 
point -on a line being the conjugate of the point at infinity. 
4. He then proves that an involution projects into an 
involution. 
5. A harmonic set is defined, and the proof supplied that 
a harmonic set projects into a harmonic set. 
6. The property or fOle and polar is developed to all 
12. This idea seems, to Or'iginate with Kepler' i~, hi• -, 
•Aatl'.'.Oll~Gi~!!t\~~e:~OP,~ic~! of.!~~~>~· Jt~~'te .~1 ,97~)':.!p.290. 
13. ~'°P.P.:U!;-@o~~~·'!Ir prop. 130 define• a relation called 
cross-ratio for plane figures which Desargues developed. 
• ! 
. j 
c~~ics ,:, _4nd' he shows that{'\he diameter 




0£ a conic is the 
7. In all this, he establishes the method of projection 
and section as a proof-method. 
The surviving work of .Pascal is much shorter, but it 
is clear that his declared aim was to reduce the properties 
of conic sections to be derivable from the smallest number 
of basic properties. Like Desargues, he had the idea of 
certain properties of f'i.gures remaining substantially 
_unchanged after a pro·J.•ctive transformation, 15 and in parti-
cu1ar pr.ojecti.ve properti.es· were invariant under linear 
transformations. He also exploited the generalised proof~ 
methods, and f'rom their work emerged the non-metric aspects 
of the new geometry. 
It can be seen that while Pascal and Desargues built 
on the work of their predecessors, what they built was an 
entirely ne~ geometry, defining a new kind of space where 
parallel lines met at infinity. Their own declared aims, 
however, were to produce a new approach to Euclidean geometry 
which was copsidered to be a more thorough and more simple 
. 
description of' the real world. The fact that their geometry 
was not pursued at the time probably had something to do 
with this attitude, but was also largely overshadowed by 
the concurrent developments in analytical geometry and 
tq. Apollonius Book III gives harmonic properties of' 
pole and polar applied to plane circles. 
15. Kepler's work of 1604 contains the idea th4t the 
... -
conic sections can be continuously derivable one 
f'rom another-. 
.. . ' t --· --- ·• - I', -· _, •. ': .~' - "" _1.-"',,..,.~ ..J..--....._ .. ·-- ... -·-· '. . ~ - . 
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The underl.ying ideas coming through to the ninete.er:ith 
century were the principle of continuity "" a general working 
principl.e that a property attr.l»utabl• to one figure could 
also be found in another figure derivable from the first: 
by projection, 17 the idea of a property being invariant 
under some transformation, and the beginnings of' a distinct-
ion between invariant properties or resul.ts, and invariant 
operations, a realisation tbat it was generally impossible 
~nd inappropriate to attempt to preserve any metric propertie.s 
of figures under· the transt'ormation ot projection, and the 
use of the method of' projection and section along with tbe 
principle of continuity as an acceptable method of proving 
theorems. 
Poncelet, a pupil of Monge, is considered to have 
made the greatest single nineteenth century contribution 
to the rebirth and establishment of projective geometry as 
an important branch of' mathematics. He wrote a major text-
book18 which reaf'f'irmed and developed the. ideas of his 
16. It is often not recognised that Cartesian geometry brings 
a powerful new.technique to the old, Euclidean, geometry 
while projective geometry is a new geometry. This seemed 
to be too much £or mathematicians to take at the time. 
This was also tbe period of the great 'pre-calculus' 
developments 0£ Cavdlieri, Torricelli, Fermat, Roberval, 
Wallis, Barrow and others. 
17. For example, we can regard a circle as a special case 
of an ellipse where the two foci are coincident. 
18. Poncelet, 'Traite des proprietes projectives des f'isures' 
Paris, 1822. 
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predecessors bringing out new concepts and exploiting the 
old ideas in a new way. Here we £ind det'ined projectivity, 
perspectivity, and the concept of' homology, where twot'igures 
are homologous it' one can be derived t'rom another by the 
method of' projection and section; the principle of' continrH ty 
is adopted as an 'absolute truth' of' the methodology, and 
applied to discover new theorems t'rom old; 19 the pole and 
polar properties are examined, and the remarkable principle 
of' duality is t'irst established where it is noticed that 
the words 'poi~t' and 'line' are interchangeable in theorems 
that apply to non-metric properties of' £igures. 18a In all 
this, Poncelet provided the mathematicians of the nineteenth 
century with a collection of ideas and methods that were to 
prove fruitful and controversial for the rest of the century. 
18a. It was Gergonne who introduced the term 'duality• 
and ge~eralised Poncelet•s idea to apply to non-metric 
. 
situations. Kline (1972),. p. 845. 
19. Please see following page. 
'' 
I' 
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Footnote 19 
An example 0£ the application 0£ the principle of 
continuity appears in Fletcher, T. Some Lessons ·in 
Mathematics 1964 (266-269) where angle properties 0£ the 
circle are demonstrated and discussed by moving a pair 0£ 
intersecting straight lines drawn on a piece 0£ tracing 
paper or acetate over a £ixed circle drawn on another 
piece 0£ paper. 
By moving the line XY in the horizontal direction we may 
also get dynamic variations on the intersecting chords 
theorem, and by projection and section, we can turn the 
circle into an ellipse, and examine whether similar theorems 
hold in this case. 
..,, .. ' .. 
I 
,1 
Another French geometer, Cbasles, wrote: a hist.orica.1·, 
20 study o:C geometric methods, and re-discovered a work .0£ 
21 Desargues. He developed the idea of homography, the 
general linear transformation of a plane in space, and 
supported Poncelet in the defence o:C the principle o:C 
continuity as a logical truth against those who regarded 
it only as an heuristic working principle. Chasles put 
forward principles for developing proofs, suggesting that 
special theorems should be generalised to obtain the most 
general result, which would be 'simple' and 'natural•,
22 
and that a proof should contain a 'principal truth' that 
would be immediately recognised because other theorems would 
result from a 'simple transformation'. The belief that great 
truths of geometry were simple and intuitive supported the 
idea that although they could be demonstrated by algebraic 
methods, the principles and proo:Cs themselves did not depend 
on algebraic proo:Cs. Ideas like the principle of continuity 
were accepted at this time as intuitively clear and had 
th t t 
. 23 much e ~ame s a us as an axiom. 
20. Chasles, M. Apercu historique sur l'origine et le develop-
ment des methodes en geometrie. Paris,1837. In which he 
admits ignoring German writers because he did not know 
the language • 
. 21. See above (11). 
22. This principle of generalisation was not new at the time, 
we find it implicitly or explicitly throughout mathematical 
history. Developed as heuristic, we find it most recently 
in the work o:C Polya (1965), and Lakatos (1963-64). 
(Chasles, (1837) 
1 
Kline (1972) p.835) 
23. Another famous principle was to appear in algebra about 
the same time. See below. p.151 
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The next major contributions in this period come f'rom 
two Germans, .Steiner and von Staudt. Steiner produced a 
t ti d 1 t b d thr . . 1 24 sys ema c eve opmen ase on ee princip es: 
1. Points, lines and planes were the essential data of' 
geometry, and all other objects, figures or configurations 
must be deduced from these before we are allowed to discuss 
them. 
2. The principle of duality was extensively used to 
further this aim, and double column printing was employed 
to emphasise the methodology. 2 5 
3. The points, lines and planes were assembled into a 
fundamental concept, projective forms; ranges of collinear 
points, pencils of coricurrent lines and pencils of' con-
current planes. 
From Steiner we have the now standard method of 
defining conics in projective geometry as a set of points 
of intersection of all pairs of corresponding lines of two 
projective pencils. 
Von Staudt perceived two basic weaknesses of projective 
geometry whi~h he was able to resolve. The first concerned 
the definition of cross-ratio from which other projective 
relations were derived. This was still dependent on length 
and he sought a projective relation independent of a metric 
concept. The second was the definition of the imaginary 
24. Steiner (1832); Kline (1972) (846-848). 
25. Double column printing was to become a standard layout 
for texts on projective geometry through to the 
twe.tieth century. See Cremona (1885), and later 






entities used freely for example, when two circles inter~ 
' . 
sect in two points, the points define a real line, while two 
non-intersecting circles were said to intersect in an 
imaginary line. Knowing that it was possible to define 
26 imaginary numbers in terms of real numbers in algebra, 
von Staudt asked if there was some analagous way of 
defining the imaginary entities of geometry. He succeeded 
~· in defining a projective relation27 to be when two funda-
mental one-dimensional forms (ranges of points, pencils of 
lines etc.), have their members in one-one corre•pondence, 
and a harmonic set of one corresponds to a harmonic set of 
the other. To tackle the imaginary elements von Staudt 
decided to define an imaginary line as all points common 
to two planes with no common real line, with corresponding 
definitions for plane and point. 
A further development was his 'algebra of throws'. 
This was an outcome of a search for another meaning for 
cross-ratio independent of distance, and provided a 
projective algorithm for cross-ratio and imaginary entities. 
The algebra:uses coordinates as identification symbols free 
from any connection with length, and defines a harmonic 
throw to have a value of -1. All rational throws can be 
built from this and it can be shown that they correspond 
to cross-ratios in the Euclidean plane. The algorithm is 
also able to distinguish between a complex entity and its 
conjugate. In order to achieve this, von Staudt had to use 
geometric constructions that defined the operations with 
26. Hamilton (1837) see below, p.151t 








his coordinate symbols so that they obeyed the commutative, 
associative and distributive. laws. The coordinate symb!)ls 
were, in £act, numbers, and thus he was able to use the 
28 ordinary laws of' arithmetic to operate in his geometry. 
Von Staudt not only f'reed projective geometry Crom 
its dependence on metric concepts, but showed that it was 
more fundamental - that euclidean geometry could be derived 
Crom it. 
The Cirst Cif'ty years oC the nineteenth century saw 
some of' the most fundamental ideas of projective geometry 
being developed. The intellectual atmosphere, the f'reedom 
Crom necessary connection with reality exploiting the 
emerging axiomatic method, the concurrent advance in 
algebraic description oC projective concepts oC Mobius 
and Plucker and others, 29 and the developments in abstract 
algebra, led to the systematic description oC geometry 
Crom the transf'ormation viewpoint in the famous •&rlanger 
28. More detailed accounts oC von Staudt's geometry are 
given in Coolidge (19~0) (99-101) and Kline (1972) 
(850-851). 
29. Mobius (1827), Plucker (1828-31), where homogeneous and 
trilinear coordinates are introduced respectively. 
Plucker also introduces the concept of' line coordinates 
and extended projective concepts to the algebra of' 
curves of the third and higher degree. Kline (1972) 
852-855 ... • 
.. 
i. 
3-0 Programm' of Felix glein. 
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7. The Laws oC Algebra. 
148 
1 • 
The algebra of the early nineteenth century was 
application of a1gebraic methods to geometry, in the solution 
of equations, in the algorithms and processes arising in 
the calculus, and in the development of notations and 
techniques arising from them, the general belief was that 
.algebra was some kind 0£ 'literal arithmetic' where if its 
truth was in doubt, numbers could be substituted to check 
the calculation&. 
At this time there was no precise definition of real 
or complex numbers and no logical justification for the 
operations on them, although they were freely used; letters 
were manipulated as if they were integers and the results 
were assumed valid when any number was substituted. The 
algebra of literal expressions was thought to possess a 
logic of its own which accounted for the effectiveness and 
correctness of its res.ults. The justification of operations 
with literal or symbolic expressions was a major problem 
that emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
30. Klein, (1872) in N.Y. Math.Soc.Bulletin, 2,1893, 
(215-249). A good exposition of these views can be 
found in Klein (1939). Here we have topology first 
defined (in 1872) as the study of all proper~ies 0£ 
a space that are invariant under one-o~e bicontinuous 
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While not justitying operations, a kind of classification 
or hierarchy existed which described the type of numbers the 
algebras dealt with, however, this was not at all clear, 
since the numbers themselves were not well defined. 
The different algebras were generally described as 
follows: 
Universal Arithmetic was the algebra of integers and 
other positive real numbers. 
Single Algebra was the algebra that allowed the introduction 
of negative quantities in addition to positive quantities, 
what would today correspond to the algebra of positive and 
negative reals. 31 
Double Algebra was the recently established algebra of 
complex numbers, known only at this time in their geometrical 
forms given by Argand and Wesse1. 32 
Triple Algebra, not yet achieved, was the name given to 
the attempted extensions of the double algebra into three 
d . . 33 imensions. 
Across .this, we have in the 1830's Peacock's classi-. 
fication intq arithmetical and symbolical 
31. While negative quantities had been used in algebra on 
and off for some time, there was still some debate as 
to the 'reality' or status of negative quantities. How to 
interpret the negative root of an equation was a 
perennial problem. 
32. Wessel ( 1797), Argand ( 1806), see below,p·.t,Jnote 41. 
33. This was attempted by a number of mathematicians. See 
Crowe (1~67) for detail.a. 
I 
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algebra:. 34 Ari thmetie'al al'§ebra' was where the· sYIDbc:fls· · ~ · ·, ' 
represented positive integers, and only operations leading 
to positive int~gera were permissible. There was no need 
to justify this kind of algebra since it was derived· from 
the operations of arithmetic. Symbolical algebra used the 
1same rules as arithmetical algebra, but its operations did 
not necessarily lead to positive integers alone. The justi-
fication for results here seemed to rely partly on a belief 
in the consistency of the rules,35 and partly on some vague 
idea that the internal logic ot arithmetic somehow carried 
over into negative, irrational and complex quantities. 
Results in arithmetical algebra were said to be general in 
form, but specific in value, while those in symbolical 
algebra were general in form and general in value. For 
example, the quadratic equivalence: 
2 ax +bx+ c • (x-x1)(x-x2 ) 
is general in form. It is specific in value when x 1 and x 2 
are positive integers, but general in value when x 1 and x2 
are allowed to take any value, positive, negative, real or 
complex. 'Gen9ral in form, specific in value• in a sense 
34. Peacock's ideas can be seen forming in his (1830) and 
(1833), to be stated more completely in the second 
edition of his (1842-45). 
35. The rules identified at this stage were the commutative 
and distributative laws, identified by Servois in 
1814/15, and described in terms of the operations of 










. 1.51 · 
. ·~ ,.,,t •·. 
def'ines the ru~e ,, while t general in f'orm, general in value• 
·•· ... 
extends the rule to other classes of' numbers. . . 
The basic principles of' symbolical algebra were that 
the symbols should be unlimited in both value and represent-
ation, the operations on them should be possible in all 
cases, and that the laws of' combination of' the symbols 
should correspond with those of' arithmetical algebra and 
the operations should go by the same names as in arithmetical 
algebra. 
This appears to be a f'irst step in def'ining operations 
in a new domain to correspond with operations in an already 
existing domain. The insistence on correspondence of' 
operations can have two general results, new numbers can 
be invented (negative and complex numbers had already 
appeared as a result), and the search f'or extensions of' 
number systems with analagous properties can be made more 
dif'f'icult, as the hoped-f'or 'triple algebra' was to show. 
Peacock's Principle of' Permanence of' Equivalent Forms 
enunciated in 1833, 36 was 'whatever algebraical f'orms 
are equival~nt when the symbols are general in f'orm but 
specif'ic in.value will be equivalent likewise when the 
symbols are general in value as well as in f'orm. '· This 
became both a metaphysical guarantee of' the logic of' the 
algebra, and a heuristic device in the search f'or extensions 
36. Peacock's 'Report on Recent Progress and the Present 
State of' Certain Branches of' Analysis' to the British 
Association, 1833. 
.............. 




The second edition 0£ Peacock's 'Treatise on- Algebra•'' · 
(1842) claimed that algebra was a deductive science where 
the processes of algebra were based on a complete state-
ment of the laws that dictate the operations used, and the 
tsymbols of algebra have no meaning except that given to 
them by the laws. The laws given here were the associative 
and commutative laws for multiplication and addition, the 
distribution of multiplication over addition, and a cancel!-
ation law, ac~bc = a=b, c¢0.(38). The principle of 
permanence of equivalent forms justi£ied the extension of 
these laws from the original arithmetical domain to the 
more general algebraic situation. 
De Morgan a~so held that algebra was a collection of 
meaningless symbols and a set 0£ arbitrary laws obeyed by 
them.39 It was in the attempts to minimise the number of 
symbols and laws that the fundamental logical processes 
were exposed. 
37. The prin~iple was used earlier by Woodhouse (1803) 
. 
'The Principles of Analytical Calculation' p.3, where 
in the equation: 1 
1-r 
2 = l+r+r + ••• 
the equality sign has a 'more extended signification' 
than simple arithmetical equality. For discussion of 
this see Kline (1972) (974-977). 
38. The term 'associative law' for the property of the 
operation such that a (b c)=(a b) c, was first 
used by Hamilton. See Crowe (1967) p.16. 
39. De Morgan (1849) 'Trigonometry and Double Algebra' see 
note 72. p.164 below. 
' . 
The principle 0£ permanence 0£ equivalent £o~ms was 
., . ,. ·"""' ~ . . 
to survive, mainly as a heuristic rule, £or som~. considerable 
time. In spite of the fact that it begged questions about 
the properties of numbers, its justification was, to say 
the least, highly suspiscious, and if maintained, rigorously 
dEfBtroyed the possibilities of generality in algebra. 
Hamilton's definition of complex numbers as ordered 
couples began to erode the principle, because it opened 
the way to consideration of more general 'numbers' and the 
operations possible on them. 40 
At that time there were two general ways of representing 
complex numbers, or imaginaries, the directed line seg-
ments of Wessel, where geometrical representation of 
vectors defined operations with complex numbers, and the 
rotation operation of Argand extending the line with positive 
and negative direction into the plane by a quarter turn 
t . :!: C-:-1 .41 represen ing ../ - .i 
While most regarded these geometrical representations 
as a basis, both Gauss and Hamilton were suspicious 
and thought of.geometrical representation as an aid to 
40. Hamilton (1837). Gauss in 1831 also describes complex 
numbers as ordered couples and describes operations 
of addition and multiplication for them. See Crowe 
(1967)(8-9) 
41. For a summary of the differences and details see 





intuition but not a satisf'actory justif'ication. 42 . 
Hamilton's algebra of.ordered couples incorporated 
the 'imaginary' quantity 'i' in the def'inition of' the 
operations and f'ounded complex numbers on the reals. 
Permanence of' f'orm and the concept of' double algebra became 
~ 
redundant, but this was realised only af'ter some time f'or 
Hamilton's ideas were generally slow to be taken up, and the 
terminology survived, Hamilton himself' talking of' a 'triple 
algebra' as a possible three-dimensional extension of' his 
.d 43 l. ea. 
The search f'or the three-dimensional complex number 
was the next step to be attempted, and we know that Gauss 
had made some investigations in 1819 proceeding f'rom the 
idea that if' a+bi represented perpendicular displacements 
in the plane, there should be a third component perpendi-
cular .to the plane, and had developed a non-commutative 
algebra. Abandoning the commutative law, thought to be a 
basic logical principle, was unacceptable, at least to the 
general mathematical community, and Gauss did not publish 
his results~ Twenty-f'ive years later the discoveries in . 
mathematics and the changes in the intellectual climate 
42. Crowe p.9., considers Hamilton heard of' Gauss' work 
only af'ter he had developed the main ideas of' his nwnber 
couples and quaternions. 
43. Hamilton's definitions have become standard. For two 
complex numbers a+bi, c+di, (a,b)! (c,d) = Ca:c,b:d) 
(a,b).(c,d) = (ac-bd, ad+bc) 
(a,b) 
(c,d) 
, ' ' i 
(
ac+bd 
= 2 2 t 
c +d 
be-ad) 
2 d2 c + 
and 
al'lowed Hamilton, not without ·a struggle·, ·t·o abandon his 
own insistence on a commutative rti~I. 
Hamilton's hoped-Cor properties Cor a 'triple algebra• 
44 were as Collows: 
The operations of addition and multiplication should be , 
associative and commutative; multiplication should be 
distributive over addition; division should be unambiguous; 
NX = N~should be unique and x should be ot the same form as 
N and N'; the law oC moduli should hold; 45 and the new 
numbers must be interpretable in terms o~ three-dimensional 
space. All these conditions are satisCied in two dimensions 
by complex numbers. 
The nearest Hamilton could get to hie specified 
properties were the quaternions, four-term hypercomplex 
numbers of the form w + ix + jy + k~. The basic relations 
.2 .2 k2 i between the complex factors were i =J = = jk = -1, and the 
commutative property.was replaced by anticommutativity 
where, in general, for two quaternions q, and q•, qq• = 
-q•q. Hamilton talked of the quaternion Q. as being 
't =scalar~ +:Vector~ and interpreted the imaginary.part 
as a three-dimensional vector. 
Being unable to find an algebra of number triples 
that conformed to his requirements, 46 Hamilton develope4 
44. Crowe (1967) p.28 
45. The law of moduli for multiplication o~ two number 
triples is if Ca 1+b 1i+c 1j)(a2+b 2i•c2JJ = Ca3+b 3i+c3
j) then 
46. O.s. P&irce 1 showed·a number-triple algebra to Hamilton's 





an al~ebra of number quadruples. It has been suggested47 
that Hamilton's development of an algebra of number-couples 
made it more likely that he would entertain the more general 
idea of an extension to number triples, number quadruples, 
etc. Also, reliance on geometrical representation as a ,,. 
justification of the new algebra would have tied him 
conceptually to number triples as the next stage and any 
four-dimensional or higher algebra would have been hard to 
conceive. In any case, the four-dimensional algebra with 
its sacrifice of the commutative law, even though replaced 
by anti-commutativity was hard fo.r the mathematical 
community to take. Hamilton's discovery was the first 
well-known, consistent and significant number system 
that did not obey the laws of ordinary arithmetic. The 
fact that a meaningful algebra was allowed to violate the 
laws of arithmetic stimulated mathematicians to search not 
only for other algebras, but also for the logical justifi-
cations, and to provide another growing point for what has 
become the 'foundations' of mathematics. 
Hamilton worked on a further generalisation and 
Grassmann's calculus of extension was an n-dimen•ional 
geometry and a generalisation of complex numbers. Grassmann's 
work was difficult 48 and was not translated into English 
until much later, but he has been suggested as the real 
n 49 creator of the geometry of R • 
47. Crowe (1967) (26-27) 
48. Grassmann ~1844) 'The theory of linear extension, a 
new branch of analysis'• The" revised e'd.i'tion oE 1862 
was more- acceptable• 
49. Se-e Klein {1939) p.61. 
·n~ 
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. 50 8, The~Solution 0£ Equations and Galois· Theory. 
The fundamental theorem of algebra bad been stated 
by Girard in the early seventeenth century and an adequate 
proof of the proposition that every polynomial equation of 
degree n jas n roots bad been sought since that time.5 1 
An interesting recent discovery shows that D'Alembert 
provided the first proof in 1746, and Gauss, Argand, Legendre 
and Cauchy followed his line with a series of proofs using 
the properties of polynomials as analytic functions, thus 
making the theorem part of complex analysis.5 2 
In the latter part of the eighteenth century Lagrange 
analysed the known methods for solving second, third and 
fourth degree equations in the hope of providing clues for 
the solution of equations of higher degree. 53 He devised a 
general method for solving second, third and fourth degree 
equations but failed at a solution of equations of the 
fifth degree. After a great deal of careful work, Lagrange 
was led to suspect that a general solution of a polynomial 
equation of degree n was likely to be impossible for n)4. 
The typ~ of solution sought was in terms of radicals. 
This meant that the expression obtained for a root of an 
equation was composed of the operations of addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, divisi0n and the extraction 
50. Kline (1972) (752-771) 
51. Girard, A. 'L'Invention nouvelle en l'algebre',1629 
gave the first general statement. A large number of 
mathematicians in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries gave some time to the contemplation oC 
this prob1em. See Kline (1972). 
52. Petrova (1974) 
53. Lagrange (1770/1), Klin~ (1972)(600-606) 
of roots; an'exatnple is P'ontaiia·•a ao1utio~~of'x3~~··px''+'q·= 0 
where: .. 
3 ;;:::?2 ~ - R. + ~ 
2 27 4 
( 54) x :: 
Lagrange's suspicion that the solution of the general 
quintic and higher degree equations was impossible in these 
~ 
terms came not so much because he couldn't find a solution, 
but because his investigations furnished his intuition and 
gave insight into some reasons why his methods were successful 
for n~4 and not for n)4. His technique showed that solutions 
were possible where certain functions of the roots of an 
equation remained unchanged after certain permutations. 55 
Lagrange had derived the theorem that the order of a sub-
group must be a divisor of the order of a group in these 
terms. These methods later led to the develop_ment of the 
theory of substitution and permutation groups, and the 
techniques for elimination of unknowns provided material 
for the theory of determinants and the theory of matrices. 56 
Gauss too became convinced that the general solution 
of the quintic was impossible, and showed in one of his 
54. Stewart (1973)p.xiv. This was published by Cardan in 
the Ars Magna of 1545. 
·55. For example, in x~+bx+c=O, the functions x 1+x 2= -b and 
x 1x 2 = c are symmetric functions because their value 
does not change when x 1 and x 2 are interchanged. 
56. Vandermonde (1772) was the first to give a theory of . , 
determinants, ! .'.:.·ch. H·:!S on ,. ' . . , . . 
~ " .. , i ,. and Ruffini made several attempts to show the 
solution of the fifth degree equation impossible at 
the turn oC the century. Kline (1972)(605-606} • .. 
I 
t_ 
proofs of' the fundamental theore~. of' algebra that.when the 
• ' • "' ·~ I 
roots of' the cyclotomic equation~ xP-1 = 0 for p a p~ime 
can be expressed in radicals, the corresponding polygon 
with p sides can be constructed with ruler and compass.57 
The proof' was finally furnished by Abel who was 
acquainted,with the work of' Lagrange, Gauss and Cauchy, and 
who after first thinking he had found a solution of' the 
general quintic, proved the impossibility of' solving by 
radicals an equation of degree greater than four in 1824.58 
One might think that this was the end of' the story, but 
as in so many instances of' mathematical discovery, it was 
the beginning of a vast new field. It was well kno~that 
some equations of the fifth degree and higher were soluble 
by radicals, and so the next part of the research programme 
was to attempt a classification of' all polynomial equations 
to sort out the soluble from the insoluble. 
This is in fact what Galois initiated. He began by 
giving a simpler proof of Abel's result and then extending 
the argument to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions 
for equations of all degrees to be algebraically solvable. 59 
57. Gauss (1801). The pth roots of unity in this case are 
2119ka: . 2 lfk9' given by: x = cos + i sin ---- where k = 1,2,3 ••• p and 
p p 
pis a Fermat prime. Kline (1972)(752-754). 
58. Abel(1826) Kline (1972)(754-755) 
59. Galois' life was tragic C\Ild rebellious. His biography 
and mathematical achieTements have been extensively 
discussed. See f'or example, Sarton (19J7},Birkbot"£(1937) 
and Inf'eld (1948}. 
16Q(r1 
An important new idea that he ·introduced was that of a 
normal subgroup. If we can· express a given polynomial in 
the roots of an eqaation as an algebraic function of the 
coefficients of the equation, then we can express its 
conjugates - obtained by permuting the roots - similarly. 
Galois also showe\i that the permutations leaving any poly-
nomial and all its conjugates invariant were a special kind 
of subgroup of the symmetric group, the normal subgroup. 
Galois was the first to know the exact relations between 
group theory and the theory of equations and begin to 
understand them as we know them today, but he was not the 
first to see that there was a relation, as the previous 
fifty years had shown. 
It was not until 1870 that Galois' work became fully 
public, but many of his ideas had infiltrated other areas 
' QI.I of mathematics to be us~d with gr~~t ~t~~cG. The concept 
of the group organised algebra, and algebraic geometry to 
inspire Klein's reorganisation of geometry from the trans-
formation viewpoint in 1872. 61 Here the different branches 
of geometry ~re eharacterised by groups of transformations 
leaving fundamental relations invariant. Further investi-
gation into the nature of invariance, together with the 
group concept and axiomatic procedure has produced the 
60. Liouville edited and published part of Galois' work in 
1846, Serret used some of his ideas in a textbook in 
1866, but the first full and clear exposition of Galois 
appears in Jordan, •Traite des substitutions et des 
equations algebriques' (1870}. '·. 






ati'ucture ot contemporary modern alg•bra. 6a. · , 
A deep and pervasive intluence 0£ group theory appear• 
in the philosophical school of structuralism. Tbe view 
that a structure is a system of transformations is elaborated 
in a number of disciplines that can be said to exhibit.· a 
system together with laws \f compoaition. 63 The largest 
class of these structures are not strictly logical or 
mathematical for their transformations evolve over time, 
and are governed by laws which are not strictly 'operation•' 
in the mathematical sense. Thia meaning of transformation 
lava depends on the idea of 'feedback', and is said to 
operate in the areas of linguistics, sociology, psychology, 
anthropology, etc. An early application 0£ simple mathe-
matical structure in economics64 was synchronous with the 
structural studies 0£ mathematicians themselves, but the 
£irst abstract structures to be isolated and identi£ied £or 
what they •ere, were necessarily mathematical. Today, "••• 
the structural models of Levi-Strauss, the acknowledged 
master ot present-day social and cultural anthropology, 
are a direct "adaptation of general algebra.n65 Because 0£ 
the abstract and general nature of the group concept, 
Piaget sees in them "••• a kind of prototype 0£ structures 
in general, and since they are de£ined and used in a domain 
62. Van der Waerden•s 'Moderne Algebre• ia o£ten considered 
to be the major text that marks the beginning 0£ •modern' 
mathematics. 
63. Thia view ia expressed in Piaget (1971)p.5-16. 
64. Cournot, 'Researches into the mathematical principles 
0£ wealth' (1838). 
65. Piaget (1971)p.17. 
where every assertion, is subject to demonstration,. we must 
look to them to ground our hope for the future oC structur-
alism •••• the group concept or property is obtained ••• by 
a mode of thought characteristic of modern mathematics and 
' logic - 'reflective abstraction' - which does not derive 
properties from things but from our ways of acting on things, 
the operations we perform on them perhaps, rather, from 
the various fundamental ways of coordinating such acts or 
operations - 'uniting', 'ordering', 'placing in one-one 
correspondence', and so on ••• Group structure and trans-
formation go together. But when we speak of transformations 
we mean an intelligible change, which does not transform 
things beyond recognition at one stroke, and which always 
preserves invariance in certain respects ••• It is because 
the group concept combines transformation and conservation 
that it has become the basic constructivist tool. Groups 
are systems of transformations; but more important, groups 
are so defined that transformation can, so to say, be 
administerea in small doses, for any group can be divided 
into subgroups and the avenues of approach from any one 
. 66 
to any other can be marked out.!' 
Further discussion along these lines suggests that the 
basic structures of mathematics (as suggested by Bourbaki) 
correspond to those necessary for all intellectual activity, 
a conclusion apparently reached independently by mathematics 
and psychology.
67 
This latest version of the biogenetic 
66. Piaget (1971) (19-21) 
67. Piaget (1971) p.27 also to be found in Lamon (1972) 
(117-136). 
68 
law need not be argued here, .but it shows the prof'ound 
inf'luence of' abs.tract mathematics not only on philosophical 
~ 
thought, but also on practical mathematical education. 
9. Mathematical Logic. 
Formal analysis of' Aristotelian logic appeared 
with the work of' De Morgan and Boole in 1847. 69 The general 
motivations for these works came f'rom the developments in 
algebra, analysis and geometry seeking the f'undamental laws 
of mathematics. Hamilton's quaternioddisobeying the laws 
of' arithmetic, Liouville's proof' 0£ the existence of' 
transcendental numbers,70 and Bolzano's attempt at an 
68. The biogenetic law appears in various contexts and 
guises. Its contemporary enunciation 'ontegeny recapit-
ulates phylogeny•, or 'the path of' mental development 
follows that 0£ historical development' appears to 
be due to the German philosopher Haeckel. To subscribe 
to this requires a structuralist view of' the history 
of' mathematics. (See above Introduction p. Section 1.) 
De Morgan (1847) 'Formal Logic', Boole (1847) 'Mathe-
• 
matical Analysis of' Logic'l Leibniz, in his 'De Arte 
Combinatoria' of 1666, (published 1690) developed the 
ideas of' logical operations and abstract relations. The 
depth of' his ideas were not appreciated at the time, 
and were only realised when his work was edited at the 
beginning of' this century. So far as we know, he had 
no influence on the early nineteenth century. 








'· ~ ' ~· 
arithmetical theory of real numbers 71 showed both the 
possibilities and the problems ahead. De Morgan's work on 
the laws of algebra a\d mathematical logic is closely 
related,
72 
and in popular writing he claims the first 
principles of mathematics to be "··self-evident, and 
though derived from observation do not require more of it 
than has been made by children in general."73 
Boole's approach was more subtle, going deeper than 
pure observational experience to establish fundamental 
ideas, he claimed that "The la~s of thought, in all its 
c processes of conception and of reasoning, in all those 
operations of which language is the expression or the 
instrument, are of the same kind as the laws of the 
acknowledge processes of mathematics.n74 His example of 
the general structural identity of logic and algebra is 
developed by Piaget and others into the concept of the 
Logical Group which forms a basis for the description 
71. Bolzano (1830-35) See van Roostellar (1962). 
72. De MoFgan•s Trigonometry and Double Algebra appeared 
in 1849. Here he suggested algebra was a collection of 
meaningless symbols, (0,1,+,-,x,-,(), and letters), and 
a set of arbitrary laws, the associative, .commutative, 
distributive and some others he considered essential. 
73. De Morgan (1831) 'The Study and Difficulties of Mathe-
matics' from the 'Library of Useful Knowledge'. 
74. Boole (1854) 'An Investigation into the Laws of 
Thought' quoted in Tahta (1972)p.71. 
·; 
j 
of thought processes in evolution.and operation.75 
Later in the century mathematical logic was td emerge 
~s a pure science of symbols for the foundation of arithmetic, 
and hence o~ all mathematics. This general aim has now been 
abandoned, but the influence of mathematical logic both in 
its practical applications and its philosophical implications 
is profound. 76 
10. Conclusion 
The period we have considered was one of profound 
and remarkable change; social changes questioned the 
traditional order of life, and philosophical changes 
questioned the traditional attitudes and beliefs of science 
75. Piaget (1953) 'Logic and Psychology' and Piaget (1972) 
'The Principles of Genetic Epistemology' (19-51) in 
particular. 
76. The logical foundation of mathematics was begun by 
Frege (1879), and furthered by the work of Russell 
and '.!hi tehead. Russell claimed that Bo·ole invented 
pure ma·thematics, see Newmann ( 1956) ( 1576-1590). In 
Russell's sense, logic and pure mathematics are 
synonymous. The claim, however, is over-rated, for 
what Boole did was to contribute a symbolic system 
to an algebra of logic. While the general philosophical 
programme failed, the techniques of logic and logical 
algebra~ combined with those of modern engineering 
have produced a vast fie1d of applications, and 
the influence 0£ the ide.a that mathematics ia a 
'logical}' .subj.ec:t• _. ·it'. inevi'tab·ly; obeys. arbitrary f'ul.'es -
i.s stil·l strong with the non-mathematician • .-.: 
t-66 
and mathematics.77 Th ~d . ere was a ynamic interaction between 
expectation of' change and acceptance oC change, particularly 
in the social and intellectual f'ields. 
The application of' mathematics to physical problems 
had made tremendous advances in the previous century, 
encouraging attempts at more subtle and dif'f'icult questions, 
which in their turn raised mathematical problems demanding 
a deeper analysis of' the mathematics involved. 
Here we see emerging views on the objectivity of' 
mathematics. belief's in the arbitrary and abstract nature 
oC the £undamental processes, encouraged by the creation 
of' new numbers and geometries, and the exploration of' their 
relation with established, well-known systems. Classif'ication 
problems arose to deal with the new entities, and bier-
archies of' algebra and geometry were derived. 
The interaction of the generalisation of entities 
and operations was carried f'orward by heuristic principles, 
of continuity, of' permanence of f'orm, which were slowly 
abandoned as the definitions oC the entities and operations 
became clearer. The crystallisation of' the idea of' some-
thing being the same but dif'f'erent af'ter an operation, the 
recognition of' what had changed and how, and the possibility 
or otherwise of' reversing such a change, gave rise to the 
77. The century began with Volta's invention of the battery. 
Dalton's atomic theory, the battle of Waterloo, the 
synthesis of' organic chemicals by Wohler, Lyell's 
'Principles of' GeoLogy', Comte's 'Cours de Pbilosophie 
Positive• , Faraday! s e-lectromagnetic induction, the 
Communist M~nif~sto and the Voyage 0£ the Beagle1 
all occurred in the f'irst f'1£ty years. 
generality of the· concepts of transformation and invariance. 
The appearance of duality, the interchangeability 
of entities giving an alternate consistent system suggested 
a deeper truth, that of a structure behind a structure. 
Axiom systems were emerging, meaningless symbols manipulated 
by arbitrary rules, which gave rise to problems of inter-
pretation and truth on the one hand, and on the other to 
hopes for the description of logical structures that would 
provide secure foundations for the whole of mathematics. 
The increase in abstraction and generality had a gradual 
but profound effect on proof methods, and there arose an 
increasing division between intuition and logic as the 
uno:f:ficial and o:f:ficial media o:f communication. 
All this can be seen happening in the :first :fifty 
years o:f the ninettenth century, and a historical study 
while the ideas are still young - and simple enough to be 
able to see the basic outlines without requiring too much 
background - shows the interconnection o:f mathematical ideas 
with each other and the general culture. 
It is important :for teachers to have some idea o:f . 
the origins o:f modern mathematics. The mathematics we 
teach has arrived by a process o:f evolution, and it is 
vital to have an understanding o:f that process, :for it 
helps to identi:fy the central ideas and to isolate the 
growing points which on the whole are deeper and more 
abstract than particular topics or techniques taught. 
There are logical and psychological reasons :for 
fl teaching particular topics or techniques: at certain stages 
JD the individual:' s mathematical. devel~p~~nt, the ··~TS and 





and our knowledge 0£ history: helps us to aiake' judgements 
about the overall relative importance of a topic, and to 
explain how it came to be. 
b) Some Aspects of Elementary Mathematics 
The psychological, developmental and linguistic bases 
of childrens learning were first investigated in a systematic 
way by Piaget
1 
and Vygotsky2 and have continued to be 
studied notably by Bruner. 3 These studies have what is 
generally recognised to be a scientific/pbilosopbical 
foundation, in contrast to the earlier, more 'craftsman-
like' approach of many teachers which culminated in the 
work of Froebel
4 
and Montessori? The contrast is between 
theories obtained from established and developing theories 
in experimental psychology of a hopefully objective nature, 
and the intuitive theories based on a teacher's belief-
system and observations of children in the classroom. 
1. Piaget (1926). Piaget's first paper (on verbal 
reasoning in children) appeared in 1921. 
2. Vygotsky (1965), first published posthumously in 
1934. (Vygotsky began this work in 1924). Chapter 6 
deals with 'The Development of Scientific Concepts 
in childhood.' 
3. Bruner J.S. Goodnow J.J. and Austin G.A. (1956) 
4. For example: Froebel F. Friedrich Froebel's Pedagogics 0£ 
the Kindergarten. (Tr.Josephine Jarvis) London 1906. 
s. For example• Monte..,.so~i M~ia;. The- M9ntessori. Me.thod 
N.T. 1912. 
Frolli 'these investigations a number of contrasting 
~j f and contraditting ideas emerge, but the more recent 
~ 'scientific' theories have been interpreted in Biggs 6 to 
produce the following 'Deductions from Research'& 
11
1. Children learn mathematical concepts more slowly than 
we realised. They learn by their own activities. 
2. Although children think and reason in different ways 
they all pass through certain stages depending on 
their chronological and mental ages and their experience. 
3. We can accelerate their learning by providing suitable 
experiences, particularly if we introduce the appropriate 
language simultaneously. 
4. Practice is necessary to fix a concept once it bas been 
understood, therefore practice should follow, and not 
precede, discovery." 
These 'deductions' and others 0£ a similar nature, 
form the basis of the child-centered approach to the learning 
of mathematics and are to be found, explicitly or implicitly 
in practically every contemporary text. 7 
I find these deductions dangerous. Since they are 
stating the obvious (any thoughtful teacher might arrive 
at them given time and opportunity for discussion), they 
are so simplified as to be open to all kinds of interpretations. 
6. Biggs (1965)p.9. 
7. The fact that they are produced as deductions from 
scienti£ic theories as opposed to deductiQns.that a 
teacher with a good knowledge of the natUJ"e and 
processes 0£ mathematics might have ,made on. a ba~Jis 0£ 
classroom-experience, I find a remarkable example of 
the authority 0£ science. 
.1i70 
They are truisms. Their negations are statements which 
are obviously wrong to anyone with experience oC young 
children, and as such, it is doubtf'ul if' they provide any 
8 
real help. In particular, the mathematics which children 
are now encouraged to learn at the elementary level does 
not necessarily ref'lect their interests or modes of' 
thought, nor is it necessarily relevant to their stage of' 
development. Yet teachers are persuaded to act as though 
it were. 
How has this situation come about ? Most of' the 
elementary mathematics taught in primary school is still 
called 'number work' and as such reflects the apparently 
simple and obvious number f'acts and relations which (it 
is said), f'irst became apparent to our ancestors. The 
mathematical-theoretical basis of' this work now lies in 
what is called the 'Foundations of' Mathematics'. 
~ithout going into too much detail 9 we can sketch 
the basic ideas of' the foundations of' mathematics which 
give us that area called the structure of' the integers. 
We are familiar with the notion of' 'set' which, in some 
way is interpreted as a collection of' objects classified 
according to some agreed criteria, and the 'equality of' 
sets' which is interpreted as the ability to put any two 
'like' sets into one-one correspondence. 'Cardinal number' 
8. Of' course, Biggs goes on to detail how these deductions 
may be put into practice on the communicating and 
organising level. Little or nothing of' real signif'i-
cance is said about the nature ot: mathematics, or· 
mathematics learning. 
• This outline is taken from Wilder (1965) Chapters 
III V 
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is a l~bel attached to a set of a particular ·~ize•, and 
two sets have the same number if they can be put into one-
one correspondence with each other, there being no 'elements' 
unmatched. An essential interpretation of the mathematical 
idea of 'cardinal number' is that the 'number' of a given 
set is constant and independent of any change in configuration 
of the discrete elements of the set. In its interpretation 
in the object-world, one certain thing two arbitrary sets 
can have in common is their 'number'. 
Having established the idea of cardinal number we 
then proceed to relate this with the idea of 'size• as a 
relative attribute, and a relation'<' is defined such that 
if-<. and{J are two cardinal numbers, the statement •oe <fl' 
corresponds to the statement 'AC:. B 1 for sets. Thus we 
obtain an 'ordering' of numbers~ This can be looked on as 
the interpretation of a kind of 'one-more-ness' in the size 
of sets. From here we proceed to the idea of an ordered 
pair (a,b), and ordered triple (a,b,c), etc., and the idea 
of 'order type' where the sets {a,b,} and [b,a,J; and(a,b,c,J 
{b,a,c,} are of the same 'order type': (by convention 
'ordered pair' is synonymous with 'order type 2', etc.) 
Thus a 'numeral' say, '5' can be considered as a cardinal 
number (some indication of the 'size' of a set), and also 
as an 'ordinal number' which designates an 'order type', 
and is interpreted in some way as a concept of 'next in 
size', or 'next in line'. 
These ideas have arisen from the development, lO 
See 9. and also Eves and Newsom (1965). The axiomatic 
method, as understood today, was initiated by Pasch in 
Vorlesungen uber neueve Geometric Leipzig,1882. 
· 1 
particularly in the last hundred years:, of a rigorous·· 
axiomatic structure, the theory of sets and of its inter-
pretations as the ~tructure of the integers. The main point 
to note here is that this is fundamentally a logical-
mathematical development which is purely abstract, conforibin·g 
to arbitrary but consistent rules, with no necessary relation 
to the real world. This, at least, is what the logician 
1 . 11 c aims. 
My contention is that because this is taken to be the 
'true' development of the number system, it is also used 
as a set of criteria by which correct teaching should be 
judged. But this sequence interpreted from axiomatic structure 
is not necessarily the way in which we learn about •number.' 
The teaching of number in primary schools is based on 
th.e practical interpretation of such theories and lists of 
the important 'concepts' are found to take the form: 
"Here is a summary of these concepts, processes and facts. 
io Sorting and classifying objects into sets. Comparing 
sizes of two sets (the number of objects in each set) 
by matching or one-to-one correspondence; learning 
the language, and later the symbols of inequality; is 
greater than) , is less than<. 
11. A rather tongue-in-cheek version of this claim can be 
found in Russell's 'Mathematics and the Metaphysicians' 
which contains the passage about mathematics being 
"••• the subject in which we never know what we are 
talking· about, nor whether what we are saying is true." 
See Newman J.R. (Ed) 1956 (1576-77) 
17; 
ii. Counting the number of objects ~rt a set (cardinal 
number) •. This, in effect, involves putting each object 
into one-to-one correspondence with one in the series 
of number names. Conservation of number. • •••• 
iii. The number line. Numbers in sequence or in order up 
to 100 (ordinal numbers). It 12 • • • • • 
Of course, it may be argued that research into childrens 
learning of mathematical concepts tells us that this is so. 
But this is a dangerous assumption. We must be careful to 
distingui.sh how children learn something we choose to teach 
them from what they know. The examples given by such 
experiments may tell us something about how children learn 
(in the behavioural sense), but little, if anything about 
what children know (in the epistemelogical sense). In 
fact, while Piaget is aware of many of the difficulties 
involved, some of his interpreters, especially those read 
by teachers in training, are apparently unaware of this 
distinction. 13 
Classic examples of this may be found in two recent .. 
books where the learning experiments described a~e care-
fully designed to bring out the fundamental ideas of the 
12. Biggs (Ed) (1965} p.11 
13. For example, I can find no mention of this distinction 
in Isaacs (1960) or Beard (1969). They are concerned 
with the description of Piagetian theory, the classi-
fication 0£ stages of mental development, and the 
appropriate mathematical concepts to teach at those 
stages. 
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axiomatic structures described above. 14 
Such is the influence of the abstract axiomat{c 
structure on the design of the learning experiments, and 
their results; we find that the early history of mathe-
matics is being rewritten to explain this learning. This 
is surely a travesty of the meaning of history. 
Smeltzer
15 is a typical example. 'Primitive' man learnt 
to count by a process of set recognition, one-one correspond-
ence and ordering. While we may feel that, at a certain 
stage of development, this may be a plausible interpretation· 
.of the available evidence, we have no means of being sure 
that this was the only way in which man learnt about 
numbers, nor have we any evidence to suggest that the stage 
of primitive written records indicated the beginning of 
number (or any other mathematical) concepts. The axiomatic 
myth is being further perpetrated in books which can be 
16 read by the children themselves. 
This is not the first time that assumptions about the 
nature o~ number have prescribed both history and teaching. 
14. See Copeland (1970) "First experiences with number" 
(57-85) and Lovell (1971) gives a summary of suggested 
activities for children (36-40). 
15. Smeltzer (1953) (2-19) in particular. 
16. Lerch (1966). This is the story of a (base five) 
number system invented by the inhabitants of a make-
believe island. The stages of invention are: one-one 
~ .. ~ .. correspondence, tallying, and a coded base-five system. 
'· . 
I. ~ • 
fa'• . . . 
Kroenecker "••• asserted that 'God made the integers, all 
thereat is the work of man'. By 1910, some of the most 
wary mathematicians were inclined to regard the natural 
numbers as the most effective net ever invented by the 
devil to snarl unsuspecting man. Others, of a yet more 
mystical•ct, maintained that the natural numbers have 
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nothing super-natural of either kind about them, asserting 
that the 'unending sequence' 1,2,3, ••• is the one trust-
worthy 'intuition' vouchsafed to Rousseau's natural man. 
The tribes ot: the AmaLon Basln were not consulted. 1117 
Much more realistic remarks about the early history ot: 
mathematics are to be found in Boyer: 18 "Statements about 
the origins of mathematics, whether of arithmetic or 
geometry, are of necessity hazardous, for the beginnings 
ot: the subject are older than the art of writing. It is 
only during the last half-dozen millenia that man has been 
able to put his records and thoughts in written form. For 
data about the prehistoric age we must depend on interpret-
ations based on the few surviving artefacts, on evidence 
provided by current anthropology, and on a conjectural 
b.ackward extrapolation from surviving documents. 11 Neugebauer 19 
in a similar context remarks: " The common belief that we 
'historical perspective' with increasing distance seems 
me to utterly misrepresent the actual situation. 1W'hat 
gain is merely confidence in generalisations which we 
:•ou1d never dare to make it: we had access to the real wealth 
contemporary evidence." 
,.11 (19,5) p.110 
~oy~r (1963~, (5~6> 
N~ug•ba~-~.(1957), viii 
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Both th••• author• are acutely aware of the dangers of 
gene:rali•ini fro• littl.• evidence, interpreting pa1St •athe-
matics in ter•s of current ideas, and of the •context• which 
mathematics develops within a culture. While recognising a 
development which may be similar to the current •axiomatic 
20 approach' as one interpretation, we must also be on the 
lookout for other evidence (both •mathematical' and •non-
mathematical') for different versions of the early develop-
ment of mathematics. This other evidence indicates that: 
i. 'Primitive• arithmetic ia not as simple as it appears 
in the current popularly accepted versions of that 
period of history. Nor are the people themselves as 
~ •primitive• as once believed. 
ii. The origins of mathematic• pre date written records and 
thus may be based upon very different ideas from those 
at the time when writing became apparent. 
iii. Since we ar,e today ready to admit many more situations 
as •mathematical' than hitherto, (relational aspects of 
objects, or the formation of language, for example) 
there are many more potential interpretations of the 
little evidence we do have. 
20. Concerning interpretations, there is circumstantial 
evidence to suggest that Piaget's view of children'• 
logical development derives from Russell's formulation 
of logic. Aiton's remark (1972) that it is instructive 
to read Russell's 'Introduction to Mathematical 
Phi.loaophy' alongside Piaget's developmental psychology 
reinforces this view. Also, Piaget subscribes (at 
.least in principle) to the bio-genetic principle. 
(Gill8burg and Opper ( 1969)p.10). Considering the 
. . 
evolutioaary baaia of hi• epistemology, thia ia hardly 
•urpri•ing. 
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A common unthinking.criticfsm of early man and of 
so-called 'primitive' cultures existing today is that they 
. 'b k d' d t . ·1· t" 21 are in some way ac war compare o our own civi isa ion. 
1Vhat is so often not realised is that they are different 
cultures from our own; we should be aware exactly what 
this difference implies, and that they may be highly 
advanced in their own terms, being well able to cope with 
the problems of their own society. 
Many general histories of mathematics start with early 
number ideas fairly well-developed; with the Babylonian, 
or the Egyptians. Having little or no evidence to the 
! cdbtrary, they give the impression that mathematics 
started here. Some compare different number base systems 
used in early civilisations, and imply that primitive tribes 
could only count up to a certain number. (This is parti-
cularly true where 'finger tally' systems are being discussed.) 22 
However, we find the critical reader's suspicions confirmed 
in a paper by .volfers 23 where he discusses the counting 
systems of tribes in New Guinea. The first, and perhaps 
the most obv~ous fact that arises is that people can employ 
different counting systems for diff~rent kinds of 
21. Cajori (1896), (1-4) makes specific remarks about the 
abilities of the 'lower' and the 'higher' races. 
22. These remarks are generally true of short histories of 
mathematics or histories written prior to the 1960 1 s. 
A notable exception is Struik (~948). 
Wolfers (1971). 
24 calculations. These different calculations otten depend 
upon the different kinds of situations that arise. One 
example is given where a tribe "••• employ a decimal system 
of numeration but with a separate set of terms to denote 
each number according to which of forty categories the item(s) 
being counted come(s) under. Other groups employ different 
bases according to what is being counted •••• 1125 The most 
commonly occurring bases are two, five and ten. Different 
counting systems may be used in transactions in everyday 
life, and in private or ceremonial situations. "The 
Mailu ••• who normally count in tens, count certain foods, 
~taro, sweet potatoes, fish and coconuts counted for a 
feast - in groups of four. 1126 Body-counting systems work 
to a number of different bases, and quite high numbers can 
be counted. Also, surprisingly (?) modulus systems have 
been discovered where the actual number names used are 
relatively few, but large numbers can be dealt with • 
• \lthough the mathematical distinction between a base and a 
modulus is precise, it is not always clear how a particular 
system operates in practice. "The existence of modulus 
systems, or of counting systems with a physically present 
or visual, but no verbal base, may explain why some writers 
have assumed that particular groups of Papuans and New 
Guineans "cannot" count beyond a certain number." (For example, 
24. This has been known for some time. 'iolfers examines 
the nature of these different counting systems, rather 
than.showing them as examples of different bases in use. 
25. op cit p.78 • 
26. op.cit. p.79 
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the person counting may use a number 0£ men, repeating the 
same number-words on a body tally system once ~or ·~~~~.» 2 7 
Apart £rom the sophistication revealed by these studies, 
a £inal remark must be made about the ~ to count beyond 
a certain number. We must be aware, when criticising 
primitive number systems that also "There was not so much 
a limit to counting as a limit to the goods and the quantities 
that needed to be counted, or that particular groups 0£ 
28 people wanted to measure." 
The development 0£ written numbers - even the simplest 
tally system - represents a stage in the process 0£ unwritten .. 
thought. It is not only possible, but necessary that be£ore 
written records emerged, 'counting' was £airly well developed • 
. ;e can speculate as to how people counted at this stage, 
with re£erence to body tally systems, but even this may have 
been at a £airly late stage in the story, and the original 
need to 'count' may not have been associated with activities 
like counting £locks. There is certainly evidence in the 
number names used29 that the original use 0£ these words 
was adjectival rather than nominal, conveying some aspect 
0£ the object being described. 
Th~ involvement 0£ man (not only primitive man) in 
ritual is well known. Seidenberg30 provides an interesting 
"£ramework £or the origin 0£ counting in ritual, suggesting 
that the original need was n~t to count as we know it, but 
27. op.cit. p.81 
28. op.cit. p.82 
' ~ .j •• l . ' "'.t ... ~ , . - .; - .... 
~9. Menninger (1969), (9-32) 
30. Seidenberg (1962). 
1) 180 
to call. upon the participants in· ·a ritual. 
Seidenberg sees what we have discussed of priad!tive 
counting systems as the application of a device (which was 
already well-established) to another situation, namely, 
t.he 'shepherd and his flock' • The application of a device . 
is seen to be an effect of the device and not a cause. 
"How can one ask 'How many ?' until one knows how to count ?•131 
The occurrence of base two counting in widely separated 
peoples suggests a common origin in a particular type of 
ritual. (The evidence for the common origin need not concern 
us here.) 32 We also know that m~ny 'primitive' peoples .. 
have a fear of being counted; the belief that by counting 
people, or knowing their name, one acquires power over them 
and can even kill them is not uncommon. The connection 
between number mysticism and ritual is also well established. 33 
These ideas are combined in a fascinating picture of 
the creation/fertility ritual where participants appear 
(or are called on by the'priest') in pairs, male and female. 
"The original intention is to mimic a portion ot: the creation 
ritual. ·1t is in this way that we envisage 'counting' to 
have become detached from the ritual and to have acquired 
its abstract or general character. 
Secondly, we think that the higher counting may have 
started as a method of taking care of longer and longer 
31. ibid p.2 
32. Siedenberg (1960). Though Wilder (in private correspondence) 
is sceptical of his evidence. 
For example, the large literatur.e. on numerology, 
divination and so on. 
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processiona (not with the idea ot counting thea, however). 
The base (which is not logically inherent in counting) 
corresponds to the number of persons in the basic ritual, 
and the higher counting derives from the continued repetition. 
with slight modifications, of this basic ritual."34 
However, we may criticise this theory, we can extract two 
ideas which may be relevant to our discussion. Namely, that 
(i) the 'need to count• as popularly imagined is not necessarily 
the origin of the act of counting, and (ii) ideas related 
to andassociated with 'counting' in the mind, may also be 
" 
connected with rituals, ceremonies and games.35 I£ we 
regard counting as the application 0£ a device, perhaps we 
should look more carefully £or the origins 0£ this device 
in 'non-mathematical' situations. 
With the gradual widening of the idea of what is 
'mathematical' and what can be regarded as 'potentially 
mathematical', or looked upon in a 'mathematical way', we 
come to accept that many other things that primitive man 
did, and the way in which he regarded his world, couid be 
seen as 'the sources of other (non-numerical) mathematical. 
ideas. Early man was aware of very sophisticated relational 
aspects of the world which we have either forgotten, or 
which do not seem to be important in our civilization. 
Even today many peopJ.es have highJ.y deveioped classification 
systems, based on their relationship with the worJ.d they 
live in, empiricai and highiy relevant to their needs. The 
ability of so-called primitive peopie to provide investi-
gators with lists of characteristics of animal and plant 
:~)It. Siedenberg ( 1962) p.10 
55. For example, children's 'counting out• rhymes. 
. lif'e should not be surprising when their sur·vival dep•nds 
on being .able to dis.tinguish f'ood and other usef'u.l things 
from their surroundings. 36 
This is onl.y the tip of the iceberg. The ability to 
classify may be a pre-requisite for the formation of number 
concepts at a particular level, but is it not also at the 
foundation of' a multiplicity of' relational ideas which may 
result in what !!!. call 'logic' or 'algebra' or 'geometry•?37 
The classification of' objects and the perception of' the 
.. 
36. Levi-Strauss (1966), Ch.II "The Logic of Totemic 
Classifications" gives many detailed examples of' how 
precise native classifications of p1ants, animals, 
times and seasons can be. 
37. For example, Gladwin (1970) is an investigation into 
the organisation of knowledge and modes of thought of 
a 'primitive' culture - the navigators and canoe-
builders of Puluwat Atoll. The navigation of small 
canoes across the ocean without any of the norma1 aids 
requires a complex and well-organised body of knowledge. 
•· 
Gladwyn criticises current educational practice, 
claiming that the •Emphasis is (therefore) on measure-
ment, with the qualities to be measured accepted as 
given. The possibility is thereby largely foreclosed 
of exploring other dimensions of thinking beyond 
those which are traditiona1ly recognised within 
educational pilychology. '' (p. 216) 
relation.a between them is a fundamental human activity. 
Also: " ••• the kind of logic in mythical thought is as 
rigorous as that of modern science, and (that) the difference 
lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but 
in the nature of the things to which it is applied ••• 
The same logical processes operate in myth as in science, 
and (that) man has always been thinking equally well; 
the improvement lies not ip an alleged progress of mants 
mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may 
apply its unchanged and unchanging powers."38 
It may be stretchidg the point too far to claim these 
activities as mathematics, but perhaps we can help ourselves 
to a better appreciation of mathematics and how it arises 
in the world (our own inner world) by capitalising on our 
·i~vestigations of the thought and world of 'primitive• 
people. Not that I want to imply that children think like 
•primitive• aduits, but that we should become aware of the 
classificational and relational .spects of our own world 
(the world our children grow up in) so that we may help 
them by exp1oiting the aspects of the world that are 
relevant and meaningful to them. These aspects wii~, 
necessarily, be different at different stages, and will 
inevitabiy produce different effects; different mathematics, 
which we will have to recognise and respect for whd~ i~ is. 
'Number• is only one, and a relatively late aspect of the 
total situation. 
We need therefore to review our philosophy of teaching 
•athematics at the primary level. These remarks have been 
t.aken from th• po:iiit ot: vie~ of mathematics rather than · 
l 




psychology or child developmeJ;lt. Whatever we may learn 
about learning, can, in this context be separated out from 
what we can learn about mathematics, and the following 
remarks on the content 0£ mathematics at primary level 
can be made: 
i) We should be aware that the 'axiomatic structure 
development' dominates elementary mathematics. This has 
occurred through a particular view oC mathematics insisting 
that there is only one true story. The result is pre-
scriptive pedagogy - and a new orthodoxy. 
ii) History oC mathematics i'11 not only based on documentary 
evidence of a mathematical nature, but also on 'non-
mathematical' and even on 'non-documentary' evidence. 
Since our view oC what mathematics is changes, so also 
does our view oC what can be admitted as evidence. 
iii) We should beware oC the histories 0£ mathematics that 
begin with 'counting'. Speculation about the early history 
0£ mathematics - or even the history oC 'counting' - must 
pay attention to the vast quantity of 'pre-documentary' 
and 'non-m~thematical' evidence that is available. Much 
oC this suggests counting to be the application oC a well-
established device whose origins may not be the 'need to 
count•. 
iv) Because oC our traditional reverence Cor counting, and 
the idea that it is somehow the 'simplest' mathematics, we 
·do not readily admit 'other kinds oC mathematics' to be 
worthy oC attention in elementary school. (Even iC we know 
.i;hey axis t • ) 
-~) The; sources 0£ elementary mathematics (not only 
, )\istoric.elly but in the contemporary sense also), do not, 
·: necessarily lie in the area -that we today recognise as 
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mathematics; but also in human activities which can become 
literature, art,. music, and other :f'orms of' communication 
when developed in di:f':f'erent ways. 
We need, therefore, to develop a number of' alternatives -
both in and to arithmetic - which are viable and valid 
mathematical activities, accessible to teachers and children 
alike. Historical perspective may enable us to produce 
those alternatives, and guard against any insistence that 
a particular a·lternative is necessarily correct. 
c). Perception, Perspective, Projective Geometry 
The development of' techniques :f'or representing tnree-
dimensional space in the plane are recorded both in the 
history of' art and the history of' mathematics. It would 
seem, therefore, that this may be a :f'ruit:f'ul area to 
explore, not on1y to widen one's appreciation of' the 
origins of', and bases :f'or certain mathematical theories, 
but also to emphasise the nature of' the connections between 
mathematics, art, the psychology of' perception, and the 
development of' children's ideas of' space. 
Theories of' perception, particular1y visua1 perception, 
are discussed in Gregory 1 and Gibson~ A summary3 puts 
forward concisely a new approach to the theory of' percept-
ion. The former approaches, which on the who1e attempt to 
describe the process of' making sense of' some abstract 
'space' or ~orm' are contrasted with an idea that emphasises 




the invariance: of perception with varying· a&nsat'i:ons. 
Sensory experience is a sp&cial self'-conscious kind of 
awareness while perceptual experience is unsel£-consci"ous 
and direct. "The individual is bathed in a sea 0£ energy 
at all times, and the stimulus energies that his receptor~ 
can pick up are a £lowing array ••• the £lowing array has 
4 two components, one 0£ change, one 0£ non-change." Gibson 
borrows two notions from mathematics, transformation and 
invariance under transformation. "The specific hypothesis 
is that the invariant component in a transformation carries 
information about an object and that the variant· component 
carries information entirely, £or example, about the relation 
0£ the perceiver to the object. When an observer attends 
to certain invariants he perceives objects; when he attends 
to certain variants he has sensations." 5 
The evidence supporting this hypothesis is extensively 
discussed in Gibson's (1950) book, where a section on the 
development 0£ perception in children suggests that 
the child does not have to construct a constant world out 
0£ ever changing perspectives, but has to discover the 
properties 0£ the world that are invariant under 
trans£ormations. 6 
4. ibid p.67 
5. ibid p.68 
6. An interesting comparison can be drawn between Gibson's 
theory 0£ perception and the account given 0£ the early 
experiences 0£ the infant by Gattegno (1973), where 










It- is interesting to·· note that the: parti-cular ;m·athe-:, 
matical ideas that Gibson uses to develop his own) .J.·deas, 
originated :from one of: the theories that he critic-is~s· 1• 
namely the various attempts to explain visual perception 
in terms of: the e:f':f'orts of: the eye to discover the· 'torms • 
or the Euclidean proper.ties of' the world. 7 
The theory of: perception which gave rise to the technical 
developments of: late Medieval and Renaissance periods, used 
Greek geometry and optical theo~y motivated by the religious 
:f:dea that the eye is the window of' the soul, to change the 
emphasis in painting f:rom symbolic repre,•ata'tiO-.into· a 
8 visually accurate record. 
7. Gibson (1965) p.64 distinguishes three types of' theory 
of' perception; (i) those that appeal to innate ideas or 
the rational faculties of: the mind f:or making sensory 
data intelligible; (ii) those appealing to past experience, 
memory or learning f:or supplementing and interpreting 
sensory data; (iii) the idea that sensory chaos is 
. 
org4nised by a spontaneous process in the brain. The 
idea that Euclidean space is innate, and that the mind 
is informed not by sense impressions but by its own 
preconceptions, was a common assumption of' Medieval optics. 
8. The period of: this change can be approximately given 
as mid-thirteenth to f:if:teenth century, i.e. f:rom 
Duccio(1255-1318)to Della Francesca (1416-1492). 
·----·-----------------------------~ 
~he stages in this development tell of a particularly 
interesting and well-motivated piece of applied mathematics.9 
The analysis of children's art indicates that symbolism 
is foremost, and the perspective representation is not 
10 generally possible until the age of about fourteen. 
However, a few attempts at giving an impression of depth or 
distance produce a 'plan' or •terrace' where objects are 
arranged in rows, as it were, the foreground being in the 
first row, and the most distant objects being in the back 
11 row. Kellog is quite adamant in insisting that the term 
perspective is inappropriate for describing children's art 
"because young children lack the ability to draw in true 
perspective. 012 
In the history of art there exists a parallel to this 
early stage of 'distance representation' to be seen in 
'Terraced Perspective' where rows of dignitaries, saints, 
angels, etc., are placed one behind the other, but are 
9. The technical problem appears to have been solved by 
Brunelleschi about 1425. His pupil, Alberti in Della 
Pittura (1435J produced tne rird~ dcientific writing 
on the new theory of perspective. 
10. The pri~cipal works consulted here are ~ng. (1954), 
Kellog (1970) and Jameson (1968). 
11. Jameson (1968) p.46, figs.90, 91. The children were 
aged 7 and6 respectively. Piaget interprets similar 
pictures quite differently (see below). 




still all the same size. 13 
It is, however, dangerous to make much of such 
parallels, because i~ an over-eager analysis of sp~tial 
representation, aspects of pictures like their conceptual 
organisation and symbolism and even in some cases the 
artist's materials, may make a more significant contri-
bution than merely accurate representation of physical 
space. 
The development of children's concepts of space has been 
14 analysed by Piaget, where a progression from topological 
through projective to Euclidean concepts is described. 
The elementary topological perceptions are : "(1) proximity 
or near-byness, (2) separation, (3) order (or spatial 
succession), (4) enclosure or surrounding, (5) continuity.n 15 
"Projective space begins psychologically when the object 
or pattern ••• begins to be thought of in relation to a 
'point-of-view' ••• (and) is concerned with the inter-
coordination of objects separated in space II 16 ... While 
projecfive correspondences can ba regarded as topological 
correspondences plus the conservation of straight lines, 
euclidean correspondences begin with the conservation of 
parallelism, and later include the conservation of angles 
13. Terraced perspective is shown well in Medieval paintings 
' 
like 'Majesty' or 'The Annunciation' both by Simone 
Martini (1285-1344). 
14. Pia~et,J. The Child's Conception of Space.Routledge 1956~ 
15. Holloway (1967)p.3. The rest of the summary is also 
taken from this work. 




In a more g~nera.l cont~xt_, Piaget claims 
that this is the reverse of the qistorical process; that 
while topological aspects may be the first to be perceived 
by the child, it was the euclidean aspects of space that 
were first recognised in the history of mathematics. 18 
While it may be true that euclidean geometry was the 
first formalised system, it was certainly not the first 
kind of geometry discovered. 19 Visualisation we know was 
an important factor in pre-euclidean geometry, 20 and the 
so-called 'proofless' geometry of Greece, Egypt, Babylon, 
India and China requires some appreciation of the topological 
17. ibid p.55 
18. Piaget (1950) 11 ••• historiquement, la g~ometrie 
euclidienne a precede de beaucoup 
la constitution de la g~ometrie projective, et celle-ci 
a precede de beaucoup la de'couverte de la topologie." 
p.237. The section (236-242) is a discussion of this 
idea. 
19. Seidenberg (1962) 
20. Szabo (1961) 
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and projective aspects. 21 There is obviously a difference 
between order of discoYery and· order of recording. 
Although pre-Greek geometers may have been aware of some 
topological and projective properties, they might have 
been considered trivial or unimportant at the time. 
Euclidean aspects of space seem easiest to record and 
manipulate, so it is little wonder that for a long time 
man has been persuaded of their necessary correspondence 
with reality. 
The development of spatial relationships in 'pictorial 
space' in children is seen in three states. 22 The first 
contains only topological relationships; proportions, 
21. If we consider proximity, separation, order, enclosure 
and ~ontinuity as fundamental geometric intuitions, and 
the conservation of straight lines as one of the first 
experiences of objects in space, these are the topo-
logical and projective precursors of euclidean space. 
As soon as the construction of buildings became a 
necessary task, objects in space were seen to preserve 
affine and metric properties when manipulated. Many 
pre-euclidean proofs might easily be re-written in 
terms of the motion geometry used in schools today. 
A possible example is found in Seidenberg (1975). (289-291) 
22. Holloway (1967) (9-11). 
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distances, perspectives, projections and sections are 
all absent. The second.i$ a stage of intellectual realism23 
where children.attempt to show •everything that is there' -
different points of view may be represented on the same 
picture, while attemp1amay be made to show both the inside 
and outside of closed objects. Projective and metric 
• 
relationships are not coordinated here. Finally, attempts 
at visual realism appear, "••• so late as to suggest that 
projective and euclidean notions are slow to SJDerge in the 
realm of representation in contrast to their development 
in perception." 24 
Little useful correspondence can be made between these 
developments and the history of art, for the historical 
products we have are the work of mature artists and depend 
on the cultural context for their significance. Even in 
the area of the pure technique of visual realism earlier 
theories have had to be revised in the light of new 
23. A similar idea appears in twentieth century art, but 
this .is a deliberate technique, not a half-developed 
concept. 
21:1. Holloway (1967) p.11. While these stages may be use-
ful for the analysis of spatial concepts, the aspects 
of the world children are interested in recording, 
and their technique, or lack of it, need also to 
be considered. 
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evidence. 25 
It appears that the techniques 0£ ar-t'ists and cra£tsmen 
£or the representation 0£ distance and the correction 0£ 
illusion appear in the £i£th century BC., in the construction 
; 0£ buildings like the Parthenon26 and the construction 
and use 0£ scenery in the Greek theatre. 27 The techniques 
of £oreshortening and 'aerial perspective• (the gradual 
diminution of intensity 0£ coloUJ:~ with distance) were 
apparent in the wall-paintings 0£ Pompeii. 28 The Renaissance 
artists had to rediscover these techniques, and the earlier 
attempts 0£ the use 0£ colour tones and the use 0£ 'Vertical 
perspective• (parallel lines in nature meet on a verticalline 
in the centre 0£ the picture) in Duccio and Giotto are quite 
striking in contrast with their Medieval precursors. 
Ghilberti's doors to the Baptistry in Florence at the end 
0£ the £ourteenth century show how depth was also attempted 
by building the relie£ up in layers. 
Brunelleschi is considered to be the £ounder 0£ the 
system called '£ocussed perspective' (all lines parallel 
in nature meet on a vanishing point on the horizon line), 
and Ucello is obviously £ascinated by this technique. 29 
Alberti's book gathers the techniques together and shows 
why it is necessary £or a painter to know geometry.JO 
25. The history 0£ visual realism in art is not only about 
the theory 0£ perspective in Medieval and Renaissance 
periods. 
26. Fletcher (1961) p.95 
27. Nicoll ( 1966) p. "· 
28. First century A.D. 
,29. The £amous 'Rout 0£ San Romano' and his drawing 'Study 




After writing on geometry, De Corporibus Regularibus 
(1487) Della Francesca produced a book on perspective 
De Prospettiva Pingendi (1470-1490), and his paintings 
are brilliant examples of the application of the new 
- 31 perspective techniques. Other artists of the same period 
brought technique and experience together in a series of 
' 32 sensational applications of the new mathematical theory. 
Della Francesca's work contained practical procedures, 3J 
demonstrations and intuitive definitions which were to form 
the basis of Viator, De Artificial! Perspectiva, (1505) 
and the first work in northern Europe: Durer's Underwey-
sung der Messung mid dem Zyrkel und Rychtscheyd (152S), 
to help artists with perspective. Durer's work contains a 
statement of the theory behind the known techniques, and 
it is fairly certain that he gained the ~uclidean concept 
of the visual cone from a journey to Italy in about 1506. 34 
A series of famous woodcuts demonstrate some of the practical 
techniques available.35 
31. For example 'Flagellation' and 'Architectural View 
of a City.' 
:;2. For. example, Boticelli, Leonardo, Micaela~gelo, Raphael. 
33. Here appears for the first time the remarkably simple 
'distance point' or 'tiers points' construction for 
obtaining a true perspective based on the properties 
of similar triangles. 
Sit. Panofsky (1956) 
35. Kurth (1946). 
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By about 1635, we have the perspective techniques well 
enough known to be applied to ~tage scenery by Inigo J.ones36 
but it seems that the particular problem here is one 0£ 
moving actors against a perspective painted background 
the reciprocity oC size and distance. 37 Dubreuil's 
Perspective Practique (1649) seems to be the de£initive 
work on the application oC these ~echniques in the theatre 
oC this period. 
By this time, a series oC theorems on perspective 
drawing had been developed which are little changed in the 
text books oC today.38 
Desargues' 'Brouillon Projet' .oC 1639 appears to be a 
development oC an earlier pamphlet on perspective 0£ 1636, 
and is usual1y considered to be the beginning 0£ projective 
geometry as such. 39 It was, however, intended to be oC use 
36. The designs Cor 'Florimene' in Nicoll ( 19b6)p.ro7, 
37. Gibson (1965) Cig.3 p.66 
38. For example see Kline (1972) (231-236) 
39. G. Desargues 'Exemple de l'une des manieres universelles 
du S.G.D.L. t~uchant la practique de la perspective 
sans employer aucun tiers point, de distance n'y 
d'autre nature, qui soit hors du champ de l'ouvrage.' 
Paris, 1636. This practical pamphlet was followed 
by the 'Brouillon Projet d'une attiente aux euenemens 
des rencontres d'un cone avec un plan.' 
Paris 1639. 
' ( 
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to artists and to this end employed a 'non-mathematical' 
language invented by Desargues which unfortunately faiied 
to catch on, in spite of his energetic lectures and demon-
40 strations and a popularisation in 1648 by his pupil Bosse. 
About the same time Pascal in two works was also 
developing the techniques of pr~jection and section seen 
in Durer into a mathematical analysis of conic sections. 41 
These works were lost, and the sudden development of 
projective geometry in the nineteenth century began with 
the re-discovery of a work by la Hire, Sectiones Conicae 
(1685), which contains most of the familiar properties of 
conic sections synthetically proved and systematically 
established. Here also we find the first focus-distance 
definitions of conics, in contrast to the appolonian 
definitions as sections 0£ cone. 
The main responsibility £or the revival of projective 
geometry lies with Poncelet in Traite des proprietes 
proJectives des figures (1822) in which he produces the 
general formulation of the pole-polar transformation, and 
40. Bosse, A. 'Maniere universelle de M. Desargues pour 
pratiquer la perspective• Paris 1648. 
41. The first, about 1639, was seen by Leibniz but lost 
some time after 1676. The second '~ssai Pour les 
Coniques' was lost and not rediscovered until 1779 
see Oeuyres t, 1908, (243-260). The contrast between 
the approaches of Pascal and Desargues is quite 
striking. Desargues appears mainly interested in 
practical applications, Pascal on the development ot 
new geometrical llethods. 
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42 in a later paper, uses the 'method of reciprocal polars' 
as a transformation to establish new theorems. 
The first significant difference between the mathe-
matical theory of perspective and the projective geometry 
of Desargues is the introduction by Desargues of a convention 
of points and lines at infinity, (para1lel lines meet at 
infinity, 43 and lines paral1el in different directions 
meet on a line at infinity), which is an extension of the 
perspective idea that parallel lines meet at vanishing 
points on the porizon, enab1in.g parallel planes to meet 
at a line at infinity. Thus Desargues was able to state 
a basic theorem of projective geometry which still bears 
his name. 
The fundamental problem of projective geometry lies 
in the investigation of properties of figures which are 
constant under the projective transformation. None of the 
usual euclidean invariants (length, area, congruence, 
similarity) apply, and in this investigation Desargues 
appears to be the first to hit upon the important invariant 
of cross-~atio. Cross-ratio was known to Pappus and his 
work contains the theorem that a cross-ratio is tbe same 
for every transversal cutting line emanating from a given 
point, where all the transversals pass through the same 
point on one of the given lines. 44 
42. Poncelet, J.V. 'Memoire sur la tbeorie generale des 
polaires reciproques'. Jour.fur.Math 4,1829, (1-71). 
43. Parallel lines meeting at infinity and the principle 
ot continuity appear in Kepler's 1 Geometricae Pars 
Optica' of 1604. See Kline (1972) p.290 
44. Book VIl, prop.129. See Kline (1972)p.127. 
It seems fairly obvious that Desargues' knowledge. 
of Pappus, together with his idea ot points and lines at 
infinity together produced the important realisation that 
cross-ratios were the property 0£ figures that were preserved 
under the projective transformations. 
In fact Book VII of Pappus contains a number of ideas 
known in the seventeenth century (•complete• quadrilaterals, 
harmonic sets of points) which were applied only to Euclidean 
space, but which were found to adapt usefully and powerfully 
to the new geometry. Moat of this application however, had 
to wait until the nineteenth century. 
Thus the second difference between the theory of 
perspective and the new geometry was the important idea 
of invariance under a transformation. 
For a number of reasons the analytic ge'ometry of Descartes 
greatly overshadowed Desargues' work, 45 but the idea of 
transformation seems to have come through. 46 
:vith the revival of synthetic geometry in the nineteenth 
century we find the following four ideas emerging as power-
ful principles whose application was responsible not only 
45. Descartes 'La Geometrie' (1637) was an appendix to the 
major philosophical work 'Discours de la Methode•. 
Not only was the general context more powerful, and 
the manner of its presentation more persuasive, 
Cartesian geometry provided a powerful tool for the 
development ot infinit•simal methods into the calculus. 
46. The •trans:Cormation 0£ axes' found in Fermat's coordinate 
geometry could equally well be a source ot this idea. 
See Boyer (1968) (380-381)~ 
- j 
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for advances in geometry, but also in other branches of 
mathematics. 
1. Transformation 
The simple idea that the same figure looks differ~nt 
when viewed from different directions motivated not 
only the investigation of projective transformations, 
but also other kinds of transformation, even more 
general. 
2. Invariance. 
Having applied a transformation to a figure, what can 
one say about the new figure in relation to the old ? 
dhat remains constant ? Cross-ratio was the first 
invariant discovered, but as the nineteenth century 
progressed, the investigation of invariants of trans-
formations became a particular branch of mathematics, 
apart from its geometric origins. 47 
3. Continuity 
The principle of continuity was known and used much 
48 
earlier 
• ·• i, L .l. 1>l ., , but in its 
application by Poncelet49 as an instrument for the 
47. Later in the nineteenth century this evolved into 
invariant theory. 
48. Kepler, see note 43 above. Leibniz also believed that 
infinitesimal changes do not alter the geometric 
properties of figures, and Pascal's 1640 has this as 
a basic method. 
49 ., Poncel.et {.ct82-a) • 
discovery of 1utw theorem$ 111otivated much· discussion 
between the geQmeters and the analysts concerning the 
validity of the principle. 50 Poncelet introduced the 
idea of geometric continuity as a dynamic principle -
if one can make a statement about a figure and then 
apply a transformation, since it is essentially the 
same figure, then a similar statement applies about 
the new situation. This led to the idea of points 
and lines becoming imaginary at infinity, and was used 
as a powerful heuristic principle in the establishment 
_of new theorems. 
4. Duality 
Poncelet's 'method of reciprocal polars' led to the 
establishment of another principle which was used to 
establish a large number of new theorems. It had 
been observed that the replacement of the word 'point• 
by 'line' and 'line' by 'point' in projective geometry 
theorems produced other theorems which not only made 
sense, but could be proved to be true. Brianchon 
founa the dual to Pascal's theorem in this way. Other 
ideas like point curve (the curve as locus of a moving 
point) and line curve (the curve as the result of 
intersecting tangents) arise from this reciprocal 
relation. 
Gergonne appears to have been the first to state 
duality as a general principle applicable to all theorems 
50. The discussion was mainly about whether the 'principle 
of continuity' was a fact or just a heuristic principle, 
and lasted well into the nineteenth century. 
involving non.;..metric properties, i'ntroducing the terai" 
duality to denote the relation between the original ·and' 
the new theorem.5 1 
Like continuity, the principle of duality continued 
to be used as a device to suggest new theorems, and 
standard works of the late nineteenth century continue to 
use the side by side layout of proofs originated by Gergonne. 52 
These four principles became the motivating factors 
behind much of nineteenth century mathematics, and continue 
in their contemporary versions, to be of importance today. 
To have some idea of the origins of these ideas and access 
to material on this particular phase of the development 
of mathematics could be of enormous pedagogical use today. 
Not only do we have a wide range of experience open to 
mathematical investigation from the point of view oC the 
origins of these ideas in children, but also a large number 
of potential problem-situations for classroom exploitation 
at all levels. 53 
From the historical point of view, the development of 
51. Gergonne, J.D. Ann de Math.16, 1825-26 (209-231) 
52. Cremona (1885). 
53. For example, ~lementary Science Study (McGraw-Hill, 
1963). 'Light and Shadows' gives many examples of 
projective explorations Cor primary children, and 
the common techniques of projection and section and 
engineering drawing are available for older chil.dren. 
projective geometry Crom euclidean space54 is an example 
oC a powerful generalisation. Applying the Cour principles 
above, mathematicians later demonstrated that a non-
metric axiomatic projective ·geometry was possible, thus 
showing projective concepts to be logically more fundamental 
than euclidean. 55 This search Cor the 'essentials oC 
space' led to the statement by Russe11 5' that projective 
geometry was in a sense a property oC the mind whereby 
it received and organised perceptions oC space. 
With this, the wheel turned Cull circle. Russell, 
as we now know, was overconfident in his claims, but at this 
point we see logically, mathematically and philosophically 
established the ideas that the renaissance artists set out 
to investigate. The teacher with access to this knowledge 
is in a powerful position, Cor not only is he able to judge 
54. There is no definite evidence so Car that projective 
geometry grew directly out oC the theory oC perspective. 
Circumstantial evidence suggests that the key figures 
Kepler, Desargues and Pascal made strong conceptual . 
links with perspective techniques. There is still 
much debate about this point. 
55. This was due mainly to Von Standt's 'Geometry oC 
Position' (1847) and Steiner's 'Systematic Development 
oC the Dependence oC Geometric Forms on One Another.'(1832) 
56. Russell (1897) makes interesting reading. Kline's 
foreword to the Dover edition oC 1956 is a useful 
precis. 
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the relative importance, both logically and psychologically, 
of certain mathematical concepts' but is also i •bi.•,;,, .. ~ ,. ' 
to make critical assessments of theories of learning that 
use these concepts in their formulation. 
d) Calculus: Metaphysics and Practice 
1. Some Fundamental Ideas 
Literature on the origins of the calculus is 
extensive. No single invention in mathematics has yet 
contributed so much to both theory and applications, so 
it is no wonder that so many mathematicians, educators, 
historians and philosophers have given their attention to 
the conceptual and technical problems surrounding its 
development. This discussion uses aspects of the calculus 
as an example of the way in which we might apply some of 
the models for teaching of Sect.3. 
This is not the place to embark on yet another detailed 
analysis of the motivations and concepts of Newton and 
Leibniz, but from the literature available, we are now 
able to abs~ract a fair summary of the vital schemata 
in use in the seventeenth and eighteenth centur.y. 
It is possible to consider these schemata under two 
broad headings: technical and philosophical. More parti-
cularly, one might distinguish here two types of mathe-
matical procedure: on the one hand we have that allowed 
for discovery; the procedures of the working mathematician, 
often appearing non-rigorous and even artful, and on the 
other that required to secure the foundations and to 
supply acceptable mathematical proof. 
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We know that one o'£ the major aims of both the 
inventors of the calculus was to obtain fro• the 'inverse 
method of tangents' algorithms and tables of tangents 
and quadratures that would both survey and help to classify 
the large number of problems now within possible solution; 
part of their correspondence indicated their joint desire 
1 for the completion of such a program. 
The methods employed were different. Newton's •conjunction 
of calculus with analytic geometry ~ expansions into 
2 infinite series', forms the core o'£ his method, and his 
particular use of infinitesimals, fluxions and prime and 
ultimate ratios are not successive attempts at more rigorous 
presentations, but can each be shown to have a particular 
and important role in his total scheme. 3 
Leibniz seems not to have attempted a variety of 
apparently different approaches, but to have used his 
'differentials' as a development of the infinitesimal 
technique in a context where the parameters describing a 
curve could be selected from a large number of variables: 
axia1 co-ordinates, arc length, radius of curvature, 
. 
area, etc., and where, unlike present practice, the 
normally accepted partitions of the variablas were not 
4 always equal. \'fhile Leibniz was concerned both with the 
developii1ent of the algorithms and with the problems of 
proof, it appears his immediate successors, having such a 
powerful technique at their command, paid more attention 
Scriba (1962). 
Whi tesi.de (197'2')' 
Kttche'r,' (1973)'. 
Boa,' (i914). See esp. p~4-8. 
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to the development of the technique and its application to 
a range of bi therto d·ifficul t, insoluble and even. undreamed 
of problems, employing a heuristic of differentials which 
is much more complex than previously imagined.5 
For both Newton and Leibniz, the calculus was a 
technique for classification and analysis of geometrical 
problems, and it is important to note that curves were 
not considered as functions x y(x) where x is the independent 
variable. 
The concept of function as a mapping, and the convention 
of a rectangu~ar co-ordinate system, was generally absent 
until well into the eighteenth century. A curve was conceived 
as embodying a set of relationships between variable geo-
metrical quantities, any one of which could be chosen as 
independent and which determines all the others by nature 
of their particular relationships described in a formula 
or equation. In the consideration of practical problems a 
commonly accepted underlying assumption was that curves 
6 were generated by motions of objects in time, and the 
name 'fluxi6ns' that Newton gave to his technique derives 
directly from such a background. 
5. op.cit. (53-64) Leibniz' own appreciation of the 
problems indicates a very clear distinction between 
the existence of infinitesimals, and their application 
to the solution of problems. He saw the calculus as 
a shorthand for the traditional proofs by exhaustion, 
and his proofs of the rules of the calculus were based 
on a •law oC continuity'. 
61~1 The "Brachistarone 1' problem is typical, posed by 
John Bernoulli: in 1696• 
)-
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Thus th~ kind of concern later shown for problems of 
continuity were mainly motivated by a redefinition of 'curve' 
in the dynamic sense, as 'function• in the analytic sense. 
For the exponents of the calculus in the seventeenthand 
early ei~hteenth century, there were no discontinous 
curves.
7 
The development of the function concept has been 
discussed elsewhere; 8/ 9/lO suffice it to say that the 
change from proportional or dynamical definition, through 
equation to functional definition of curves is both a 
consequence of, and a motivation for, many practical and 
theoretical problems of the calculus. 
11 It has been carefully argued that Newton's calculus 
operated on two levels, a heuristic technique for the 
discovery of solutions ~o p~oblems, and a rigorous procedure 
for the justi£ication of the technique in terms of the 
'method of the ancients•. The analytical method of the 
Ancients was a common heritage for both Newton and Leibniz, 
who searched £or a way of presenting their discoveries so 
that they would be acceptable to the mathematical community. 12 
7. The infinitely diminishing cycloid of a bouncing ball, 
£or example was in this sense, no less continuous than 
the geometrical construction 0£ a parabola. Of course, 
broken curves were known and discussed, but these 
•monsters' were generally barred from the calculus at 
this time. 
8. Boyer (1946) 
9. Boyer (1956)· 
10. Grattan-Guinness, (1970) 
11. Kitcher (1973) The following substantially represents 
Kitcber•s views~ 
12. Famous precursors, Barrow & Huygens were strong in their 
belief that the developing art should be firmly founded 
on the geometry of Euclid and the algebra 0£ Vieta. 
207 
The method of fluaons was a heuristic technique 
reclassifying the large number of problems to be tackled 
and reducing them to a set of fundamental problems which 
could be resolved in kinematical terms. Tangents and 
curvat~res could be obtained by finding 'fluxions•, and 
quadratures by finding the 'length of space described'. 
Infinitesimals were used as a justification for the 
fluxional processes with the implicit admission that they 
were applied intuitively, and within the tradition of the 
'demonstration•, which was the use of an intermediate and 
commonly accepted device that explained algebraic practice 
and suggested further development. 
It is clear from the repetitive nature of Newton's 
papers that he was involved in a search for a method of 
pres~ntation of his new analysis so that it was both 
general and precise, and the height of his achievement 
became the method of prime and ultimate ratios conceived 
as a synthetic proof-method of the analytical theorems in 
the tradition of the ancients. He showed that all justi-
fications using infinitesimals could be replaced by proofs 
using ultimate ratios. It has been claimed that in this 
achievement Newton almost produced a theory of limits. 13 
Thus: fluxions are the general framework for applicable 
technique and problem classification: infinitesimals 
provide intermediate justification and immediate reassurance, 
the demonstrations often suggesting further developments: 
ultimate ratios provide the rigorous and more lengthy proofs. 
The suggestion that this is the case, and that each of 
these aspects has an important place in Newton's theory
14 
13. Kitcher (1973) p~34 note ,;. 
14. Kitcher op.cit. p • .34 
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corresponds with the common belief and experience of 
mathematicians in the way they work. Rigor is relative. 
The labels we use; justification, demonstration, proof and 
many others apply to the different levels of rigor we 
choose to work at. Any change in rigor must be motivated -
an increase in response to a challenge, a decrease in 
response to tradition, security or expediency. 
The inability of Berkeley to appreciate the range of 
subtlety is shown by his expectation that the mathematician 
should work at maximum rigor·at all times. 15 This is not 
to deny that his criticism was useful, for eighteenth 
century Znglish mathematics was swept by his challenge. 16 
Berkeley showed himself familiar with the work of L'Hopital 
and other continental mathematicians, and included their 
methods in his presentation. 
Differentials, as we have seen, are infinitely small 
variable geometric quantities, the relations between them 
defining a particular curve. Because of the absence of 
the concept.of function in the Leibnizian claculus, no 
. 
particular variable was considered as independent, upon 
which all the others depend, 17 and so in that calculus, 
the idea of derivative does not, and indeed could not, occur. 
Later the emergence of the function concept, the study of 
functions of more than one variable and the solution of 
15. Berkeley (1734.) See especially arts.1-4. A criticism 
of fluxions and infinitesimal techniques. 
16. Cajori,F. (1919). & 
17. Current convention makes an equi-partition of a 
horizontal axis the basis of the independent variabl.e. 
di£:ferential equations produced so many technical probJ:ems 
with higher order di££erentials, that mathematicians were 
compelled to adopt a convention that consistently designated 
an independent variable, and the derivative was £ormulated. 18 
Further practical and conceptual problems brought 
about the introduction by Euler 19 of differential coefficients. 
This means that the differential of a particular variable 
is supposed constant, and for every variable y, we can 
write dy = pdx where p is a finite variable called the 
defferential coefficient. 
The developing theory 0£ limits, as expounded by 
Euler, D'Alembert and others was the rigorous proof-technique 
applicable to all cases where, for the sake 0£ heuristic 
simplicity, differentials became infinitesimally small, 
and were required to disappear. 2° From hindsight, we know 
that the formulation of the limit concept in the eighteenth 
century allied to the clearer definition of function gave 
rise to the breakthrough in the mid-nineteenth century. 
The attempt of Lagrange to base all on power series and 
work at the extreme level of rigor failed, 21 and was 
18. Bos (1974) 
19. ~uler,L. Institutiones Calculi Differentialis, St. 
Petersburg 1755. Repr. in Opera Omnia ser.1. Vol.X. 
Leipzig-Berlin 1913. See especially ch.VI. 
20. ~arly assumptions that (a) two quantities were equal 
if they differed by an infinitesimal amount and (b) 
infinitesimals obeyed laws of ordinary arithmetic 
were inconsistent, but judiciously and selectively used. 
21. Lagrange,J.L. Theorie des £onctions analytiques •• 
Paris 1797. 
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balanced by that of' Cauchy who still worked with inf'ini-
tesimals while attempting to give rigorous proofs based 
22 on the developing limit concept. 
The inability of many later mathematicians to appreciate 
the problems and motivations 0£ the original inventors, 
combined with the spectacular success of the heuristic 
techniques and the complexity 0£ the technical problems 
so generated, showed the calculus 0£ the early nineteenth 
century in a great deal 0£ confusion. Too many things 
had changed for the old Corms of argument to be accepted 
any longer, the relative rigor happily allowed in the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century was now disturb-
ing (for while the heuristic produced results, the justi£i-
cations became increasingly tricky and less plausible), 
and the mathematical community was striving toward new 
£ormulations 0£ £undamental concepts, and a hope £or a new 
mode 0£ rigor was emerging. 
2. 3ome Nineteenth Century ~nglish Texts 
The con£usions 0£ the nineteenth century become 
' 
apparent wpen we look at some of the popular text books, 
£or here we see the edge 0£ research being directly trans-
mitted to the student as probably never be£ore or since. 
The century opens with Robert .:oodhouse' s attempt to 
22. Cauchy, A.L. Cours D'Analyse, Paris 1821: Leions sur 
, 
le calcul di££erentiel, Paris 1829. 
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introduce the differential notation into England23 adopting 
methods after the style of Lagrange, where the 'sound 
analytical principle of the calculus' were based on the 
multiplication of algebraic symbols. The resistance he 
encountered was strong, but he encouraged a group of young 
24 
men to follow Babbage; Herschel and Peacock produced an 
Snglish translation of the well-known text book of Lacroix2 5 
which again was in the Lagrange tradition. This is a 
23. ~oodhouse (1803). After a century of fluxional practice 
it had become clear that ~nglish mathematics was 
lagging due largely to the insistence on the use of 
this notation. This is an example of where notation 
inhibits development. Technical problems of writing 
and manipulating successive orders of fluxions became 
insurmountable. Joodhouse's attempt appears not to 
have been well received. 
24. The true relations between woodhouse and the Analytical 
Society are not clear. There appears to be no record 
of :ioodhouse ever being a member or attending meetings. 
~ 25. Lacroix,S.F. Trait~ elementaire du calcul different~el 
et du calcul integral. Paris 1802. Second ~dn. of 
1806, tr. as An ~lementary Treatise on the Differential 
and Integral Calculus. Cambridge 1816. First part: 
Differential Calculus. (Tr.Babbage.) Second part: 
Integral Calculus (Tr. Peacock.) The appendix of 
Lacroix on Differences and Series was replaced by 
an original treatise by Herschel on the same subject. 
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shortened version of' an earlier work, 26 and the translators 
mention that "••• he has substituted the method of' limits 
of' D1 Alembert, in the place of' the more correct and natural 
method of' Lagrange ••• n 27 Limit theory judged less rigorous 
here is used to demonstrate results which can be proved 
by the method of' differences and series. de are told that 
"The Differential Calculus, and that of' Differences, 
although forming two distinct branches of' analytical 
investigation, have still a very near relation to each other, 
and when the former is considered in the 'light in which 
Leibniz presented it, or as depending on the theory of' 
limits, it becomes a particular case of' the latter. 1128 
Herschel then demonstrates how Taylor's theorem arises and~ 
claims that ''••• the analytical theory of' the Differential 
Calculus no longer presents any difficulty, and accordingly 
we may perceive by this process in what manner this calculus 
results from that of' dif'f'erences. 1129 The modes of' operation 
are thus clearly separated: D'Alembert's limits for demon-
stration of' principles and justification of' working, and 
Lagrange'~ differences and series for the rigorous proof's. 
In this treatment we can see that a new concept of' 
function is being evolved, "In order to indicate that a 
quantity depends on one or several others, either by operations 
of' any kind, or by other relations, which it is impossible 
26. Lacroix,S.F. Trait' du calcul dif'f':rentiel et du calcul 
integral 3 vols. Paris {1797-1800). Probably in 
collaboration with Lagrange, see note 21 above. 
27. Lacroix (1816) Advertisement p.(iii). 
28. op.cit. (539-540) 
29. op.cit. p.541 
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to assign algebraically• but whose existence is determined 
by cert.ain conditions, we call the first quantity a function 
of the others. 11 ,(underlining mine) 30 and that this idea is 
incorporated in the definition of the differential calculus 
as "••• the finding of the limit of the ratios of the 
simultaneous increments of a function, and of the variable 
on which it depends ••• in general the error arising from 
taking the differential (du) instead of the difference 
(u1 - u) will t: so much the less, the smaller we suppose 
. 31 
the increment of the variable to be." 
The kinematical and infinitesimal ideas referred to 
above(p.a:>6)are shown in a statement of the law of continuity, 
which itself defines the class of functions allowed in this 
analysis. ''It was in the course of enquiries relative to 
curve lines that geometers first arrived at the differential 
calculus, which has since been exhibited u.nder so many 
different points of view; but whatever may be the origin 
we assign to this calculus, it will always depend on an 
analytical fact antecedent to any hypothesis, ••• and this 
fact i~ precisely that property which all functions possess, 
of admitting a limit in the ratio between their inciements 
and that of the variable on which they depend. This limit, 
which is different for different functions, but constantly 
the same for the same function, and which is always independent 
of the absolute values of the increments themselves, character-
ises, in a peculiar manner, the course of the function in 
the different stages through which it may pass. In fact, 
the smaller the limits of the independent variable, the 
more nearly the successive values of the function approximate 
30. op. cit. p.1 
,1. op. cit. p.5 
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to each other; the more does the function also approximate 
to coincidence with th~ law of continuity; and the more 
nearly does the ratio of' its changes to that of the 
independent variable approximate to the limit assigned by 
the calculus. By the law of continuity is meant that which 
is observed in the description of lines by motion, and 
according to which the consecutive points of the same line 
succeed each other without any interval. The method of 
considering magnitude in analysis does not appear to admit 
of this law, s.ince we always suppose an interval between 
two consecutive values 0£ the same quantity; but the smaller 
this interval is, the more nearly we approach to the law 
of' continuity, with which the limit accurately agrees; it 
is also in virtue of this law that the increments, although 
evanescent, still preserve the ratio to which they have 
"32 gradually approached before they vanish. 
-,ihile the objects of analysis may be contin ous f'unctions 
these f'unctions may be implicit, def'ined by operations of' 
any kind, or by "other relations" impossible to describe 
algebraically.33 These ill-defined statements bring 
increased confusion later. 
It is of' particular interest that Lacroix and by 
implication the members of' the Analytical Society, were 
happy to show t.wo levels of' operating in this expository 
work; the intuitive discovery method of' limits, and the 
more rigorous proof' method of' differences and series. 
32. op.cit. (73-74). 
33. I assume this means the usual operations of' arithmetic 
+, -, x, -,~. ()n and algebra understood as generalised 
arithmetic. 
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Lardner's calculus text appeared next 34 and set out 
to be a simplified and shorter version pf his predecessors. 
He gives a brief description of the principles of Newton's 
fluxions, D'Alembert's limits and Lagrange's series, viewing 
tpem as successive improvements in rigor, and adopts the 
differential notation saying that "differentials" ••• are 
the same quantities as the "fluxions'' in the Newtonian 
method differing only in notation and name." He omits 
discussion of "Leibniz's infinitesimal method •• because •• 
it is inferior in rigor to the others. Its validity 
consists in a kind of compensation of errors." The differ-
ential notation is u~ed "•• in preference to that of the 
fluxional as well because it is generally received by the 
scientific world at present, as because of its superior 
simplicity and power. ,;e shall, however, use the principles 
of all the three methods as they may seem best suited to 
the subject of investigation." In a footnote he adds, ti 
'"iherever it can be used without too great complexity • • • 
••• I have preferred the method of Lagrange, as being most 
rigorous, a:nd free from metaphysical objections. 1135 The 
sub'tl.e distinctions of the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century faded, and while it may be believed by this text 
book writer that Lagrangian rigor is the ultimate, any 
method that seem~ 1 b~st suited• will do to solve the problem. 
There is no clear distinction here (like there was in the 
earlier theories) of the separate roles of fluxions, limits 
and series; indeed, the only distinction apparent is that 
fluxions and limits are somehow less legitimate or respect-
able than series. 
34. Lardner (1825). ~ 
35. op. cit. (5-6). 
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Lardner defines function thus: "~hen two var~able 
quantities enter the same investigatian, they are frequently 
so related that the variation of' •ither •ay be determined 
by that of' the other. In other words, a relation may 
subsist between them, such that any particular value being 
assigned to either, the corresponding value of' the other 
will be determined. In this case, either of' the variables 
is said to be a function of' the other •• ~ The character 
or :f(x) 
F or f' signifies a function, and F(x)lsignif'ies a function 
of' x, x being considered the variable. Thus, u = F(x) 
signifies that u is a function of' x. 11 36 This given, the 
object of the differential calculus is to "determine the 
rate of' the variati.on of' a function relatively to that of'. 
its variable."3
7 
Although this was a much more abstract 
definition of' function it was still strongly connected 
with geometric illustration. 38 Difficulties arise however, 
and amongst these we have a discussion and enumeration of' 
singular points; points of' inflexion, multiple points 
(two or more branches of a curve intersect), conjugate 
points (single isolated points), cusps and points of' 
osculation, all where the differential coefficient at some 
stage assumes the Corm 0 .39 -. 
0 
36. op.cit. (2-3) 
37. op.cit.p.3 
38. Lardner makes no reference to Fourier whose Th{orie 
analytique de la Chaleur appeared in 1822. 
39. Lardne_r. op .pit. ( 137-144). Here he investigates cases 
where the dif':ferential coeCCicient becomes zero. 
He puts 0 = !2 p.138 
0 
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I ' ." 
The technicalities of treating curves assumed continuous 
by the method of series throw up a large number of problems 
and demonstrate the inadequacies of Lagrange's approach. 
A further attempt at exposition of p~inciples of the 
calculu~ in a simple and clear manner was made by De Morgan 
4o 
whose work first appeared as a serialisation in 25 parts 
Crom 1836 to 1842 in the 'Library of Useful Knowledge'. 
From the start, the rejection of series is clear, and 
the concept of limits is reinstated. 
"The method of Lagrange, founded on a very defectiye 
demonstration of the poss~bility of expanding ~(x+h) in 
whole powers of h, had taken deep root in elementary works; 
it was the sacrifice of the clear and indubitable principle 
oC limits to a phantom, the idea that an algebra without 
limits was purer than one in which that notion was intro-
duced. But, independently of the idea of li~its being 
absolutely necessary even to the proper conception of a 
convergent series, it must have been obvious enough to 
Lagrange himself, that all application of the science to 
,. 
concrete milgnitude even. in his own system, required the 
theory of limits. 1141 
Basic principles are given in the second chapter 
entitled "On the General Theory of I<'unc tional Increments 
and DiCCerentiation 11 ~ 2 the first remarks being on function 
and continuity: "ifuen any function of x is given, we can 
determine by common algebra the value which the function 
receives when x receives any given value, say a, and also 
40. DeMorgan (1842) 
41. op. cit. preface (iv-v) 
42. op. cit. (44-65J. 
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the change of value which takes place when x becomes 
a + h, by which we merely mean when we pass from the 
consideration of the ·function a to that of the function a + ~11 4 3 
:vhen x = a, ~(x) may have two kinds of values, (i) n a ., 
finite calculable value positive or negative" or (ii) •• 
"one of the varieties of form which arises out of our 
supposition being followed by an absence of all magnitude, 
or O, in a place where the general form of the function 
would lead us to suppose there is some number or fraition 
to be operated on 
1 
ao (.!)o , (.!)o, 
0 0 




' a ' 
The second possibility is overcome by the principle of 
limits and the following definition. "The function is said 
to have the value A when x has the value a, either when the 
common arithmetical sense of these phrases applies, or when 
by making x sufficiently near to a, we can make the function 
as near as we please to A. In the first case A is simply 
called a value, or ordinary value, of the function: in the 
second case A is called a singular value. 114 5 
In order to explicate this definition, the following 
postulates are given: "Postulate 1 - if ~a be an ordinary 
value of ~x, then_h can always be taken so small that no 
singular value shall lie between ~a and~. (a+ h), t•at is, 
no singular value shall correspond to any value of x between 
x = a and x = a + h. 1146 He goes on: "The truth of this 
43. op. cit. p.44 
44. loc.cit. These could ar·iae Cor example from forms 
like ( 1 x)(1 - x) at 1. - x = 
45. loc.cit. 
46. op. cit. (44-45) 
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postulate is a matter of observation. We always find 
singular values separated by an infinite number of ordinary 
values... ~'ie have drawn the representation of a function 
below, so as to exhibit every variety of singular value, and 
more than the skill of the most practised algebraist would 
at present be able to find a function for. The stars mark 
the singular values, or rather the places at which there 
may possibly be a singular value; all other values are 
ordinary, however near the singular values they may approach 
in position. And we see that, however nearly a, the value 
of x may approach to b the value of x at one of the singular 
points, it must be possible to take a + h lying between 
a and b. 1147 
There follows a diagram (below) showing a bizarre 
function with maxima, minima, points of inflexion, cusps, 
multiple points and asymptotes. 
Fig.~1 De Morgan (1842)p. 45 
Thus, continuity is preserved in the neighbourhood of 
singular points. 
47. op. cit. p.45 
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"Postulate 2 - If' -a be any finite value of' fax, it is always 
possible to take h so small that ¢ (a + h) shall be as near 
to ¢a as we please, and that ¢x shall remain finite f'rom 
x = a to a + h, and always lie between ¢a and ¢(a + h) 
in magnitude. 
This again is part of' our experience of' algebraical 
functions. It is generally assumed under the Law of' 
Continuity • • • It is possible to imagine a function which 
does not observe this law, but we cannot, without further 
consideration of' singular values, f'ind the means of' expressing 
it algebraically. For i~stance, in the following figure, 
the function represented by ABCDEF is discontinuous at B 
and D. But we have no means of' expressing such a function 
in common algebra. ~e may call the law expressed in this 
postulate the law of' continuity of' value, to distinguish it 
from that of' the next postulate; and we may say that functions 
which do not obey this law, if' any, are discontinuous in 
48 value." 
0 
Fig. 4.2 De Morgan (1842) p.45 
And finally we have: 
"Postulate 3 - If' any function follow one law f'or every 
value of' x between x = a and x = a + h, however small h 
may be, it follow the same law throughout: that is, the 
48. op. cit. (45-46). 
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curves oC no two algebraical functions can entirely coincide 
with each other, Cor any arc, however small ••• This we may 
call the law of continuity oC Corm, or permanence of Corm. 
Exceptions to this law may be represented but cannot 
yet be algebraically formed. As in MNP~R, we may conceive 
. 
a function which is represented by an arc oC a circle joined 
to one of a parabola, which is itself joined to part of a 
straight line, and so on. Such a function would be called 
discontinuous in form, and though not now exhibited algeb-
raically, may actually occur in practice. Suppose, Cor 
instance, a spring oC the form :MNPtl.R Cixed at the end M, 
and disturbed at the other end. The number of its vibrations 
per second might become a subject of enqui:Jty. 11 4:9 
In thes~ few pages we have De Morgan laying bare the 
state oC the art as it was immediately prior to .. 'eierstrass. 
_.\ware of the conceptual breakthrough of Fourier, 50 where a 
curve may be drawn and an algebraic expression be found to 
describe it, we first oC all have an abstract deCinition 
of function as the mapping x ... ~x to include all the unusual 
situations' conceivable. Then, in order to deal with the 
ano•alous cases, it is necessary to make three postulates: 
' rostulate 1 covers limiting values of ¢x at sirigular points 
and guarantees continuity of the function in their neighbour-
hood; Postulate 2 guarantees the contin~ity of ordinary 
alge~raic functions, while Postulate 3 covers uniqueness 
and states that iC the values of two functions are equal, 
the functions are identical. 
4:9. op. cit. p.46 




The justification for these postulates is entirely 
intuitiv~, relying heavily on our "experience of algebraical 
functions", and it is upon these principles that all sub-
sequent justifications and proofs lie. Later in the century 
these ideas were to be re-cast into a more 'respectable' 
axiomatic form. 
For De Morgan, his main to61 is the process of differ-
entiation, or finding the differential coeCficients of 
functions, while the theory of limits forms the basis of 
his proof-method. He states that "the limit of iJ(x + Q)- iJx 
Q 
is called the differential coefficient of iJx with respect 
to x" and that "every function either has a finite di,ffer-
ential coefficient when x has the specific value a, or when 
it has a value, a + k where k may be as small as we please."5 1 
Thus every function is differentiable, but some are more 
differentiable than others, for there are the exceptions, 
the singular values that have to be dealt with separately. 52 
The enormous labour and lengthy discussion taken over these 
cases is a consequence of the lack of precision of the 
postulates and the inability to shed geometrical preconcept-
ions. 
De Morgan goes to great pains to explain his _procedures 
giving copious examples in some 850 pages of close print. 
I admire the perseverance of victorian students, for I marvel 
that anyone could digest such a bookt 
The last pre-Jeierstrassian text of significance is 
that of Todhunter53 whose book is considerably shorter than 
51. op. cit. p.48 
52. op. cit. ch.X(172-183) and Ch.XIV(374-388) 
53. Todhunter (1852). 
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De Morgan. While De Morgan exposed his innermost thoughts, 
his doubts and problems, Todhunter is quite uncompromising. 
It seems tnat by this stage the techniques of the calculus 
(or at least the strict proof-forms) have become so complex 
that they are no longer necessary or appropriate for the 
student. The definition of function, for example, is 
introduced by the notation y = ~(x) and further brief 
discussion distinguishes explicit and implicit functions 
in terms of algebraic formulae. ~xplicit functions are 
then classified as algebraical or transcendental, the former 
being obtained by the usual operations of arithmetic 
(including raising to powers and extraction of roots) 
while the latter are exponential, logarithmic or trigono-
metric functions. 
The notion of limit is given more emphasis and some 
theorems and numerical examples are introduced. However, 
there is little motivation. Bald statements like: 
x 
"Limit of (1 + 1) • The following theorem, which we x 
proceed to demonstrate, is very important. 1154 are typical 
of the tone of the book. The emphasis is on demonstration 
by example, and continues in this way to submerge conceptual 
difficulties and foundational problems in a display of 
technical mastery. The fundamentar ideas of function and 
limit are discussed in the short introductory chapter,55 
differentials appear much later as a shorthand for the 
usual notation of ~ 56 , and nowhere do we find the pains-
taking and revealing arguments of earlier writers. The 
54. op. cit. p.6 
55. op. cit. (1-15) 
56~ op. cit. (340-344) 
224 
Doctrine of Limits is the true foundat~on of the calculus 
and the student is required to persevere to understand 
this truth. 
Jifficulties are briefly acknowledged at the end of 
the introductory chapter where Todhunter remarks that the 
apparent lack of practical applications in the earlier part 
of the book may lead the student to' believe he has not 
correctly understood the elementary principles of the 
subject. nrt may, therefore, be of some service to assure 
him that the difficulty of which he complains is probably 
owing much more to the nature of the subject than to his 
own want of comprehension •• he must be satisfied at first 
with reflecting ~pon the meaning of the definitions, and 
examining whether the deductions drawn by the writer from 
those definitions are correct ••• we shall at first confine 
ourselves merely to the logicul exercis~ of tracing the 
consc ~iuences of certain definitions."57 
Talking of limits he admits that the student may have 
"a suspicion that the methods employed are only approxi-
mative, and therefore a doubt as to whether the results 
are absolutely true. •• In such a case all he can do is 
to fix his attention very carefully on some part of the 
subject as the theory of expansions for example, where 
specific important formulae are obtained. He must examine 
the demonstrations, and if he can find no flaw in them, he 
must allow that results ~bsolutely true and free from all 
approximation can be legitimately derived by the doctrine 
of limits. 1158 
57. op. cit. ( 1'1 - il!) 
58. op. cit. p.12 
Clearly, we have here the belief that ultimate rigor 
has been achieved in the theory of limits and that the 
student shoul.d learn to operate consistently and continua·11y 
at this level. 
3. The problem of relative rigor. 
Towards the end ot the nineteenth century calcul.us 
texts are beginning to contain elements ot the recent work 
ot~Weierstrass.59 This has obvious influence on a work 
such as Lamb's calculus, 00 publ.ished in the year ot 
Weierstrass's death. 
Here we find a definite attempt to simplify the 
presentation of the subject and to exercise the student in 
the kind ot mathematics most useful tor elementary appli-
cations in physics and engineering. Functions of a single 
variable only are the major concern, being defined when 
"one variable quantity is said to be a 'function' ot another 
when, other things remain the same; it the value ot the 
61 latter be fixed that of the former becomes determinate." 
The first chapter is headed: 'Continuity•, and firmly 
establishes t11e idea that the main stu.dy . concerns continuous 
Cunctioni~ the more awkward 'indeterminate Corms• being 
omitted. 




formulation ot the fundamental concepts ot analysis. 
See Smithies, ( 1975). 
. Lamb ( 1898) 
op. cit. p.12 
op.- eit.· p.vi. "The omissions referred to incl.ude the 
gedera1·thdory ot indeterminate forms. This is somewhat 
tediou• to establ.iah rigorously; a good deal ot it is 
very arti~icial; and, practically, the rules are not used 
by mathematicians who have recourse when the occasion 
arises, to more direct ioethod..s o~ evaluation." 
; ~ ~ ~ 
. ! I IJ ~ 
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The det'in.J.t-:f~iti;\.lf COD'finUOUS t'unction ia giTen thua: 
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"Let x and y ··i;i~'corresponding values ot' the independent 
variable!·"~zid it-< the' :f"unc;t:i':on/ · L•t · 'x' he any admiasible 
increment ~ s anct~:Y the·. corresponding increaent ot' ·y. 
zero, such that t:or all admi.ssibl.e values ot: J x which are 
less (in absolute value) tpan * th~ valu.e ot: I y will be 
less in absolute value than~ 1 the £unction is said to be 
'continuou;S' t'or the particular value x ot' the independent 
variable. 
Otherwi~e, 1.t .J§.(x) be the l'.~C::tion~ the det"ini tion ·, 
requires that it shall be possible to t'i~d a quantity • 
such that 
fSCx + h) - l'Cx) I < tr 
£or all. admissible values ot: h such that fhf < f.. The value 
of i will be in general limited by that ot:tr, but it is 
implied that the condition can always be satisfied by 
some value ot: E , however small. 4' may be.n 63 Discontinuous -. 
functions exist, but are only admitted insofar as they can . 
be applied ~o physical problems. The derived function, 
derivative or differential coefficient is defined as: 
-· (x) = lim 
h•o 
IHx + h) - gj(x) 
h 64 
and infinitesimals are variables which tend to ·a limitihg 
value of zero and are "equal when the limiting value ·of 
the ratio ot: one to the other is unity." 65 
63. op. cit •. ··p.16. 
64. op. cit. p.65 
65.. ~· :.,cdflt... ·•i; 
~ ,.,, .{~~· 
~i. -~~.. &t.lt .. · pi'd! 4ot9. {..,~:l· .. v; .tf.) 
;: -
:;.,,- ' : 
Ditf'erentia~~ ,,~t\~ 4f/lt YJl~O\~~;:t~.<?~. :-P..•r~ 
fx • -· (z), + ' tl7.,- 'r hcr• .. ata.) A 
.. 
so that as tr .. 0 it i• ..... nearl:y true that 
If. = '' (x) or f~ • ,;yx) J :s 
which is o£ten written 41 • ''(x) dx 
"The vanishing quantiti•• dX, dy are called'di££erential•'•"66 
The aia is to achi•V• a coherent presentation, "Consider-
able attention ha• been paid to the logic 0£ the subject •• 
It i• not claiaed that th• proo:t• ot :tundamental proposi.iou. 
..) ~ "'-.. ' .- : .. ..l L. p !. t ... !:,\ : ' .. "';" 
which are here ottered b•Te th• tor.al precision ot stateaent 
, \ ' 'ii ;~ el~i It,;.:' .} t9. l tl ..,. . ' 
which is de rigeur in tbt theory referred to; but it 18 
hoped that in substance th•Y will be tound to be correct. 
Occasionally, where a riaorou• proot ot a theore• in its 
Cull generality would b• 10DI or intricate, it has been 
£ound possible, by introd~oing some additional condition 
into the statement, to •implify the argument, without 
really impairing th• i>raotical value of the theorem. n67 
This presentation ••t the final Cashion that has 
predominated till th• pre11nt, the original motivations . 
largely concerning th• problems o:t continuity generated by 
the rede£inition ot tunction, have been submerged. 
To summarise, in th• 1ixteenth and seventeenth century 
there was a well ••tabli•h•d tradition 0£ proo£, founded 
in Euclidean geometry and th• algebra oC Vieta; the working 
mathematician used intiniteaimals (or indivisibles) as a 
shorthand method ot juatitieation, oC checking results, or 
! ~ . 
.. 
""1 ·•twi.." 1t:~ery tr·"'~"; fl. fr<.4 ~ tfret ~:ri.P<·i•'i<11•. 
' .... , ·~·" :·. 't'Ct~t~ .. (!l ., ... i b*1 •4 ~:l i.i1.~.,. .p.a.it1·y .. 




deilronstra't;ing precedurea.68 '?11ia also provided a heuristic 
tor the classit'ication an~ approach to problems. 
l1hen the 'Method ot Inverse ~angents' was established, 
the heuristic changed .• 'fluxions' and '·~ff'erentials • 
providing the re-classi:t~cation and suggesting new approaches. 
At this time the three levels ot working are distinct and 
generally accepted. 
During the eighteenth century be&ins the separation ot 
algebra and geometry, new contributions to the concept of' 
£'unction, and a host 0£ t•clu:lioal problems, :t'oundational.
1 
operational and in the choice and meaning of notation. 
On top of' this we have demands to make the new._;calculus 
respectable, so that it becomes as rigorous as other parts 
of' mathematics. 69 
The early nineteenth century shows a distinct lack of 
clarity as to which level to work at; this insecurity 
being a consequence of' the tact that there was no commonly 
-accepted proof'-process to stabilise the f'oundational aspect. 
Weierstrass's breakthrough occur• in the area· of proof-. 
process, the redefinitions of fundaaaental ideas s11ggesting 
ref'ormulations of' the technical processes; the demand for 
working at the level of' maximum rigor seemed to be :f'ulfilled. 
Today we know that this is not possible, we still have 
dif'f'iculties even in the 'elementary' calculus and the 
demand for maximum rigor seems unattainable. 
Much of' the time we are teaching, and even 'proving• 
theorems, we are working in Popper's tirst world (o:t' 
68. Thia wa• necessary on two counts: t> •• a ahertening o:t' 
the proot 1 tsel:t', and *I) a inc• the accepted :t'aabion was 
to prove e~ery resul.t :t'rom the :t'irat principles. 
69. The ultimate model. being Euclidean geoaetry. 
objects and probl•••situatio:ns) and his second world 
(ot beliet~•ystema, creatiTe processes and heuristic 
229 
devices). 
So long as w6 are abl~ to recognise the level·(or the 
world) we are working in, we can come to terms with the 
objects and devic~s used. It is no longer necessary to 
demand a high level ot rigor from a low level ot working. 
In tact, heuristic devices cannot be rigorous in this sense. 
even though their use may be quite legitimate.71 
70. See above, Section 3. 
71. We can make a case tor the rigorisation of heuristic 
devices; the 'rehabilitation' ot infinitesimals by 
Robin~on (1966) Ch.Xis an example. The appropriate-
ness and relevance of this to Leibniz's theory is 
discussed by Boa (1974) where he clearly shows that 
these infinitesimals are not the same entities. 







Teaching History ot Mathematics and teaching mathematics. 
As indicated earlier 1 there have been a large number 
of papers, reports and other articles advocating the study 
of the history of mathematics and outlining its pedagogical 
implications. The purpose of this section i•·to collect 
and summarise the reasons given, and to discuss t1r•*£ly 
the practical and p,edagogical implications of the teaching 
or use of the history of mathematics at different levels. 
a). Reports, Courses and Sources 
2 Apart from the more general pedagogical writings 
there have been a number of reports of official bodies on 
the teaching of mathematics, and on occasion, in this 
context, there has been mention of the history of mathe-
matics. Of those examined,3 very few make more than a 
passing mention that history can be •useful' or 'interesting'. 
In my opinion, the most signficant of these reports are 
4 the I.A.A.¥. Teaching of Mathematics of 1957; the Ministry 
of Bducatio:rr Teaching of Mathematics in Secondary Schools 
of 1958; the Mathematical Association Second Report on the 
Teaching of Mechanics in Schools of 1965, and the A.T.C.D.E. 
Teaching Mathematics of 1967. All of these reports not only 
claim a definite place for the h?-s.tory of mathematics in 
1. See above Section 1.p.f~ 
2. See above Section 1.p. :off· 
3. I refer to only those reports of organisation.a in Great 
Britain, like the numaroua reports of the Mathematical 
Aasociation. 
~. Incorporated Association ot Aasiatant Masters. 
schools and teachers coaraee, but make suggestions and 
provide illustrations 0£ the teaching a~d uae ot biatory, 
and also provide some guide to books £or teachers and 
pupils. 
In the I.A.A.M. report the general view is that 
mathematics is a fundamental part of human culture and a 
knowledge of the part mathematics has played in the progreaa 
0£ mankind is an essential part 0£ education. The history 
0£ mathematics "should be brought in appropriately at 
various stages 0£ the teaching ot mathematics as a part ot 
the subject as a whole·'°" Mention is made 01' the posaible 
advantage of considering the historical developme~t 0£ 
mathematical ideas "From the point oC view 0£ teaching ••• " 
though, apart £rom the reason already mentioned, it is not 
clear what else one hopes to gain, particu~arly since the 
"historical approach to a topic is not always the best 
one. 115 
Teachers need not be experts in the history of ma'.Ule-
matics, but "Much 0£ the history of mathematics can be 
taken casualiy as a natural part 0£ the instruction oC 
mathematics." A sample list of topics suggests the areas 
of mathematical history with which a teacher ought t,o be 
familiar. 
There follows a separate section on the Philosophy of 
Mathematics, which, while it does not necessarily advocate 
such an approach in the classroom, points to the underlying 
questions on the nature 0£ mathematics, mathematical proof, 
ai~i£ica11it events, develop•ent 01' techniques, and examinatiea 







of :toundation.s t_hat cer,tainl1. ha~~, relevance. ror the. teacher • I 6 
. - -.. ~ 
The fact that children can challenge .apparently .tirmiy , 
established belie.Cs with simple queations shouJ.d not really 
be surprising, and taachers should answer such questions aa 
.Crankl.y as possible, pointing out the interrelation o-.t 
various fields of mathematics, and showing that mathematics 
is still. a living and growing subject. 
The Ministry of Education report bas by far the 
longest chapter devoted to a conaideratiolll. 0£ the hi.story 
o.C mathematic•. The reaaona give.n for, attention to be paid 
to the historical development. of mathematics fall into two 
genera.1 areaa,1 
(i) Reasons directly related to pupila learning.f the cultural 
in.t'luence of mathematics and the social significance of 
mathematicians, .Crom astrologer to statistician; the fact 
that some mathematics has been discarded, and the reasons 
why this is so; the process of mathematical modelling and 
the checking of results from models by observation and 
experiment; t~e fact that principles and methods have been 
used to obtain results often long be:fore any analytic 
justification was available; the consideration of mistakes, 
paradoxes and controversies, and the insights given to 
pupils into individual mathematical creativity. 
(ii) Methodol.ogical reason.s: A teacher's knowledge of the 
history of mathematics gives continuity to a course, 
helping him to prevent ·teaching techniques in isolation or 
unrelated ~o :turther o~ later. development.a; knowledge of ' ... . ~ - ' 
6 .. · M..,-. ot' •. th••• id~~" canpot re~lly be ~eparated t ill H .. > ; ' -· • 
* 
1· n ! i ' 




"knowing the history makes it easier :tor the 'teacbe:i-, '.'..c;"·:: 
'so to teach that he creates the impression - the illusion, 
perhaps - that the pupil ia discovering £or bimselt what 
he is trying to teach him.• •• n 7 The greatest advantage ot 
a knowledge o:f' history 0£ mathematics is the realisation 
that mathematics is a branch o:f' human culture important in 
its own right, with links with social history, art; 
literature, philosophy, and so on. tl'i th thilJ ktiowle'dge· 
the teacher can go a long way towards ·dispelling the :tear 
of mathematics :text by so many pupils. 
These tvo sets o:f' reasons are, o:f' course, not entirely· 
mutually exclusive, but give a good idea 0£ the obvious 
~irst bene£its, and the more subtle advantages o:f' the use 
0£ history. 
The Second Report on the Teaching ot Mechanics-· ~ claims 
a definite place tor the history of mechanics. The intro-
duction says: "A knowledge of the history of the development 
ot mechanics is invaluable to the teacher •••He should 
realise tha~ interest lies not only in possible early 
. 
anticipation of modern concepts, but also in trying to 
understand why men much cleverer than himself' often took 
so long, and found it so difficult, to discover what seems 
obvious to him~ •• The wise teacher will stimulate interest 
from time to ti'-e by reference to earlier developments and 
their attendant difficulties, and be will encourage an 
attitude of humility in looking back on the pioneers from:_ 
-~D. a:ae Yhicll enJoya t"be ·:truition of their ideas. Perhaps 
t'li~ "tie At heip ihat clhr b~t · de~:tved t'rom 'a knowledge ot the 
(. '' f. 
. , , .... 
Min~stry o:f' Educatioa.-(.1.9.58~.p •. ttf . t. .• The quotation is 
h"o•·e.i.tiiaant;;ia :Matb.ematique, Paris 1898 • 
--i ~ ~: 
I 
' ;J ; 
1· 
~ 
history·ot th• subject is the use ot it to·bring out so•• 
. 
ot the tirat principles -in their earliest and simplest ~'. 
forms, so that pupils are encouraged to see the implications 
of these principles and the importance ot precision in the 
enunciation ot them."8 
A later chapter byU.R. Ravetz)gives an historical 
& 
sketch·ot so•e problems and methods in mechanics trom 
Aristotle to Newton. This also contains a bibliograph~ 
• 
wtiose contents are suf'ticient to provide stimulation over 
a wide range-of subjects, certainly thoroughly covering 
the tradi"tional" school syllabus on the subject. rn sketching 
the possibilities ot·stud:y af'ter Newton, Ravetz mentions 
several areas: celestial and theoretical mechan'ics, ··rational 
mechanics, applied and industrial mechanics, and text books, 
which served as a place for discussion ot the foundation• 
of mechanics. "From a study of these dif'f'erent traditions 
{and their interactions) we may come to illuminate pedagogical 
and conceptual problems in the elaborated structure of 
classical m~chanica.u 
It is clear from the inclusion ot this chapter that 
,, 
the authors think that it is the teacher's duty to increase 
his awareness ot bis subject, and that a good historical 
background helps hi• to appreciate the dif'ficulties, develop-
ment, and pedagogical implications of the study of mechanics. 
Thia view i• shared, in the wider context, by the 
authors ot a short section in the A.T.C.D.E. report, Teaching 
Mathematica. While commending tha._1ectures that might be 
~iven to •11.r"ich • llain cour••• tt •• thi• kind o~ approach 
cli.ir •~ar~ly it• eo .. iCNrwct atr adiJqua=te baala ·~or the 
l 
'I 
Pl'ope,io study ot tbe hist~ry o,f' mathematics. Indeed, any 
course.unsupported by study and investigation on the part 
0£ the.student can- contribute little to the student's 
understanding of' the d~velopment of mathematical concepts, 
techniques and proo~ structure, which is what the history 
ot ma·t~ematic~ is about. n 9 
It is clear from these reports that there are many 
advocates f'or the study of the history of' mathematics. 
We may.~e able to"judge the succea4 of these exhortations 
by looking brie:f'.ly at some examinations that laave been set 
a.t.dif'f'eren;t levels. In 1952, the new 0-level G.c.s. 
mathematics examination of London University had a 2~ 
hour paper on history of' mathematics. Candid•tes were 
asked to write one essay and answer four other questions. 
It is easy to criticise such an examination, and one has to 
be aware of the context and content of' secondary school 
mathematics about this time. &ven so, it is difficult to 
see how pupils might answer such questions as: "Describe 
how deductive geometry cu:-ose, and mention the partsc·pl.ayed 
10 hy some of' the men who developed it in its early stages." 
in the given time, without memorising teacher's dictated 
notes. Other questions like, 11Give an account of either 
the Greek g!:, the Egyptian number systems and the method of 
dealing witb!ractions·in the system you have chosen."11 
may look simp1er, but could be just as difficult to answer 
(lnder examination conditions. Late~, a. short Histor.y of 
9. ATCDE,.(1967) p.2'1 
10. LoAdon 0-leYel G.C.&. History 0£ Mathematica. 1952 
Question 2. 













Mathematics was pttbli.shect1a expressly to help pupils pa1fs 
this examination. 1'be book was 4iv1ded into short chapters 
(some of' only a couple ·ot pages) ·with •typical• examination 
questions interspersed. This examination appears to have 
been discontinued sometime after 195813 • Since the more 
serious pupils wo.uld have been doing •real' mathematics, 
the less able probably found the history quite dif'Cicult, 
and the number of' candidates did not justify its contiliuance. 14 
Advanced level examinations in mathematics are more 
' ' 
demanding o'f' both pupils and teachers time, and the 
inclusion ot a history question in the Cam6ridge pure· 
. 15 mathematics paper seems an anomaly. The effort required 
to give a reasonable answer to one question, resulted in 
that too, being discontinued. 
12. Freeburr (1958) which takes mathematics up to the 
seventeenth century. 
13. The University of' London Schools Examinations Department 
was onl' able to f'ind copies of' these papers from 
Autumn 1'52 to Autumn 1956. 
14. Aleo, Crom about 1958 onwards many teachers were devoting 
their energies to the development of' 'new maths' 
courses. 
15. It has been particularly difficult to trace any history 
of' mathematics examinations at Advanced level. This 
inf'ormation was obtained from G. Kelloway at the 
Dep~rtment of' Education at Cambr;idge. 
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History. of' .~a~h,em,a.~C.~;~ a .. ~eJ»ar~t,•.r i,1',b~~:t: ~'bthe: 
' 't.' 
school curriculUll seems. to l>e.. a n.on-st~r.te,r ~. ·u~~~ ,i;,.,~ons 
·cor this are clear: not oniy is a f'air matheaatical ba~k-
, ~ t ~- ~ - ~ .. • . " 
ground required f'or even the most elementary bis,torical 
' :· ~ ,., . ..... . ' ........ 
study, but time :i,:S at a. premium, and DJore obv~ously 
utilitarian mathematics gains precedence. Other f'actors 
include the sys.tem. which requires a timed examinatio11 
rather than a .long-term ess4y or project, 16 tb.e. gener~J.i ,~. ~ 
.lack of historica.1. Knowledge.. of' teachei-s.., and. r~ao~c.•a.t ,.,,t . 
at the right leTel for both tet?:c~~rs an~. pup:LU.t~" 
History of' mathe1'~tic.~ .•. ~ b~. su,c,ceat~u,J., .,ii\' •,~.,.R,.,~• 
as a background to- mathematical. cours~s, 17 ~4 in other 
more subtle ways, but in the f'orm des.cribed above is 
generally inappropriate. It may, bowevei", be possible to 
include history in some new examination syllabuses f'or 
18 
non-specialist sixth formers. 
For a long time educators of' teachers have recommended 
a knowledge of' history of mathematics as essential,. and 
examinations at the certificate, B.Ed., and postgraduate 
levels have c:ontained opportuni.ties to answer question.a or 
write essays both on history of' mathematics and the ua.es 
of' history in mathematical education. Unf'ortunately, 
apart from the institutions where there is a me~ber ~£. 
staCC who is particularly interested in history oC mathe-
matics, these studies tend to be rather limited, and the 
16. This latter is n4w becoming possible with selected topics 
in the £ramework 0£ exulinationa like the c.s._E~. ,~o,~ 3• 
Sea belo~ 9;21!0 b•~l~)"~d '~c2·5~:.:2.,.5'"i>t. ;, ~~ .. : · ,_-.# ~·,, .. ._, 17. 
....~pJ.19 ,:h" al4 ......... ( t'J-d..-.. J ~........ . ... \ 
For exaaple at the propoaed Ii .1......... , .. ,}--.: 
: ~ i·>~~·:i_'· . i. :·. 
1a.· 
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students ettor~s are sometimes quite trivial. 19 nThe - .. :: ""\ • · 
' . ~ ... " 
proper study o:f' the hi,s.tory f!t mathematics must always ~ 
-· 
involve constructive and creative endeavour on the par~ . _ 
of individual students and student groups. Studies in 
this :f'ield should generate imaginative insight and wilL 
require patience and persistence o:f' a high order in asking 
relevant questions, formulating problems, hunting :tor 
20 sources, analysing, classit'ying and interpreting material." 
Such a level of activity will not be possible without sta.t't 
who are aware of the enormous contri,butio1' historical 
' , . 
studies can make to the .pro:f'essionalism o:f' the teacher, 
and good library facilities; tor "it the history o:f' 
mathematics is to be studied seriously in a college then 
there must be at least as many history books on the shelves 
as there are textbooks on analysis or ~odern algebra or 
21 any other field of study." 
Fortunately, the resource situation. is improving. 
At college level the more recent histories of mathematics 
P.rovide goo~ coverage of most fields. 22 While some suggest 
topics for self-study or use in the classroom, 23 others 
21! integrate history with the study ot' a particular area. 
19. I quote my own and colleagues experience in examining 
many such students. 
20. ATCDE (1967) p.24 
21. ATCDE (1967) p.25 
22. For example Boyer (1968) Kline (1972) 
23. For exa111p~;Eves (19~'1.~ .~allerberg (l969) 
, .. 
24. For e~am}'l• Eves and N••som (1965) Greenberger ((t'973) 
. ' • j t ... ' • '-. 
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More specialist wo1" has appeared recently, 2 5 and biblio-
'"'- .. , ~ ... ., ~. -;,:-· .. ·' .<': .. h.,~ :..::. ,·:: _, .,\ .' --._ ....... ';' 26 
graphies help the investigator to locate books and materials. 
..... ,.. . 
I' : . 
Source books and reprints Of original works are more easily 
available 27 and more journals contain articles with historical 
28 background. Finally, the recent inception ot the Open 
University course in the history of mathematics has provided 
colleges with a range of films, tapes, books and course 
units that have yet to be fully exploited. 29 While the 
·~ { . 
resources are there, the major problem is one of cost. 
t• _..,. 
Books are expensive and even with present library allocations 
the propor.tion of money spent on books on the history of 
mathematics is quite small, unless for example, there 
happens to be a separate allocation to a department of 
history of science. 
If colleges in general find it difficult to provide 
adequate resources, schools are in a far worse position. 
Not only are books costly, but the majority are inappro-
pr~ate for school use, 30 and justifying the outlay on 
25. Novy (1973) and Menninger (1969) • . 
26. May (1973) and Rogers (1975) in particular are appro-
priate at this level. 
27. Struik (1969) and \lhiteside's editions of Newton for 
example'. 
28. Apart from those devoted to history ot: science and mathe-
matics more recent teachers journals like Int.J.Math. 
Educ. Sci. Technol and Mathematics in Schools are quite 
keen to publish historical material. 
29. The spon.sorship ot cheap paperback editions of Wilder (1968) 
Kline (1951t) Boyer (1968), Dedron and t'tard (197'1) and 
Popp (1975) ia most welcome. 
30. Histories like Boyer (1968)are usetul but the majority ot 
works already mentioned are suitable only £or the best 
sixth form pupils and tea~bers. 
j. 
2~0 
such ·material: la dit':ticul t iii tti4 t'ace of' csth•·r prior·ttiea. 
There i• a real: lack of' r•liable and appropriat• ut•ri:al. 
f'or use at school levei. 31 The hi•tory of' matbe•atica in 
schools can beat be ••rved, in my opinion, by producing 
materials like abort topic books containing relevant 
historical background; 32 tape/alide. programmes; collection.a 
0£ £acai•ilie documenta; 33 po•t•r• and portrait•;'~ and 
a f'ew cheap paperback book• on •elected subject• like the 
history of' •odern algebra, f'or example, that can be read 
by f'if'th and aixtb f'or•era. Writing f'or teachers ia al.so 
poaaible,35 and wbi1e aolie recent book• give much hi•torical. 
background a good history of' mathematical. education in 
31. While we •ay cite Dubbey (1910 ) and the tape/alide 
material.a shown in Rogers (1975) (supplement 1) a• good 
examples, there are a number 0£ trivial and inaccurate 
books around. See my review of' Morgan (1972) in 
Mathematics Teaching, 63, June 1973 p.77. 
32. For example Tabta ('' 69 ) 
33. 'Jackdaws• have produced a co11ection on 'Newton and 
Gravitation' (llod.") 
34. Uae£ul f'or initiating questions and discussion, they 
are notorioualy ephemeral and difficult to locate. 
35. Thia continues to flourish, as already mentioned in 
28 above. 
..,.A. ... '"'. ,) .,.; f 
<' 't ( ' •• 




Great Britain has yet'.'t'O b•·wri.tten:. These are:--tbe way• 
that background mater~al can be provided to show teachers 
and pupils that mathematics has a history, and that.its--
past is highly relevant to its present and f'uture. 
b) History oC Mathematics for Teachers 
lVhile it is relatively easy to write a syllabus £or 
a course containing what teachers ought to know, the reality 
is that both time and the student's energies are limitea. 
The purpose oC the f'ollowing outline theref'ore is to 
provide relevant background f'or teachers on the bistoric•l 
development oC some of the ma·jor areas ot mathematics which 
appear in current certificate and B.Ed. syllabuses.37 It 
is selective and not intended to be too detailed. Deeper 
individual study of' particular areas of' the history oC 
mathematics would be possible in coursework assigned at 
diCCerent stages in the programme. It is hoped that the 
outline below will : 
• 
1) Portray the evolution of' mathematical ideas as an 
. 
ongoing.human endeavour and a major part oC our culture; . 
~) Contribute to the teacher rs philosophical backgroun_d 
by providing dif'f'erent views on the nature of' mathe-
matics and mathematical activity; 
3) Provide pedagogical insights, motivations and examples 
Cor use in the classroom, 
i) Give some idea oC the causes and problems surrounding 
changes in mathematical. education • 
. ' 
37. I take as model the ai!J.labuses for theae examinations 
at the Uaiversity of' London. The mathematical content 
ia ta1rly typical oC aimilar courses throughout the 
country. 
~ -~. Such. a~ c.ourse" c~ be ·thought of. in two. sections, 
-· ~ • - ... ~ ·-· .,_, !;..... -~· - ... _ • • & - • - - J_. -- .... 
intended.to be independent of each other iC requireo. 
(i) Elementary: intended•Cor non-specialist primary and 
middle· school teachers; 
(ii) Advanced: intended Cor specialist teachers in middle 
and secondary schools. 
One would normally expect those taking the advanced 
course to have followed the elemtary course, but within· the 
courses themselves, there is little necessary order. In 
Cact, the· order oC the suggested topics is probably best 
dictat·ed by a• correspondence with other mathemat;Lcs• covered, 
either in the processional, or specialist context. 
Elementary Course. 
It is assumed here that the mathematical background oC 
students entering the elementary course is minimal.~ It is 
also expected that in general their attitudes towards mathe-
matics may be poor, through lack oC personal success oC 
understanding. 
The Collowing topics are suggested so that they comple-
ment a student's processional studies and contrast with . 
their probable recent school experience. 
Arithmetic; Notations and Computation 
Tally systems~ heiroglyphic, symbolic, hiudu-arabic 
notation; the origins oC counting and number-names; decimal 
and other counting systems; Cinger reckoning, the use of 
the abacus i elementary operati·ons and diCCerent methods in 
arithmetic; operations leading to unit Cractions. 
U-ae· can~ be; ·iaade here o~. aom& 0£ the ideas in Section 48. 
~. ,. ~ 
' .. ~ I "" ""' ,,- ... .r• ~ o1~ 
... - ... • .,.. 
t i ( " .. 
Geomet'i-y: P•»apective and·· the G•ometr1. of Position~·. 
From perception to•perspective, renaissance painti~g and the 
portrayal ~' reality; Euler and the bridges problem, 
connectivity and n•arness. 
· Some o~ the mAterial that can be used here is described 
in Section 4o. Euler's original abort paper is available 
in translation.38 
Measurement: The development 0£ common weights and measures. 
Motivations and problems in practical measurement; measures 
of value, time, length, area, volume, weight and mass; 
measures ot likelihood and the origins of probability •. 
Quite a lot of material is available £or example i·n 
Berriman ( 19 5'.}) and Zaslavsky ( 1973). Simple ideas of 
probability can be found in David ( 196~, and Rabinovi ta (.1973) 
describes a probabilistic method of making unequal shares 
'f'air•. 
Assessment of' such a course could be by project or 
essay. Collections of ideas and materials could be made 
for use in school. 
~ 
Advanced Courlie 
This course would normally require A-level mathematics 
or an equivalent standard. It is envisaged that this course 
would run in conjunction with a course of advanced mathe-
matics, either certificate or B.Ed. Students would norm~ily 
have followed the Elementary cours.e at some earlier stage. 
Thus the Elementa~y and Advanced courses might run in 
•' 
The following topics are suggested: 
(i) General: SGrYey of' the phaaea of •athematical. history. 
38. Newman ~.R. (Ed) (1960) (573-580) 
I 
j' 
The writing ot history; sources; in:formation storage 
and retrieval. 
(ii) Alcebra: 
a) The solution o:f equations and the dev4PlC?pment ot 
algebraic notation XV, XVI, XVII• centuriea. 
b) Complex numbers XVIII, XIX• centuries. 
c) The rise o:f uiomatias XIX, century 
This section shows the concurrent evolution o:f techniques 
and notation, and the application ot standard methods 
(in particular, the e~traction ot roots) in new 
situatio~ which gave ris• to new types ot numbers. 
The development of complex numbers and other generalised 
numbers gives a background to linear algebra, and the 
period o:f the algebraists Peacock to Peano shows the 
development o:f the axiomatic background. 
The Open University films: "The Great Art" and 
"Quaternioll8 - A Herald ot Modern Algebra" can be 
used here. 
(iii)Analysi.s: 
a) ProbJ.ems ot tangents, quadrature and rectification. 
b) Intinitesimal techniques in XVII; Newton's approxi-
mate soiution ot equations; Newton's versions o:f 
the caiculus; Berkeley's objections. 
c) Limit theory in XVIII, XIX; the beginnings ot point 
set topology. 
Note: This section is intended as a background to numerical 
methods, calculus and modern analys,J.e. 




.. ..... . ... 
(tv) Geometry 
a) Invention 0£ analytic geometry in XVII, Fermat and 
Descartes. 
b) Projective Geometry XVIII, XIX, centuriee. 
c) Non-Euclidean Geometry, XIX, century.. 
This section gives an account of the development of' a 
number 0£ important concepts, principles and methods in 
contemporary mathematics; trans£ormation, invariance, the 
principle 0£ continuity and the idea 0£ a mathematical 
model. It is also a good vehicle £or the study 0£ the 
development 0£ methods 0£ proof' and standards 0£ rigor. 
The section (b) £ollows on :Crom the elementary course 
geometry. Part (c) connects with the earlier advanced 
section on algebra (ii)(c) above, and demonstrates the 
breakthrough to postulational systems. 
(v) Mathematical &ducation 
a) Historical survey 0£ the reasons Cor teaching 
mathematics. Mathematics syllabuses and examinations. 
b) Movements in mathematics teaching; Ki"ein, Hilbert 
and the Gottingen school; teachers organisations, 
c) Evolution 0£ mathematical ideas; survey of' general 
trends in geometry and algebra; later developmen~s, 
\ 
e.g. statistics, £inite mathematics and operational 
research. 
This section represents aspects o:C mathematics and 
~athematics teaching developing as a result of a number of 
internal and external in£luences: di££erent philosophies 
0£ mathematics, socio-economic de•and• externa1 to •ath•-
matics, social events Within •athemati'ca (e.g. appoint•enta, 
meetings, friendships, animosi tiea ·etc.), 't•cbilol.ogical. 
developments (e.g.·f'a•t ca1culatora, library •Y•tema., etc.), 
poli tieal decisio11;s (e.g. e_ducation acts, financing of 
research, etc.). Much material for this section can be 
found in Griffiths and Howson (1975) and Frendenthal (1974). 
With regard to this list of topics, it will be observed 
that a number of areas which might be considered to be 
important both historically and mathematically have been 
omitted. For example, no mention has been made of Greek 
mathematics, observational astronomy, the problems of force 
and motion, navigation and map-making, Babylonian and 
Chinese mathematics, and the rise of Newtonian mechanics. 
This is not to deny their importance in the development 0£ 
elementary mathematics, but these areas are sufficiently 
documented in a more or less readily accessible form for 
them to provide a wide selection of problems and situations 
£or research on the part of the student. A number of 
assignments given to students following the advanced course 
could be taken from these areas. 
c) How ~ve can Learn from the History of Mathematics 
Any study· of the history of mathematics offers 
opportunities for the contemplation of the evolution of 
mathematical structures. (In pure mathematics the structures 
are presented as complete. They may be constructed during 
a lecture, or in a course of lessons, but there is in 
general no opportunity to discuss the evolution of structures. 
This sense of constant growth is important in the teaching 
of mathematics.) The evolution of mathematical structures 
involves the gradual widening of concepts and changes in 
attitudes concerning the purpose and nature of ••thematic•.· 
In investigating how a particu~ar problem ~as solved. or a 
•' .. . 
technique invented, we are involved in studying mathematical '·. 
n n ·??!. 
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inve:tition. ·The ·study of "pure· mathematics· provid4t••.~::_-G,, • 
opportunity for the participation in and diacu8sion·oc 
mathematical invention, but in the wider historical context, 
we have the possibility ot considering the solution ot·-
problems which are so deeply embedded in our mathematical 
culture as to be taken for granted, their solutions obvious 
even to the beginner in mathematics. By studying the 
activity involved in the solution of many of the proble111t1 
of elementary mathematics, we can generate attitudes toward 
the nature ot mathematics and the regard tor mathematical 
ideas. In a study of the history ot mathematics we also 
become involved in problems in the philosophy of mathematics, 
not necessarily as an end in itself, nor at a very technical 
level, but as an essential aspect of the understanding and 
explanation ot mathematical ideas. This dual involvement 
in the philosophy ot mathematics and the study of mathe-
matical activity leads to the area of mathematical episte-
molo~y, or how we come to know mathematical ideas, and the 
realisation ot the power and potential of the mind. Thi·s 
leads us on to the communication of mathematical ideas and 
their acceptance or rejection by society. This concerna 
not only society at large, but more immediately the mathe-
matical community of which the individual is a part. The 
status ot axioms and definitions, the methods ot proot, 
the techniques ot construction ot theories, the pertinent 
problems, become significant when we see them in the context 
where they originally appeared. 
By relating the parts of mathematics to the whole, by 
sugge8ting retrospective-deductive explanations ot the 
~ . 
...... . ... .. 
. . 
•· evolution of mathematical ideas, we become increasingly~~ 
. . 
' . 
aware of the nature and quality of mathematical thought, 
fl ·~ 
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and the kinds 0£ cond.ttiona that are likely ~·~ enc~urage it. 
Because mathematics is continually growing we need to 
revise and replace our explanations regularly. New 
explanations may become apparent, not necessarily through 
the discovery of new historical evidence, but perhaps 
through some change in the philosophy of the investigator. 
ile do not learn by vainly searching for laws of mathematical 
discovery,but by realising our explanations depend on the 
necessary fluidity of mathematical definitions. 
d) What we Learn £rom the History of Mathematics 
Many of the kinds of things we learn from the history 
of mathematics might be learnt from other sources within 
and without mathematics, and from the ways in which we are 
encouraged to learn mathematics in the first place. In 
particular, the area concerning the activity of mathematical 
invention can obviously be studied without reference to 
the history of mathematics. I would claim, however, that 
many of the following that might be encountered elsewhere 
have their most striking manifestation in the context of 
the history of mathematics. It would be futile to attempt 
a comprehensive list, but the following general areas are 
considered to be the most importanti 
i) The evolution of mathematical structures and the place 
of particular problems in their development. 
ii} The significance of some fundamental problems and the 
kind of mathematical philosophy involved in their 
attempted solutions. 
iii) The gradua1. changes in mathematical concepts and the 
breakthroughs connected with these changes. 
iv) The motivations surrounding particular problems. 
•. 
• t?' •.. , •• ··r ii 
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· v) The generation 0£ abstract mathematics f'rom physical 
L ~. t • j ! 
problems. 
vi) The nature of' mathematics as a mental activity and 
the necessary impermanence and uncertainty of' the 
theoretical structures. 
vii) Fashions in mathematics and the type 0£ problems 
involved: the kind of' mathematical activity produced 
as a result. 
viii)The communication of' mathematical ideas both within 
and without mathe~atics. 
ix) The evolution of mathematics as a body of knowledge 
and the levels at which mathematics exists in the 
culture. 
x) The relation of past mathematics to present mathematics 
and mathematical activity. 
xi) The evolution of heuristic and mathematical education. 
xii} The History of Mathematics as providing the data for 
curricul.um modification. 
The study of the history and philosophy of mathematics 
and mathematical activity itself brings us to the £ie1d of 
epistemology, the basis of pedagogy. 
e} Implications for Teaching 
It has never been denied that the history of mathematics 
forms a serious and fascinating study at research level, and 
that both postgraduate and undergraduate courses can demand 
a great deal, f'or a know1edge oC both mathematics and of 
l' l • I . ' ' 
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_history. is essential £or a balanced view. 39 
The major emphasis of the argument presented here · 
has been in the context of the training of teachers, and 
properly, this should be extended to the teachers of 
mathematics in the polytechnics and universities. For 
many of these, their reseorches lead them to examine 
previous work in their own field, and an essential 
preliminary to any research is a survey of similar problems 
' 
and the att~mpts at their solution. 
Wilder (1972) claims 
that a knowledge of history can suggest new problem-areas 
or show that a field is declining, and if this is the case 
we have a serious argument for the inclusion of history 
of mathematics in the training of researchers as well 
as teachers. Thus there is a fair case that some aquaint-
ance with the history of mathematics is a necessary part 
of the training of every mathematician, for many of the 
· d b l t b &' d · h d · · 40 reasons summarise e ow are o e LOUD in sue iscussions. 
39. Some requirements are quite deman~ing. For example, 
for postgraduate work Truesdell asks for ''••a fluent . 
reading knowledge of Latin, French and German; competence 1.L 
in 'lbathamatics e<pivalent' to a good bachelor's degree in 
it as taught by mathematicians; some study of rational 
mechanics as it is understood today; and a good general 
view of the political, social, literary and artistic 
history of the period in which the candidate would 
concentrate." See Historia Mathematica 2(2)1975 
( 192-i93j; 
• ' . '- ... ~ • .,. .... .. ""' ~ .. ...? .. ' ' \ t \ ~ 4 
4o. see Gratta:D.'-Gbiness ( 197-l} ·•· · .. 
~ i " ttrl 
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I:. 
l ~ '.• 
"· 
251 
While it waa stated at, the outset that manY. 0£ the • ... ... #:·· ·: ._ '. ~ - ' - ,. • -· 
aims wefmay have in our teaching 0£ mathematics have no 
necessary reliance on a teacher's knowledge 0£ history, 
it does seem that much the easiest and most £ruit~ul 
way 0£ presenting a large part 0£ mathematics is either 
against a background 0£ history, or in the context 0£ a 
historically based philosophy 0£ mathematics. Teaching 
mathematics with an historical perspective is not merely 
a~tempting to imitate in teaching one's interpretation 0£ 
a sequence 0£ historical discovery, neither is it assuming 
that a growing ch~ld is passing through the same mathe-
matical experiences as our ancestors; it is the constant 
awareness 0£ the continuing and dynamic dialectic by which 
mathematics evolves. 
The implications £or teaching are profound. The reasons 
£or the study and the use 0£ history 0£ mathematics £all 
into three main areas; philosophy, pedagogy and methodology. 
I. Philosophy: concerning the fundamental nature 0£ 
mathematics and mathematics in history. 
i) Understanding 0£ the natµre 0£ mathematics and 
0£ history aids the development 0£ critical philosophy 
from ideology. 
ii) Examination 0£ different areas 0£ mathematics in 
different periods emphasises the varying status 0£ a 
theory and its stages 0£ development. 
iii)Critical examination 0£ proofs and proof-structures 
assists our appreciation_ of the evolution of mathe-
matical concepts and develop• the d~alectic necessllr)" ' . .,,. -· '-. 
£or the practice ot ••'the•atics. 
i : 
.. ' n 
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II Pedagogy: Concerning the basia of the communication 0£ 
mathematics. 
i) Probing the logical and methodological difficulties 
at di£ferent atages in a theory enables us to make 
discoveries about the creative processes 0£ mathematicians. 
Such discoveries may be useful when we examine the 
creative processes of children. 
ii) Historical maturity enables us to criticise theories 
of teaching, many 0£ which are founded on historical 
interpretations. 
iii) Historical research enables us to suggest alter-
native forms of mathematics for inclusion in curricula. 
III Methodology: Concerning the more practical aspects of 
the teaching-learning situation. 
i) Critical examination of course structure from an 
historical viewpoint enables priorities to be decided 
and interrelationships made between topics. 
ii) Historical perspective ensures that attention is 
paid tp motivations and original problem-situations • 
. 
iii) History provides a fruitful source of connections 
with many other subject areas, and examples of the 
range and applications of mathematical models. 
iv) Knowledge of the evolution of mathematical concepts 
and proofs furnishes data for the construction of 
heuristic. 
v) Demonstration of developing mathematics increases 
its accessibility, promotes,interest and encourages a - .~'- -·' ... . .., r ': 
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